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ABSTRACT :,j 
_ This thesis is a political and diplomatic analysis of a . United· 
Nations special conference - the United Nations Conference on 
the Environment and Development (UNCED) which took place over 
a period of two and a half years from 1989 to 1992. It examines 
the process and substance of the UNCED negotiations as seen 
through the role played by Malaysia. It shows how Malaysia, a 
small, develo~ing country, strives to influence events at the 
Uni ted Nations. A number of issues have been selected as 
negotiation case-studies. They include forests, biological 
di versi ty, climate change and the cross-sectoral issues of 
finance and technology transfer. The thesis examines the motives 
of nation-states in resolving these environmental problems and 
analyses the unprecedented role of non state actors which took 
an active .part in the UNCED process. Finally, the thesis 
analyses the results of UNCED and attempts to predict its future 
as seen through the newly created Commission on Sustainable 
Development. 
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ABOUT THE THESIS 
The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992, was by far the 
largest special conference that the United Nations had ever 
held. It was attended by 116 Heads of State and Government, 172 
states, over 8,000 delegates, 9,000 members of the press and 
3,000 accredited representatives of the Non-governmental 
Organisations (NGO). This thesis is a political and diplomatic 
analysis of that special conference. It analyses the process and 
the substance of UNCED; examined through the role played by 
Malaysia. 
The thesis explains that while UNCED provided the 
international community with the platform on which global 
environmental problems could be addressed, its achievements fell 
short of the intended goals. It is an example of states moving 
from one conference to another, reiterating with noble and 
sometimes towering ambition, the intention of alleviating 
global environmental problems, but failing to translate them 
into action. This occurs because states, while agreeing to come 
to the negotiating table, are not prepared to transfer or 
relinquish their claims to national sovereignty. On the 
contrary, the UNCED deliberations and results demonstrated that 
states saw UNCED as a tool to pursue and secure whatever they 
regard as their national and economic interests. 
Thus, while extensive efforts were made in finding the 
solution to implement the UNCED decisions, different interests 
2 
and different priorities have since encouraged states to 
compromise in the name of consensus. UNCED has~resul ted in a set 
of bland agreements which serve merely the minimal interests of 
all participants. 
The thesis attempts to show that states still consider 
themselves as the only actor that matters on the international 
stage. In the pursuit of their national interests, states have 
fully capitalised on the intellectual resources afforded by the 
NGOs. While they welcomed the contributions offered by the NGOs, 
the latters' ideas were taken selectively to the extent that, 
at the end the form and content of the agreements negotiated all 
conformed to the governments' expectations, not the NGOs' . While 
Agenda 21 (the Programme of Action) referred to the new form of 
partnership with the NGOs, it was mere lip service as in reality 
governments, whether in the North or South, were equally 
unenthusiastic about the intended new form of collaboration. In 
. 
short, NGOs were accepted only in so far as they were useful to 
governments. It remains that in the affairs of multilateral 
negotiations at the UN, the state is still in charge. 
The thesis analyses the UN's institutional capacity to meet 
the challenges posed by UNCED. Over the years, the UN system 
has grown to the extent that is has become incapable of 
efficiently managing its own units. Coordination among its 
agencies has proved to be virtually impossible and with yet 
another institution in place, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), which is likely to turn into another 'talk 
fest' . 
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UNCED took place in a complex context of multilateral 
diplomacy and if many things were left "unsaid" at UNCED, this 
should not surprise anyone with the knowledge of the limitations 
of conference diplomacy. The answer to the problem lies in the 
willingness of the states in the international community to 
create a genuine partnership and trust to address the wider 
issues of inequality and the maldistribution of resources, which 
in fact are the major contributors to environmental problems. 
Finally, this thesis demonstrates how Malaysia, a small, 
developing country, can influence events such as UNCED. While 
the exercise was exhausting and the results minimal, Malaysia 
still considers it useful to engage in such multilateral 
negotiations. This dilemma however continues to haunt the poorer 
countries which can ill-afford to participate in such expensive 
and elaborate meetings , given their limited resources and 
expertise. 
SCOPE OF STUDY 
The thesis is divided into four areas of study. Chapter I covers 
the conceptual framework of UN special conferences. It discusses 
the actors, the decision-making process, the politics and the 
different paradigms around which the conferences evolve, with 
particular reference to the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972 and to UNCED, held 
twenty years later. The second part of the chapter traces the 
events leading to the adoption of the of the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 December, 1989, which 
provided the mandate to convene UNCED. 
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The second area of study, discussed in Chapter II, 
describes how Malaysia prepared itself for this special 
conference. It shows how national views are shaped and how 
strategies are devised to ensure that the positions taken are 
being understood on the home front before they are suggested to 
the world outside. The chapter goes on to describe the 
initiatives undertaken by Malaysia to mobilise the position of 
developing countries through regional conferences such as the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment, the Group of 
Fifteen (Summit-level Group of South-South Consultation and 
Cooperation), the Beijing Ministerial Conference of Developing 
Countries on the Environment and Development and the Kuala 
Lumpur Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on the 
Environment and Development. The final part touches on 
Malaysia's unsuccessful attempt to introduce the Malacca Straits 
pollution problems and the issue of Antarctica into the UNCED 
agenda. 
The third area of study is about the process and substance 
of the UNCED negotiations. This is described in Chapter III 
through a case study. Here, seven issues of particular 
importance to Malaysia and the developing countries have been 
selected. An assessment of Malaysia's role in each of these 
issue-negotiations provides an idea of how, small, developing 
states negotiate. The section on the elements and processes of 
the negotiation is inspired by the works of Gilbert Winham in 
his political analysis of the Tokyo Round and Kennedy Round 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
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The behaviour, conduct and performance of actors in 
resolving issues 'at the Summit' forms another area of study, 
which is discussed in Chapter IV. These aspects merit attention 
as delegates, due to time constraints, are pressured to arrive 
at an agreement in the final stages of the negotiations. As 
practitioners are not the only actors at the Summit, the role 
of Non-negotiating actors such as the Heads of State and 
Government, the media and the NGOs is also discussed in this 
chapter. Emphasis is placed on whether these non-negotiating 
actors made a substantial difference in influencing the results 
, 
of UNCED. Finally, the chapter outlines the outcome of the 
Summit. 
The thesis ends with an assessment in Chapter V, of UNCED 
as a special conference. It provides an appraisal of the role 
played by Malaysia at UNCED and speculates on what the future 
hOlds for UNCED, as seen through the mechanisms already put in 
place, in particular, the Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD). 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
UNCED provided its actors with a rich experience in multilateral 
negotiations. It afforded an enormous learning experience, 
especially for developing countries, on negotiating behaviour 
and on the diplomatic process of reaching agreement through 
coalition and consensus-building. The ability of negotiators to 
cope with the multitude of complex issues and to resolve them 
wi thin a time-frame of two and a half years contributed to 
6 
making this UN special conference a unique event which should 
be of interest to students of international organisations. 
Malaysia's participation at UNCED merits attention, given 
the active role it assumed throughout the two and a half-year 
process. Malaysia has been embarking on an active foreign policy 
since the early 1980s. Although a small and developing country, 
it has aspired to influence events at the multilateral level. 
For example, Malaysia jolted the position of the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP) at the 37th UN General 
Assembly when it proposed the application of the common heritage 
principle in the administration of Antarctica. The issue has 
since been kept alive annually at the UNGA. In 1983, Malaysia 
hosted an international conference on the Question of Palestine 
in Kuala Lumpur. In 1987, it participated actively in the 
International Conference on Drugs and Illicit Trafficking at 
Vienna in which its Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was 
elected as president of the conference. 1989 was an eventful 
year for Malaysia as far as multilateral relations were 
concerned: It hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) at Kuala Lumpur, was elected as member of the 
UN Security Council for the 1989/90 term and chaired the Group 
of 77 at the United Nations. In 1989, at the Non-aligned Summit 
held in Belgrade, the Malaysian Prime Minister, together with 
a group of leaders of the South, announced the creation of the 
South Commission in 1990 and the South-South Consultation and 
Cooperation Committee (or the Group of Fifteen). From that 
period onwards South-South cooperation became an important 
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aspect of Malaysia's foreign policy objectives, complementing 
its existing relations with the North. 
UNCED provided another occasion for Malaysia to assume an 
active role in the international arena. This thesis shows how 
Malaysia set out to influence events at this UN special 
conference in defence of its economic and national interests as 
well as in promoting its image abroad. 
An analysis of the UNCED diplomatic process and the role 
assumed by Malaysia in that process merits study. UNCED has made 
many sectors of the Malaysian population aware of the importance 
of protecting the environment. At the time of writing, a number 
of Malaysian scholars are also writing on the various aspects 
of environmental protection such as environmental impact 
assessment and other related fields including sustainable 
development, a concept popularised by UNCED. Together with these 
studies, it is hoped that the analysis of the international 
relations aspect of UNCED attempted in this thesis will prove 
useful and provide a comprehensive understanding of the subject 
to scholars and practitioners alike. 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a case study of a UN special conference. It 
describes, narrates, analyses and interprets UNCED and the role 
assumed by the players in a chronological and thematic manner. 
Each issue found in Chapter III stands alone, enabling the 
reader to understand the situation described in its own terms. 
Only at a later stage in the analysis, in Chapter V, is it 
a 
possible for the reader to compare and contrast cases as well 
as to see how they are linked to one another. 
The data collected for this thesis is based on primary 
sources and a literature review. The main source of reference 
is the official records of the United Nations pertaining to 
UNCED. Resolutions (both in their draft and final form), reports 
of experts meetings, reports of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committees (INCs) on the two Conventions signed at 
Rio, the aOO-page document of Agenda 21 and all agreements 
reached at Rio have been carefully scrutinised. In addition, 
speeches, intervention notes, media reports, and press 
interviews pertaining to UNCED provide useful information on 
the conference proceedings and discussions that took place. 
To understand the position of developing countries, reports 
of the regional meetings held prior to UNCED such as the ASEAN 
Ministerial meeting on the Environment, the Beijing Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment and the Second Ministerial 
Conference of Developing Countries held in Kuala Lumpur are 
important sources of reference. 
Information on Malaysia's participation and national 
Position are found in the intervention notes which now form part 
of the official UN documents, in the speeches made at the 
relevant meetings, seminar reports, the National Report as well 
as from interviews and media reports. The researcher's position 
as a participant in the UNCED process and as a member of the 
Malaysian negotiating team forms an important primary source of 
information. 
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Draft resolutions would form a basic source of reference 
if one were to understand fully the UNCED negotiating process. 
However, since the conference documentation reports only the 
formal decisions, usually as General Assembly and ECOSOC 
resolutions, it is difficult to know precisely which actors 
initiated a particular process. Corridor agreements, important 
as they may be in conference diplomacy, do not constitute formal 
deliberations, while official speeches do not always reflect the 
underlying negotiation strategies. Press releases, personal 
interviews and discussions with those who participated at the 
conference thus become useful. 
The study is strengthened by a chapter on the conceptual 
framework on UN special conferences which provides the 
foundation of the thesis. There is a growing literature on 
international organisations written by authors in the field such 
as Johan Kaufmann, Peter Willetts, Paul Taylor and A.J .R. Groom, 
to whom the chapter makes reference. On the area of substance, 
the writings of Stanley Johnson, Michael Grubb, Caroline Thomas, 
Marc Williams, Jacqueline Roddick, Richard Gardner, Gareth 
Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Richard Benedick, Hurrell and 
Kingsbury, Patricia Birnie, Wolfgang Sachs and Matthias Finger, 
to name a few, provide interesting analyses as well as important 
sources of information. Journals and periodicals such as the 
Third World Resurgence, Ecologists, Environment, lIED 
Perspectives, International Environmental Affairs and 
Environmental Politics also afforded useful and interesting 
observations. The Earth Summit Times, Terra Viva and Earth 
10 
Summit Bulletin gave a day-to-day account of what happened at 
the preparatory committee meetings and at Rio. 
On the aspect of negotiation behaviour and the process, the 
writings of Gilbert Winham, Roger Fisher, Fred Ikle, H.Raiffa, 
Knut Midgaard and Arild Underdal have been found to be very 
useful. Finally, journals such as Internation~l Organisation and 
World Politics regularly publish articles on multilateral 
negotiations. Here, the analytical assessment of Oran Young, 
William Zartman, Peter Haas and Susan Strange provided the 
researcher with a wider perspective. 
11 
CHAPTER ONE 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY AND UNCED 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a foundation for the 
thesis. Many elements make up what was commonly referred to as 
1 
"diplomacy by conference". Today,- contrary to what Sir Harold 
Nicolson predicted, conference diplomacy has become an integral 
part of the state's external activity which governments cannot 
afford to ignore. This chapter begins with an explanation of 
certain common concepts and elements of conference diplomacy, 
using the special United Nations conferences on the environment 
as an illustration. The second part of this chapter discusses 
the debate that sparked off the 1992 Rio Conference on the 
Environment and Development, commonly referred to as the 'Earth 
Summit' . 
THE CONVENING OF SPECIAL CONFERENCES 
The past twenty-five years have witnessed the unparalleled 
growth of special conferences initiated by the United Nations 
General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
The emergence of a new agenda of international issues has 
popularised the convening of such conferences. New discoveries 
brought about by the rapid change in science and technology have 
created a growing awareness about the problems confronting the 
world. Global problems such as nuclear proliferation, population 
1 
Sir Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, (UK: Home Uriiversity 
Library, 1963). 
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growth, pollution, food production, refugees and poverty, call 
for global solutions and provide the stage for a multilateral 
approach to diplomacy. Many of these problems so transcend 
national boundaries that states are not in· a position to resolve 
them bilaterally. A common international interest therefore 
imposes the need for international.cooperation. 
Before delving any further, it is necessary to provide a 
working definition of the term 'special conference', since it 
is no where envisaged in the UN Charter. Article 61 of the UN 
Charter merely states that the Economic and Social Council 'may 
call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United 
Nations, international conferences on matters falling wi thin its 
competence'. A.J.R. Groom argues that the essence of the matter 
is not therefore constitutional, legal or bureaucratic; it is 
political in the sense that if a sufficient degree of consensus 
on relevant values does not prevail, nothing effective can be 
done. And, in so far as special conferences are concerned, this 
means that its members should be convinced that self-interest 
2 
necessarily involves a modicum of community interest. 
Peter Willetts contends that although the UN has been 
conducting specialised conferences since its early years, the 
special conference first eme'rged as a major phenomenon in the 
1970s. Before t~at period, the United Nations could not be 
considered as a global organisation because one whole region, 
Africa, had very limited membership. In addition, the UN did not 
2 
A.J.R. Groom, 'Reflection on a Changing System', in 
Global issues in the UN Framework, ed. by Paul Taylor and 
A.J.R. Groom, (New York: St. Martin Press,1989). 
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approach universal coverage of the world's population until the 
/ 
Beijing government took the Chinese seat at the UN in 1971. 
The conference is 'special' because it deals with a specific 
range of questions. It is limited to one issue-area and is 
convened on an ad hoc basis, rather than part of the regular 
work of the UN. To be truly global it must be opened to all 
governments. In addition, the impact of transnational pressure 
groups and the attention of the world media adds to its 
universality.3 
_LeRoy Bennett facilitates a clearer understanding of such 
conferences by pointing to a number of features. The typical 
pattern of each conference is to select a single topic for 
attention, set a time period and meeting place for the 
conference, arrange for preparatory work by existing or 
specially created agencies, hold a conference of two or more 
weeks' duration generally open to all states, and adopt a set . 
of principles and an action plan requiring implementation 
through new or existing United Nations or related agencies. 
4 
Added to these features is the fact that the composition of 
national delegations is somewhat different from the delegations 
normally found in UN meetings. Delegations of special 
conferences are made up not only of diplomats from the foreign 
ministries and ~he UN permanent missions, but also of experts 
from the various home ministries. This is reflective of the mere 
3 
Peter Willetts, 'The Pattern of Conferences', in 
Global issues in the UN Framework, ed. by Paul Taylor and 
A.J.R. Groom, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1989). 
4 
A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations, (Prentice-
Hall Inc. 3rd edn., 1984). 
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problem-sol ving character of the conference rather than the 
usual UN power bargaining system. 
5 
Fortunately by 1982, a report prepared by the Secretary-
General of the UN came up with a definition of special 
conferences as those arranged outside the regular framework of 
the United Nations and its agencies and.normally initiated by 
the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. They 
occur when new problems are identified, demanding action which 
is not under the jurisdiction of any particular Specialised 
Agencies and requiring separate and additional budgetary 
provisions. They are intended to be unique occasions and 
therefore require an extensi ~e level of planning and servicing. 6 
The following conferences fit inter alia, the above 
defini tions of UN special conferences: The Stockholm Human 
Environment Conference held in 1972, the UN conferences on Food 
in 1974, on Population in 1974, 1984 and 1994, on Women in 1975, 
1980, 1985 and 1995, on Human Settlement in 1976, on Water in 
1977, on Desertification in: 1977, on the Environment and 
Development in 1992, on Human Rights in 1993 and on the Third 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea which extended over ten 
years from 1972. More recently, the General Assembly also 
endorsed the convening of the UN conference on Population in 
Cairo in 1994 and a conference on Social Development in 1995. 
5 
A.J.R. Groom (1989), op.cit. 
6 
JOint Inspection Unit, 'Secretariat Organization and 
Procedures for Preparation of United Nations Special 
Conferences', prepared by Mark-Allen et al.j JIU/REP/82/2, 
P.1. 
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The increase in the number of special conferences conducted 
by the UN since 1972 reflects the importance given f~ conference 
diplomacy despite the pressure on the limited resources. In this 
regard, the General Assembly took heed of the call by the 
Secretary-General made in 1963 urging that 'as a general rule 
and until it has been possible to rationalise the normal 
programme of the United Nations meetings, no more than one maj or 
7 
special conference be scheduled annually'. 
Contributory studies on the evolution of special 
conferences within the UN system point to a number of factors 
leading to the convening of such conferences. Special 
conferences are seen as a result of the growing awareness of the 
necessity to confront problems which the individual actors on 
their own cannot resolve without the help of the larger 
international community. The dimension is extended from 
government to non-governmental participation as pressure groups, 
SCientists and experts converge as informal partners with their 
own internal political systems and relationships. Special 
conferences, in addition to generating knowledge, also provide 
opportunities for those who are ready to benefit from them. In 
such cases certain individuals and organizations, in the pursuit 
of their narrow self-interest, demonstrate in these conferences 
the determinati9n to apply new knowledge to solve practical 
problems. Another reason for calling such conferences is 
attributed to a moral dimension that has become overwhelming in 
today's international society. Paul Taylor, in explaining this 
7 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1987 (XVIII) of 17 December 
1963. 
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phenomenon, stressed that the problems of maldistribution rather 
than the inadequacy of resources was the powerful~energizer in 
8 
the convening of such conferences. The fact that there is 
damage and deficiency in one area and excesses in another 
reinforces interaction and interdependence. Charles Beitz argues 
that the belief in interdependence reinforces a preparedness to 
accept transnational linkages, and concomitantly the perception 
that maldistribution involves moral considerations.
9 
These 
beliefs cultivate the view that someone is responsible for 
someone else's problems, and that, therefore, something should 
be done. This is particularly reflective of the special 
conferences on development, food and the environment. 
A common view shared by many international organisations' 
critics is that special conferences are a product of certain 
weaknesses in the UN system. It has been observed that the 
economic and social international organisations of the UN's 
system have failed to develop procedures for identifying and 
tackling new problems as a matter of routine. Existing 
Specialised Agencies are seen as far too narrow and detached to 
absorb the new problems that emerge over time. Proposals 
suggesting changes in the existing system are taken defensively 
by such organisations and there appears no means of harmonizing 
the thinking of ,the executive heads of the different agencies. 
Even the Economic and Social Council, which would have been the 
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appropriate body to coordinate and control the acti vi ties of the 
Specialised Agencies, has failed to live up to the~expectations 
of its founders. The reports of the various institutional 
committees such as the Administrative Committee on Coordination 
(ACC), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), hard 
hitting though they may be, remain advisory as the agencies' 
heads resist change in defence of their agencies' interests. 1o 
A further weakness is that the General Assembly has no 
authori ty to instruct the agencies and no means to monitor 
effectively their performance. The underlying problems according 
to Paul Taylor are that the ·system has become polycentric, and 
that it has no organisation within it which coordinates and 
manages its wide range of economic and social activities. The 
polycentric character, and the resulting failure in management 
mean that it is always easier to respond in an ad hoc fashion 
to new problems - to create ad hoc conferences - rather than to 
adapt rationally within the system. 
11 
According to Paul Taylor, special conferences would not be 
necessary if the system were effectively managed. But we are 
after all dealing with sovereign states in international society 
and with institutions which·'have the Weberian characteristics 
f 12 o bureaucracies. Al though, as this thesis will indicate, 
conference fatigue' will set in as states stumble from one 
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conference to another, it is unlikely that we will see the end 
of special conferences in the near future. 
SPECIAL CONFERENCES ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
The Stockholm Conference on Human Environment 
The United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) held 
in Stockholm on 5 16 June 1972 was an unprecedentedly 
important event by UN conference standards. It was a one off 
special conference and, for the first time in the history of the 
UN, a new dimension - the environment - was introduced into its 
programme. 
John McCormick asserts that the role of the single issue 
of 'acid rain', brought forward by Sweden, triggered the need 
for such a conference.
13 
The developing countries, on the other 
hand, were drawn in by their fear that western desire for a 
narrow environmental conference would marginalise and hamper 
their economic aspirations. 
The General Assembly's Resolution 2398 (XXIII) of 1969 
provided the mandate to convene UNCHE. The Preparatory Committee 
(Prepcom) was set up immediately and held sessions in New York 
in 1970 and in Geneva in 1971. Maurice Strong, a Canadian 
official, was appointed as the Under-Secretary-General in charge 
of the Secretariat in Geneva. At the same time, numerous UN 
regional seminars took place to discuss the subject in Bangkok, 
Addis Ababa, Mexico and in Beirut. Governments were required to 
prepare a comprehensive report on their environmental positions 
13 
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and policies while the various UN Specialised Agencies such as 
the WHO, WMO, ICAU, FAO, UNESCO and IAEA, uncoordinated as they 
were, were requested to provide reports on the environmental 
aspects of their work. 
14 
Six subjects were placed on the conference agenda: planning 
and management of human settlements for environmental quality; 
environmental aspects of natural resource management; 
identification and control of pollutants and nuisances of broad 
international significance; educational, informational, social 
and cultural aspects of environmental issues; development and 
environment; international organisational implications of action 
15 
proposals. 
Unlike UNCED, the Cold War dispute brought a number of 
political disagreements into the Stockholm preparatory process. 
The USSR and the East European countries boycotted the 
conference because of the dispute over the international status 
of East Germany. UNGA Resolution 2850 on rules and procedures 
enabled all members of the UN and its Specialised Agencies to 
participate in the conference. However, while neither the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) nor the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) were members of the UN, the FRG was a member of 
many Specialised Agencies and was therefore eligible to attend, 
14 
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whereas the GDR was not. There was also disagreement as to 
whether the environmental aspects of the war in Vietnam should 
be discussed; whether testing of nuclear weapons should lead to 
any recommendation and whether apartheid and colonialism should 
be formally condemned. 
16 
Another set back faced during the preparatory process was 
the luke warm attitudes of the developing countries towards the 
conference. There was such concern about how many developing 
countries would eventually participate that efforts were made 
to convince them that the conference agenda would extend beyond 
the environmental problems of industrialised countries. Thus, 
as part of the preparatory process, a number of key developing 
countries rapidly unfolded their own approach to the UNCHE 
agenda. Their position was summed up in the 'Founex Report,17 
which created echoes right up to Stockholm. In summary, the 
Report argued that the current environmental concern was 
pollution and the disruption of the natural system caused by the 
high levels of industrialisation in the developed countries. The 
developing countries also had a stake in these issues as they 
impinged on their own economic relations with the industrialised 
world, and to the extent that the developing countries 
themselves confronted these problems in the course of their own 
economic development. However, the main environmental problems 
16 
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facing developing countries stemmed not from pollution but from 
poverty, disease, hunger and exposure to natural disasters. The 
solution was to be found through the process of economic 
development itself. In the rich countries industry might be the 
problem; in poor countries it was the solution. 
18 
The developmental twist given by the developing countries 
to the environment issue took the industrialised countries by 
surprise. They found the agenda broadened to include such issues 
as poverty and financial aid. The developing countries held that 
in order to compensate for the costs of meeting higher 
environmental standards, they would need extra funding and 
modern technologies from the industrialised North. The North's 
reaction to compensation and 'additionality' was not positive. 
The United States maintained firm opposition against any form 
f 
. 19 
o a1d or compensation. 
The Stockholm Conference was attended by 113 governments, 
gathering about 1,200 delegates. It was held at the ministerial 
level and apart from Olaf Palme from the host country, the only 
Head of Government who attended UNCHE was Indira Gandhi from 
India. The Conference selected a theme 'Only One Earth'. UNCHE 
had two distinct features which were to become characteristic 
of subsequent UN special conferences. The first was the extent 
of media interest and coverage, which raised public interest on 
environmental issues. The second was the involvement of NGOs, 
18 
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mostly from the North, in a parallel 'Environment Forum', 
~/ 
officially sanctioned and encouraged by the UN Secretariat and 
the Swedish government. The NGOs were able to follow the 
conference proceedings and were permitted to make a formal 
statement to the conference. They published a daily newspaper 
Eco, edited, produced and financed by The Ecologists and the 
Friends of the Earth. Their activity at Stockholm was 
subsequently looked upon as a precedent and encouragement to 
the NGOs themselves. 
YNCHE adopted a 26-point Declaration on Human Environment 
and a 109-point Action Plan. An Environment Fund was established 
by voluntary contributions from governments. Following the 
Conference, the General Assembly established the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) to pursue the Conference's 
Objectives. UNEP's programmes included Earthwatch, an 
international surveillance network with three main components. 
The first is the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) 
which monitors, measures and interprets selected environmental 
variables to provide governments with the information necessary 
to anticipate and combat adverse environmental changes. The 
International Referral System for Environmental Information 
(INFOTERRA) serves as a worldwide register of sources of 
environment information and the International Register of 
Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) provides scientific and 
regulatory information on potentially toxic chemicals that may 
be dangerous to health and the environment. 
None of the decisions taken at Stockholm had any binding 
obligations upon governments. Yet they were significant as they 
23 
set the scene for international environmental agreements and 
/' 
~ 
created the legal and political basis for the Rio conference, 
twenty years later. 
UNCED 
In terms of organisation, UNCED was in many ways a repeat of the 
Stockholm Conference held twenty years earlier. The Secretariat 
was headed by the same person, Maurice Strong, who was invited 
to organise a conference secretariat in Geneva which had the 
responsibi I i ty of setting the agenda and seeking potential areas 
of consensus. The Secretary-Generalis role included developing 
the first drafts of the documents for UNCED as well as 
Coordinating the Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meetings. Based 
on past experiences, it was found useful for governments to 
prepare 'National Reports' outlining the situation and the 
policy in their own country. Background papers were written 
and research studies were commissioned for the purpose of 
conference documentation. A wide range of regional meetings 
took place during the preparatory period corresponding to the 
regional commissions of ECOSOC. Expert group meetings on 
particular topics were also conducted in different capitals in 
order to diversify awareness.)O 
Like Stockhqlm, which had a theme, "Only One Earth", UNCED 
also had a theme "Survival of Earth and Humanity" and went 
through the same preparatory process with the establishment of 
Working groups and Preparatory Committees. Four Prepcoms were 
20 
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held - the· first in August 1990 in Nairobi, the second in 
/ 
March/April 1991 in Geneva, the third in August 1991 in Geneva 
and the fourth in April 1992 in New York. UNCED had a 
Declaration, a Programme of Action, it established an 
insti tution (Commission on Sustainable Development) and was 
participated in by member-states as the main actors. The NGOs 
were also accommodated and provided with a parallel 'Global 
Forum' and like Stockholm, it attracted a great deal of media 
attention. What was unusual was that, unlike Stockholm, UNCED 
was sponsored not only by the donor governments but also by 
major companies (e.g. ICI, Swatch) and foundations (e.g. 
MacArthur and Rockefeller) .21 "This new phenomenon is significant 
as the involvement of big corporations in the UNCED process has 
been seen by some to have been, in many ways, responsible for 
shaping the UNCED agenda and influencing its outcome. 
Before the conclusion of UNCED, it was hoped that the 
Conference would conclude conventions on Climate Change and 
Biological Diversity. Negotiations on the two conventions 
Continued in parallel groups. The convention on Climate Change 
was assigned by the General Assembly to an Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC) which met in Nairobi, Virginia, 
Geneva and New York. The Biological Di versi ty Convention had its 
own INC, for whi~h UNEP served as the Secretariat. Negotiating 
sessions were held in Madrid, Geneva and Nairobi. 
UNCED was also to consider the possibility of a convention 
on Forests, to produce an "Earth Charter" that would set the 
prinCiples of conduct on environmental protection and 
21 
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sustainable development, to adopt a programme of action for the 
~/ 
implementation of these principles and to study the 'cross-
sectoral issues' such as finance, transfer of technology, 
poverty, human settlements, the role of women, health and 
education. 
ELEMENTS OF CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY 
Johan Kaufmann defines conference diplomacy as 'that part of the 
management of relations between governments and of relations 
between governments and intergovernmental organisations that 
22 
takes place in international conferences'. This section will 
attempt to discuss the elements that constitute conference 
diplomacy in relation to the UNCED process. These include the 
actors, the decision-making process, the politics and paradigm 
shift. 
The Actors 
UNCED, which took place at Rio de Janerio from 3 - 14 June 1992, 
was attended by over 8,000 officials representing 172 member-
states of the United Nations, 700 UN officials and 116 heads of 
government. This estimated count, not including the 9,000 media 
representatives and over 26, 000 individuals representing several 
hUndred intern~tional governmental bodies (IGOs), NGOs, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) who in one way or another, 
partiCipated in related meetings at Rio, represent the actors 
in the UNCED process. 
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A.J.R. Groom observes that in normal UN diplomacy, members 
of the permanent mission in Geneva or New York att~nd meetings 
not because they are particularly knowledgeable about the 
b . 23 su ] ect but because they are there. This cannot apply to 
special conferences such as UNCED where special delegations 
consisting of officials and experts from the relevant home 
ministries may have to be appointed to negotiate issues that are 
multidisciplinary and multi thematic. In some instances, 
parliamentarians form part of the official delegation. Their 
presence has two purposes: to expose them to the international 
scene and to follow discussions at the NGO fora. 
The growing interest and participation by non-state actors 
at UNCED meetings is another unusual feature which 
differentiates UNCED from the Stockholm conference. Although 
state actors are seen as the primary determinants of issue 
outcomes, NGOs and powerful corporations do, to a certain 
extent, influence the setting of agenda, regime formation and 
policy formulation. Initially~ NGOs which were recognised as 
having consultative status with ECOSOC were invited to 
participate in UNCED proceedings but with no negotiating role. 
By the Fourth Prepcom, the doors to NGO participation were 
opened wider to include those which had no consultative status 
with ECOSOC. As ~ result, UNCED attracted a wide range of NGOs _ 
from the Green movement in the North and South which included 
deep ecologists, political ecologists, social ecologists and 
New Age environmentalists, to the environmental lobbying 
organisations which originated around issues of nature 
23 
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protection and environmental conservation. Among these 
~/ 
organisations it is important to note that Greenpeace has a 
budget bigger than the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP)(approximately US$150 million), the 'Big Ten' including 
the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the National 
Parks and Conservation Association, the Izaak Walton League, the 
Wilderness Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends 
of the Earth and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
represents the wealthiest environmental organisations in the 
United States and probably the world. 
24 
These organisations normally engage in their own 
administrative and substantive consultations to ensure maximum 
impact at conferences. It has been a standard practice for the 
conference secretariat to provide basic facilities for NGOs to 
run their parallel meetings, forum, debates, lectures and 
exhibitions alongside the main diplomatic conference. 
Communication between the official conference and the NGO forum 
occur through recognised NGOs and official delegates mutually 
gaining access to each other's meetings as well as by newspapers 
sponsored by some of the leading NGOs. At UNCED, the Earth 
Summit Times published by Theodore W. Kheel with Katsuhiko 
Yazaki and the Kyoto Forum, the SUNS, a bulletin serviCing the 
Group of 77 and the Third World Resurgence, published by the 
Third World Network, were published on a daily basis for the 
dUration of the conference and distributed free of charge to the 
24 
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official delegates. These newspapers, written by professional 
journalists, ~ provided useful information on what other 
delegations were doing. Through these, the NGOs have been able 
to influence considerably the perception of their governments 
and their citizens on the environment issue. 
Corporations were influential actors where UNCED was 
concerned. Big corporations such as Swatch of Switzerland, UK 
-based ICI, USA-based Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M)~ 
Coca-Cola, USA-based Atlantic Ritchfield Oil (ARCO), Fiat of 
ItalYI Lintas, Volkswagen, Xerox and Asahi Glass Co. of Japan 
helped to finance the Summit and the Global Forum through their 
contribution to the EcoFund. A fifth of the financing of the 
Summi t came from these corporations which helped to pay the 
salaries of Summit staff and sponsor events such as the cultural 
gala and reception for negotiators at the New York Prepcom 
m t " 25 ee l.ng. 
Having sponsored UNCED, it was in .their best interest to 
take advantage of the opportunity opened to them. Many of the 
Corporations had appalling environmental management records yet, 
because of this well-defined interest, they often have 
sUffic~ent technical knowledge of the issue to be able to veto 
international regulations through transnational alliances and 
their ready acces& to the secretariat and other decision makers. 
So powerful were these non-state actors that some argued that 
25 
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the nation-state itself was challenged as they tried to 
• 26 
man1pulate and control the outcome of events. 
The decision-making process 
The decision-making processes in special conferences such as 
UNCED do not differ very much from that of. the normal UN 
meetings. Decisions take the form of resolutions which are 
arrived at by consensus. Draft resolutions are prepared based 
on the agreed agenda items during the Prepcoms at New York or 
Geneva rather than at national capitals. These drafts normally 
take the form of a preliminary working document and are 
d 27 iscussed ad referendum. 
At UNCED, negotiations were mainly conducted between 
groups, not between individual countries. Among them, the Group 
of 77 (G 77) did a considerable amount of caucusing in order to 
develop common posit~ons on important agenda items. Throughout 
the prepcoms and during UNCED proper, the Group of 77 met 
regularly without fail, prior to the plenary or main committee 
sessions. Draft resolutions, initiated either by the Group or 
by another outside the Group, would be circulated and 
extensively discussed before the position was made known by its 
spokesperson at the main committee. Apart from the main groups 
which included the European Union (then referred to as the 
European Community) and the Western group, there were a number 
26 
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An ad referendum agreement' 
Contingent on settlement of 
SUbsequently. 
is an unbinding agreement 
issues to be negotiated 
30 
of smaller groups formed by the Arab states, the small island 
/ 
/"/ 
states, the CANZ Group made up of Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, and the former East European group which found it 
necessary to develop common positions on matters affecting their 
common interests. 
Over the years, it has become a common practice at the UN 
to arrive at decisions by consensus rather than by a vote. The 
one-country-one-vote system has proved to be less than effective 
as more like-minded members of the UN, particularly the 
developing countries, can easily acquire a qualified but 
meaningless majority. However, consensus-building has proved to 
be not only more time consuming, as shown by the large amount 
of 'square brackets' or disputed issues in draft resolutions 
which remain right up until each conference, but also 
ineffective, as it tends to reward the obstinate players, as 
SUbsequent chapters ~ill show. 
The UNCED prepcoms were conducted in a business-like 
manner, following the UN's standard 'line-by-line' negotiation 
method. No formal speeches or general debates were allowed 
during sessions unless it was unavoidable, as in the case where 
an Environment Minister happened to be in New York and would 
like to deliver a statement be'fore the main committee. At Rio, 
the occasion for speeches was provided at the plenary while the 
Various committees met simultaneously to 'remove the remaining 
square brackets'. Due to the overwhelming attendance by heads 
of governments at the Summit, only seven minutes were allotted 
to each speaker. An interesting point to note was the 
Conference's decision to deny the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. 
31 
Miyazawa, who was unable to attend the Summit, the opportunity 
./ 
/"/ 
to deliver his speech via satellite link. The granting of such 
a request would undoubtedly have set a precedent for future UN 
Summits. 
UN decisions appear in various forms, the main ones being 
resolutions, declarations and conventions. Resolutions are 
formal, written texts in which the conclusions of debates are 
formulated and the unanimous or majority views of the member~ 
states are expressed. In an attempt to clarify their legal 
status, Nico Schrijver contends that most resolutions have quite 
often a purely political or factual content and have nothing to 
do with international law at all. On the other hand, 
declarations still have the status of a recommendation and norms 
Contained in declarations are accepted as binding legal norms. 28 
Verwey suggested that in appraising the legal value of a 
Specific resolution it is necessary to take into account such 
factors as its contents (whether they are legally relevant), 
its form (a declaration suggests greater value than an ordinary 
resolution), the wording (whether it is compulsory or 
recommendatory, vaguely or concretely formulated), the voting 
results (whether it was adopted unanimously, by consensus or by 
a maj ori ty - large or small) and whether' states expressed 
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Conventions on the other hand, are first-step agreements 
~' 
which allows countries to "sign on" at the outset even if there 
is no agreement on the specific actions that must be taken. 
They are not legally binding in that, subsequent legislatures 
in those countries are free to abrogate them. The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Biodiversity Convention 
signed at the conclusion of the Earth summit are examples of 
these. 30 
Subsequent chapters will show that the decisions taken at 
UNCED_incorporated vague language and avoided the politically 
difficul t task of defining specific terms. This made it possible 
for reluctant countries to agree but undermined the chances of 
sUccessful implementation. At the convention-drafting stage, 
the goal appeared to be to stay at a very general level so that 
all countries would at least agree that some unspecified action 
was needed to solve a problem. As agreement could only be 
Possible if there was a give-and-take among countries, most of 
the decisions taken at UNCED were weak and without enforcement 
provisions. 
~nvironmental politics 
Environmental politics is considered 'low politics' given the 
nature of the i~sues involved. 'Low politics' issues are 
described by Peter Willetts as those involving social, economic, 
environmental and humanitarian matters, which are within the 
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coverage of . the UN's Second and Third 31 Committees. The 
..--/ 
characteristics of 'low politics' as opposed to 'high politics' 
is that military power cannot be used to influence the outcomes 
of specific international environmental issues although mili tary 
power may indirectly be used to divert resources and reduce the 
abili ty of a state to play a lead role .on an environmental 
• 32 
l.Ssue. 
Another characteristic of global environmental politics is 
that governments differ in their perception, interest and 
influence over. the subject. Some countries that are still 
endowed with idle natural resources would willingly exploit them 
for economic and financial g~ins. Other countries, which are 
less fortunate, with no further water and land, face a shrinking 
frontier and are affected and concerned over environmental 
degradation. Some become defiant because they have been Singled 
out as major contributors to global degradation. Most countries 
began the day as indifferent to UNCED, partly because they were 
neither accused of contributing significantly nor felt 
exclusively threatened by the global environmental crisis. 33 
COuntries that saw themselves as unfairly targeted during UNCED 
discussions exerted' veto' power over agreements and became more 
effective as they formed 'veto' coalitions with other like-
minded government~. As all countries have a right of veto over 
32 
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decisions of which they disapprove, an economically powerful 
~.// 
government may not be able to impose rules on a much weaker 
government if the latter is strongly opposed to it. 
34 
Paradigm shift 
It is relevant to consider the concepts of. social paradigms in 
discussing environmental diplomacy because an understanding of 
these concepts influenced the debates on the issues discussed 
at UNCED. Willis Harman explains that in times of relative 
social stability, there is a dominant social paradigm, a set of 
beliefs, ideas and values from which public policies and whole 
systems of behaviour flow logically. However, every dominant 
paradigm is ultimately challenged by its anomalies the 
contradictions between assumptions and observed realities - so 
that its usefulness wanes, giving way to a new paradigm in a 
process called a par~digm shift. 
3S 
As economic and environmental policy are interrelated, the 
social paradigm that has dominated public understanding of 
environmental management during a period of rapid economic 
growth has been essentially a system of beliefs about economics. 
This has been referred to as the' exclusionist paradigm' because 
it excludes human beings from'the law of nature. It has also 
been called 'frontier economics', suggesting that, given a free 
market, there is not only an unlimited supply· of natural 
-
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resources but also of 'sinks' for disposing of the wastes from 
.~ 
the exploitation of those resources. Accordingly, as long as 
technology is given free rein and prices are allowed to 
fluctuate enough to stimulate the search for substitutes, 
absolute scarcity can be postponed to the indefinite future. 
Environmental consideration is irrelevant in this paradigm. 36 
Subsequent chapters will show that the Bush Administration held 
strongly to this exclusionist paradigm as reflected in thei~ 
arguments and isolationist position at UNCED. 
Since the early 1960s, this dominant paradigm has come 
under steadily mounting attack from scientists and later from 
economists, practitioners and scholars. The publication of 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 stirred the public about 
the invisible threats to the environment. She talked of the 
indiscriminate use of modern chemical pesticides, fungicides and 
herbicides on the land and warns of the ensuing environmental 
d 37 amage. During the 1970s and 1980s two studies, The Limits of 
Growth conducted by the Club of Rome and published in 1972 and 
The Global 2000 Report to the President released by the US 
Council of Environmental Quality and the Department of State in 
1980, influenced the shaping of an alternative paradigm. Both 
studies forecast the depletio~ of natural resources and the 
degradation of .ecosystems and suggested that economic 
-
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development and population growth were on a path that would 
eventually strain the earth's "carrying capacity". Garrett 
Hardin's writings on the Tragedy of the Commons also received 
wide acceptance. Hardin suggested that as populations grow, the 
earth's major natural systems and resources (the commons) - the 
oceans, atmosphere, lands and climate - are being degraded and 
destroyed as economic actors, in the process of maximising 
profi ts, dispose of toxic wastes in the oceans and other" 
dangerous chemicals in the atmosphere. At this point, the 
• 38 
lnherent logic of the commons relentlessly generates tragedy. 
By the early 1980s, sustainable development was emerging 
as an alternative paradigm. The publication in 1987, of the 
Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, popularised the term 
sustainable development', defining it as development that is 
39 
consistent with the future as well as present needs'. It 
criticised the dominant paradigm for failure to reconcile those 
needs, asserting that the existing economic policies risk 
irreversible damage to natural systems on which all life 
depends. 
The sustainable development paradigm emphasises the need 
to redefine the term 'development'. It posits that economic 
growth cannot take place at the "expense of the earth's renewable 
and nonrenewable +esources. This implies that the world must 
radically reduce energy use, that is, reduce fossil fuel per 
-
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The World Commission on Environmental and Development, 
~ Common Future,(Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987). 
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unit of GNP and shift to a greater reliance on renewable energy 
Sources over the next several decades. 
The sustainable development paradigm further assumes the 
need for greater equity not only between the rich and poor 
countries but also within societies and between generations. It 
recognises that developing countries must meet the basic needs 
of the poor in ways that do not deplete the countries' natural 
resources, and it also points to a need to reexamine basic· 
attitudes and values in industrialised countries regarding the 
unnecessary and wasteful aspects of their material abundance. 
The discussion on sustainable development was central to 
UNCED. While it received wide support, this paradigm shift may 
take years to complete because within the most powerful 
institutions in the industrialised countries, the attitudes and 
assumptions of the exclusionist paradigm are still intact. 
EVENTS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNGA RESOLUTION 44/228 ON 
UNCED 
On 22 December 1989, the forty-fourth session of United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on the United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development which 
prOvided the mandate for discussion and debate during the UNCED 
preparatory proces.s leading to the Rio Summit. The resolution, 
POpularly referred to by the delegates as 'Resolution 44/228' 
was initiated by the members of the United Nations following the 
report of the World Commission on the Environment and 
Development in 1987. This report and that of the Secretary-
General entitled' Environmental Preparation to the Year 2000 and 
38 
Beyond', were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
its resolutions 42/186 
~/ 
and 42/187 of 11 December 1987, 
respectively. Both these resolutions stressed the concern for 
the continuing deterioration of the state of the environment and 
the serious degradation of the global life-support system which, 
if not attended to urgently, would disrupt the global ecological 
balance and lead to an ecological catastrophe. 
Following the recommendations of the above reports, the' 
UNGA adopted resolution 43/196 on 20 December 1988 entitled 
'United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development' 
in which the General Assembly, among others, requested the 
Secretary-General, with the ass'istance of the Executive Director 
of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), to obtain 
urgently the views of governments on the objectives, content, 
title and the scope of the conference as well as the appropriate 
ways of preparing for the conference which included the 
modalities, suitable dates and place to convene it. The views 
of the appropriate organs of the United Nations system and the 
relevant international governmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations were also to be obtained and made 
available to the Governing Council of UNEP for its consideration 
and comments for submission to the forty-fourth UNGA through the 
Economic and Socia~ Council (ECOSOC). The Governing Council of 
UNEP, in its report at its fifteenth session on 25 May, 1989, 
identified the following issues to be discussed during the 
proposed conference: atmosphere (global warming), fresh water 
resources, deforestation and desertification, transportation 
studies and energy, transboundarymovement of hazardous wastes, 
39 
strengthening of institutions on environmental matters, health 
and poverty. 
Subsequently, the ECOSOC decided to devote one plenary 
meeting at its second regular session from 5 to 28 July, 1989 
in Geneva to a discussion on the convening of a United Nations 
conference on the environment and development. A resolution to 
that effect was passed by the Council on 26 July 1989 
(Resolution 1989/87). 
The Forty-Fourth session of the UNGA set aside a date for 
a general debate on its agenda item on the environment and_ 
development. The report of the Secretary-General (A/44/256 and 
Corr.1, Add.1 and Add.2) provided the basis for a discussion in 
wh ' h . d b 40 l.C , on 23 October, 1989, eighteen countrl.es e ated. A 
nUmber of Heads of Government also spoke on the subject during 
their plenary speech at the Forty-fourth session of the General 
Assembly. Outside the General Assembly, regional groupings came 
up with the recommendation to convene the proposed conference 
in 1992. These included the Nordic group (the Bergen conference 
in Norway), the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 
Langkawi, Malaysia, the Ninth Summit of the Non-aligned Movement 
(Belgrade) as well as the Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting held 
in New York in October 1989. 
-
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These countries are Sweden, France, Canada, Mexico, USSR, 
China, Venezuela, Japan~ Argentina, German Democratic 
Republic, Austria, India, Brazil;- Uruguay, Barbados, 




The views of the different countries, both North and South, at 
the first debate on UNCED provide a yardstick against which one 
is able to measure the intentions and the end-results. 
During the debate on the agenda item on the environment and 
development set aside by the General Assembly on 23 October, 
41 
1989 Sweden, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries 
emphasized the significance of convening the United Nations· 
conference in 1992, twenty years after the Stockholm conference. 
It called upon the Assembly to assist developing countries which. 
were badly hit by global warming, lacking in access to 
freshwater resources, adversely affected by transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes and economically displaced due to 
deforestation and drought. It also called upon the Assembly to 
address the problems of poverty and health which it considered 
related to environmental degradation. 
Speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU), France42 
emphasized that the environment and development were 
inextricably linked and therefore it would be difficult to 
concei ve of the future without development for the least 
d 43 eveloped countries. Canada, on the other hand, emphasized the 
need for industrialised countries to shoulder their full 
responsibility and. for the developing countries to understand 
that in their own interests they must decide in favour of 
41 
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sustainable development. It added that there was as much a 
// 
moral as an environmental and economic imperative and agreed 
that problems such as debt, population growth and poverty 
created enormous environmental pressures on developing countries 
and therefore should be corrected. 
While several developing countries expressed their views 
on the subject, China and India's remarks during the debate 
comprehensively explained the position of the South. According" 
to the Chinese 
44 
delegation , the acute imbalances in the 
production and consumption patterns between the developing and 
developed countries had to be addressed with a view to bringing 
about an international economi"c environment that was just and 
conducive to sustainable development in all countries. It stated 
that the developed countries were the main contributors to 
present day environmental damage and therefore should bear the 
responsibility for im~roving the global environment. This could 
be done by transferring capital and technology and providing new 
funds to developing countries' without imposing additional 
Conditionality on the grounds of environmental considerations. 
It stated that poverty remained an important cause of 
deterioration of the environment in the developing countries 
and it was unrealistic to pressure these countries into 
protecting their environment without at the same time addressing 
their developmental concerns. It pointed out emphatically that 
environmental protection'should not be pursued at the expense 
of the growth of the developing countries and still less should 




development strategy of those countries or encroachment upon 
------their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. Full 
account should also be taken of the special difficulties and 
needs of the developing countries when formulating relevant laws 
and statutes on the environment. Equally important, it was 
necessary to ensure that the obligations _and commitments of 
member-states were commensurate with both their responsibility 
and their capability. 
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India repeated the same concerns of the Chinese 
delegation. It drew attention to the fact that the environment 
could not be improved in conditions of poverty nor could poverty 
be eradicated without development and the transfer of 
environmentally safe technologies. The proposed conference 
should therefore not only focus on technical questions relating 
to the environment which were important in themselves but should 
also equally underscore the developmental dimension. Environment 
and development, it emphasized, were facets of the same coin 
and were interlinked and should-be viewed as an integral part 
of the other. On account of their state of poverty and 
underdevelopment, developing countries had far less capability 
to deal. with problems of environmental degradation. In this 
regard, it welcomed the decision adopted at the second regular 
session of ECOSOG (resolution 1989/101) on 27 July 1989 
regarding the provision of new and additional- financial 
resources to developing countries for environmental programmes 
and projects to ensure that their development priorities were 




Many of the arguments above were incorporated into the 
,~"'/ 
draft resolution 44/228 which was adopted on 22 December, 1989. 
CONCLUSION 
One conclusion to emerge from this conceptual framework chapter 
is that while numerous elements constitute a UN special 
conference, the decision-making process follows an almost 
similar pattern. Although member-states are the main actors and' 
the main decision-makers who determine the problems to be 
addressed, they are expected to act in accordance wi th the 
decision-making process that has been established by the UN 
system and perfected over the years. 
The rules of procedure determine how the conference will 
be organised, which agencies are to be involved, what financial 
arrangements are to be established and how the official members 
of the bureau are to be elected. Subsequently, the members of 
the bureau, with the help of the Secretariat will decide on 
matters such as the agenda of the meeting, the pre-conference 
and during the conference arrangements, the credentials of the 
participating countries and the documents to be prepared. Also 
relevant are questions pertaining to whether there is a need for 
a debate and if so, its scope and duration, whether decisions 
are to be voted u,pon or to be arrived at by consensus and 
whether member-states are expected to initiate an Action 
Programme, a resolution or sets of resolutions, a declaration 
or a convention at the end of the conference. 
The elements and process of the UNCED negotiations will be 
fUrther addressed in Part I of Chapter III. While as a matter 
44 
of practice, member-states are accustomed to the UN decision-
/' 
~.~ 
making process that has evolved as a result of a genuine growth 
of the UN system, individually, member-states work quite 
differently when they are within the confines of their national 
boundaries. The subsequent chapter illustrates how decisions 
are taken on the domestic front and how those decisions are 
translated into action for the purpose of confronting the 
negotiators at the international level. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PREPARATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
THE INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The constituents of the UNCED negotiations held in New York, 
Geneva and Nairobi were nation-states which possessed their own 
distinctive decision-making structures. For each state, the" 
negotiations represented only half the problem, as behind the 
formal_interaction was an internal intragovernmental process 
needed to support the external negotiation. This internal 
process itself often takes the form of a negotiation, as 
conflicting positions have to be conciliated before the national 
negotiating teams set out to get the best deal out of the 
mul tilateral conference. These internal negotiations can be 
traced through debates among government officials, inter-office 
memoranda, committee meetings, cabinet sessions and discussions 
With legislators and interest groups. It is the internal arena 
where offiCials negotiate among themselves to formulate the' 
national interest and where decisions are reached about how 
mUch the nation-state can accommodate the interests of other 
participating countries. During "this process, news media and the 
• 1 
W~der public participate to various degrees. 
-
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RSee Winham, Gilbert R, International Trade and the Tokyo 
-Qgpd Negotiation, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1986) and 
. lkl ~ p e! F.C, How Nations Negotiate, (New York: Harper and Row 
Ubl~cations, 1985). 
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In preparing the national position, committees are often 
.~. 
formed on an ad hoc basis consisting of officials from the 
government agencies and observers from the interest groups. It 
is from these committees that the national negotiating team is 
formed. Ikle, and to a great extent Winham, observed that 
national governments often face difficulties in managing their 
internal negotiations. This is due to the diversity of forces 
at work within the governmental bureaucracy brought about by . 
diverse personal motives, various public pressures and the 
bureaucratic preferences of different departments. One US. 
negotiator remarked that about nine-tenths of his negotiating 
2 • 
was done with his own side while another observed that success 
3 
abroad cannot be had without success at home. The negotiating 
team confronts problems that are often new in substance and in 
procedures. In the process, the team acquires various kinds of 
organisational learni~g, including how other countries perceive 
the problems that are up for negotiation, and what priorities 
these countries place on different issues. 
The following section will illustrate how Malaysia prepared 
itself for UNCED. In many respects, the characteristics of the 
internal decision-making process described above were 
representative of the Malaysian experience. Additionally, 
-
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RObert W. Barnett, 'Observation in International 
Negotiations', (Transcript of an informal conference, 
Greenwich, Conn, June, 1971) cited in World Politics, 30, 
October, 1977, p.91. 
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. Jo~n Midgeley, 'Linkage Revisited', New York Times! 4 
Apr~l, 1979, cited in Winham, Gilbert (1986), op.c~t., 
P.343. . .. 
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Malaysia under took the process without being quite sure that 
its Prime Minister would attend the Rio Summit. 
The National Steering Committee on UNCED 
Several weeks following the adoption of UN resolution 44/228, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia presented a proposal 
to the Cabinet on the need to establish a National Steering 
Committee (NSC) .on UNCED as well as its related meetings. The 
main task of the Committee was to formulate national positions 
and advise the Government on policy matters relating to UNCED . 
and the two Intergovernmental Negotiating Committees (INCs) on 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change and on the Biological 
Diversity Convention. In addition to UNCED related matters, the 
NSC was responsible for formulating and coordinating strategies 
and policies on other environmental issues and legislation 
outside the UNCED nego~iations such as the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Basel Convention 
On the Transboundary Movement of Toxic and Hazardous Wastes. 
The other main task of the NSC was to liaise with the UNCED 
SeCretariat on matters relating to procedures and processes 
including meeting deadlines for various tasks and preparing 
substantive inputs to the Prepcom meetings for the 1992 Special 
Conference.4 
The NSC was formally set up in March 1990 following a 
Cabinet decision. The committee was chaired by the Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and included 
-
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~Ountry Report, Malaysia:National"Steering Committee, 
Mlnistry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, Appendix A. 
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senior members of the various ministries, uni versi ties, and 
-----' research organisations. The ministries included the Ministry of 
SCience, Technology and the Environment, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Primary Industries, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry 
of Energy, Telecommunication and Posts and the Ministry of 
Transport. Other members of the NSC included officials from the 
Attorney-General's Chambers, the Economic Planning Unit of the 
Prime Minister's Department and the State Secretariats of the 
State Governments.
5 
The secretariat of the NSC, located at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was supervised by the International 
Organisation and Mul tilateral Economic Division. Three officers 
at the level of Under-Secretary, Principal Assistant Secretary 
and Assistant Secretar~ attended to the Secretariat while at the 
same time assumed other responsibilities required of the 
Division. The Deputy Secretary-General II assumed the 
chairmanship of the NSC in the absence of the Secretary-General. 
Matters that required detailed examination were either 
handled by the technical committees set up by the NSC or 
Commissioned to various experts from institutions of higher 
learning, research. bodies and other relevant ministries and 
organisations within the country. Depending on the specific 
iSsues dealt with by the NSC, non-governmental organisations and 
representatives from industries were also invited to participate 
-
5 
~, Appendix A. 
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in the various technical committees to assist in the formulation 
6 
of national policies. 
After its formation, not less than seventeen NSC meetings 
were held to formulate and coordinate strategies and policies 
7 
for the negotiations at UNCED and the two INCs. The NSC 
reported regularly to the Cabinet for guidance and decisions on 
policy issues. 8 
National Seminar on UNCED 
One of _ the first acti vi ties of the NSC was .to organise a 
national seminar on UNCED. In July 1990, the NSC, the National 
Institute of Public Administration (INTAN) and PETRONAS (the 
national petroleum authority) jointly organised a national 
seminar which was attended by a diverse group of participants 
from a wide range of relevant sectors and the public at large. 
The objective of the seminar was to encourage public 
participation, promote public awareness and stimulate a national 
discussion on the subject with a view to formulating proposals 
and approaches for the UNCED process. Until recent years, the 
environment had not been an important preoccupation of the 
-
6 
~bid.L Appendix A. 
7 
'Malaysia and UNCED: The Road from Rio', Seminar Report, 
National Steering Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Malaysia, 1992. 
8 
The Cabinet consist of a council of Ministers who meets 
regularly, generally once a week under the chairmanship of 
the Prime Minister to formulate the policy of the 
gOvernment. The Ministers hold different portfolios and are 
COllectively responsible for all decisions made by the 
Cabinet, which is the highest policy-making body in the 
COuntry. 
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public in the country. Surveys carried out in the 1970s 
indicated prevalent public apathy. A study conducted in 1986 
found that the public ranked the environment as second to last 
from a list of eight public issues. There was also scant media 
COverage and little public discussion of such issues. 9 
However, during the last few years, the press and 
electronic media have stepped up coverage on the more serious 
environmental problems in the country such as river pollution, 
haze, open burning and the management of toxic and solid wastes. 
Investigative media reports also increased public awareness on 
the importance of environmental protection. Consumer groups and 
other non-governmental organisations also contributed to 
environmental awareness in the country. These organisations 
engaged in discussions with the relevant government agencies in 
fora on environmental management at the local level. Special 
events to mark World Environment Day, the National Environment 
Day, World Forestry Day organised by the government were aimed 
at enCOuraging public participation and interest. Environmental 
edUcation was introduced in the upper primary schools and 
several environmental courses were introduced in the local 
Universi ties. Environmental research by the academic community 
has largely been dependent on government funding and overseas 
fUnding agencies. 10 
Thus, the national seminar on UNCED was able to pool a wide 
range of the public who had been adequately informed of the 
impact of environmental degradation. Papers and discussions at --------9 




the seminar were organised into two sections. The first 
concerned policy thrusts covering four main areas namely, legal 
and institutional frameworks, trade, technology transfer and 
related economic issues, finance and funding mechanisms and 
scientific and technical issues. The second discussed sectoral 
issues such as the concept of sustainable development, 
atmospheric pollution, land, water and marine resources, 
forests, biological di versi ty and biotechnology, waste and toxic 
waste management, poverty, health and development.
l1 
A follow-up workshop was held five months later organised 
by the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment 
together with the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister IS 
Department, the Attorney-GeneralIs Chambers, the Ministry of 
Primary Industries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its 
main objective was to evolve recommendations on the national 
POsition with regard to the sustainable goals of planning and 
management practices. The discussion covered areas of forestry 
and biological diversity, air pollution, marine living 
resources, hazardous wastes and the conservation of resources. 
The issues of Climate Change and the related conventions were 
also discussed. The recommendations of the seminar were 
ConSidered by the NSC for preparation of the National Report for 
UNCED. 
---11 ---------
c~~nv1ronment and Development: Malaysian Perspectives - A 
UN lect10n of Papers and Report of the Nat~onal Seminar on 
Mi~~D, 9 - 11 July, 1990', National Steer1ng Committee, 
stry of Foreign Affairs, 1990. 
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The National Report 
In accordance with resolution 44/228, the Preparatory Committee 
was requested to invite all governments to take an active part 
in the preparations for the Conference and to prepare national 
reports, with the official deadline for submission extended from 
31 July 1991 to 21 November 1991. In the exercise, countries 
were encouraged to promote broad-based national cooperation 
involving the scientific community, industry, trade unions and 
Concerned non-governmental organisations. 12 The Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia was 
commissioned by the NSC to coordinate the task of preparing the 
national report with financial assistance from the UNDP while 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment provided 
the chairmanship role. The drafting of the National Report only 
began in June 1991. A core group of experts was allocated the 
task of approaching the study in an integrated manner, taking 
into account the guidelines provided by the Prepcom during its 
f' 13 
lrst sUbstantive meeting in Nairobi in August 1990. The 
views from the NGOs and the public at large, as reflected in the 
output of the National Seminar, were incorporated into the 
report. References were made to the Six Malaysia Plan (1991-
1995), the Second Outline Perspective Plan and the National 
Development Policy which provided the policy framework and 
strategies for sustainable development. Extensive research and 
-------------------12 
See paragraph 11 of UNCED resolution 44/228. 
13 
See UN document: A/151/PC.8. add.1 dated 20 June, 1990. 
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studies on specific areas were carried out and their inputs were 
Synthesized into a national report. 
The committee went to great lengths in preparing the 
national report, showing particular enthusiasm about the 
preparatory process. In the midst of the research, the committee 
Was able to view the environment in a more comprehensive manner 
as it undertook to study over 40 pieces of environment-related 
legislation in Malaysia, some of which dated as far back as the 
early years of the century and covered an extensive range such 
as water resources, soil conservation, forest resources, air 
POllution, solid waste, rivers and seas resources. The Ministry 
of S ' clence, Technology and the Environment, which for several 
years had appeared to remain passively in the background, 
sUddenly found itself in the limelight of public attention as 
it began to assume a rejuvenated role. 
The National Report was finally ready by the Fourth Prepcom 
meeting in March 1992. Prior to the meeting, it was presented 
to the Cabinet for approval. Thus began Malaysia's unprecedented 
effort to pool its diverse resources towards the formation of 
a un'f' 
1 led national position. 
~han; • 
~ng the Malaysian position 
A Se ' d k rles of interagency meetings continue to ta e place, 
cha' 
lred by the relevant technical committees as well as the NSC. 
These meetings discussed the UNCED Secretariat documents that 
were prepared for the Prepcom meetings. An average of three 
meet' 
lngS were held weekly at the various ministries and other 
gOvern ' I' d ' mental agencies to deal with more specla lze lSsues 
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involving legal matters, trade provisions and matters discussed 
at the INC on the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
INC on Biological Diversity. The Economic Planning Unit of the 
Prime Minister's Department presided at meetings on sustainable 
development, the Ministry of Finance on financial institutions 
and the Ministry of Primary Industries on forest issues. The 
AttorneY-General's Chambers undertook the task of scrutinising 
the UNCED Secretariat document on the Earth Charter and the two 
Conventions. NGOs such as the Friends of the Earth, Malaysia, 
the Third World Network based in Penang, Malaysia, the 
Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia and the newly 
established Business Council for Sustainable Development of 
MalaYSia were occasionally invited to present their views at 
these meetings on the subjects of concern to them. To ensure 
cOordination and continuity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
represented in all of these meetings. The technical agencies 
sUch as the Forest Department, the Meteorological Department, 
the Department of the Environment, the Wildlife Department, the 
Atto rneY-General Chambers, PUSPATI (the center for nuclear 
energy research) and the International Trade Division of 
Min' lstry of International Trade and Industry contributed papers 
for . 
clrculation during these meetings. Situation reports were 
UPdated and Ministers from the relevant ministries were 
Constantly briefed on the issues discussed. 
As the weeks passed, the outlines of a possible Malaysian 
Posi tion began to emerge. A series of meetings generally 
attended by the same officials had generated a great deal of 
momentum tOwards formulating a Malaysian negotiating position. 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed Ambassador/Tan Sri 
/ 
Razali Ismail, Malaysia's Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations in New York to lead the Malaysian negotiating team in 
the UNCED preparatory process. Ambassador Dato' M.M Sathiah, 
the Deputy Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
headed the national delegation to the INC' meetings on the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change while Ambassador Ting Wen 
Lian, Malaysia's Ambassador to Italy and Permanent 
Representative to the Food Agriculture Organisation (FAO), led 
the national delegation to the meetings on the INC on the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. The other members of the 
Malaysian negotiating team were identified according to the 
functions they assumed in the NSC or its technical committees. 
To ensure continuity and effectiveness, the Cabinet agreed 
to the suggestion of the NSC that the same personalities 
represent the Malaysian government throughout the UNCED 
14 
negotiating process. Such a decision was crucial as it ensured 
commitment on the part of the involved ministries and 
departments to participate fully throughout the UNCED process. 
With the never-ending series of meetings at home and abroad, it 
had been difficult for heads of departments to release officials 
to attend the UNCED related meetings as environment was not the 
only important item under their portfolio. In fact, before the 
UNCED process started, environment was not even in most of the 
officials' portfolios. Thus, while the commitment on the part 
of the. various government agencies was lacking at the beginning, 




the inability of the representatives from both the domestic 
~ 
sector and the foreign office to come to terms on how to 
approach the whole range of issues. There was also some degree 
of uneasiness on' the part of the domestic sector to see the 
Foreign Ministry taking the lead. On this aspect, the diplomats 
claimed that the UNCED process could not" be left to the 
ecologists alone. Because of its close ties with a whole range 
of human activities, the environmental issue had become 
political and too serious a matter to be left to the ecologists. 
To the Foreign Ministry, the environmental issue was to be 
handled in terms of national interests and in terms of promoting 
the national image. To the domestic sector, it was a question 
of planning, implementating and monitoring projects specified 
by the national development plans. However, the continuous 
interaction among the officials and the opportunities opened for 
them to attend the Prepcoms and the two INCs meetings abroad, 
provided them with a better understanding of the issues at 
stake. One official from the domestic sector commented that 
UNCED had successfully transformed the environment officials 
into diplomats and the diplomats into environmentalists. 
15 
~iplomatic Strategy 
Having shaped the Malaysian position, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs began to devise a strategy to gain acceptance of the 
Malaysian position by as ma"ny countries as possible. Over the 





regularly apprised via circular telegrams about UNCED and 
Malaysia's stand on the issues involved. The Malaysian 
diplomatic missions were instructed to engage their host 
governments in a continuous dialogue to inform, influence and 
to gain acceptance of the Malaysian position. A constant flow 
of telexes between Kuala Lumpur and the missions abroad enabled 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be au courant of subtle 
changes in foreign attitudes and to provide new information 
16 
sensitive to other governments' concerns. 
As the Malaysian position evolved, the Malaysian Permanent 
Missions at New York and at Geneva were instructed to shoulder 
a predominant role in closely coordinating these. diplomatic 
initiatives with other like-minded countries, beginning with the 
ASEAN countries, the members of the Non-aligned Movement and the 
Group of 77 and China. Among these countries, Malaysia worked 
very closely with India, China, Algeria, Ghana, Bolivia and 
Kenya, all which showed exceptional interest in taking an active 
role in the UNCED process. The obj ecti ve of the Malaysian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to move the developing countries 
of the South towards a consensus on issues. 
In addition to the diplomatic contacts, the Malaysian 
diplomatic missions were instructed to gauge public opinion in 
their host countries.· Press and electronic media reports on the 
environmental issues of the host countries as well as their 
reaction to the issues propagated by the South were to be 
monitored and relayed home. Heads of Missions were encouraged 





academic community or the business sector of the host/country 
/' 
as a means to clarifying the Malaysian position on various 
issues of contention such as the forest issue, global warming 
and the cross sectoral issues. At various international 
meetings, the Malaysian chief negotiator encouraged the members 
of the negotiating team to accept press, radio and television 
interviews as an integral element of diplomatic strategy. 
17 
Another area of diplomatic strategy was carried out at the 
personal ministerial level. The Prime Minister and other 
Cabinet Ministers were constantly provided with updated briefs 
and talking points on the UNCED issues, which became useful 
during their meetings with their foreign counterparts. The Prime 
Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of 
International Trade and Industry regularly receive foreign 
digni taries and during these calls, the Malaysian ministers took 
the opportunity to impart the Malaysian stand while at the same 
time they attempted to influence the other side. 
As the dates of the UNCED Summit drew nearer, the Malaysian 
parliamentarians became equally involved and interested in the 
UNCED issues. Debates during the Parliamentary sessions of the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) and the Dewan Negara 
(Senate) touched on the question of the environment as well as 
MalaYSia's stance on-certain issues. Questions were posed, for 
eXample, on what efforts Malaysia was taking to allay the 
possibility of a foreign boycott of its tropical timber 
products; on whether the haze problem in the country which 





(Indonesia) would be settled bilaterally; and whether the 
Government had any plan to check the illegal discharges and 
accidental oil spills occurring in the Straits of Malacca. As 
parliamentary questions increased, officials, particularly from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment became occupied with preparing 
draft answers and sitting in on parliamentary duties to assist 
their ministers. With the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Malaysian parliamentarians participating in the 
ASEAN Interparliamentary Organisation (AIPO) meetings seized the 
occasion to initiate debates on the subject. 
The local media gradually stepped up coverage on 
environmental problems at home while at the same time relating 
them to the international scene. Under the New Straits Times 
Press Environmental Education Project, schools enthusiastically 
started their campaigns on planting trees and collecting 
discarded newspapers to assist in the recycling process. Two 
million kilogrammes have been collected since the project 
started in 1991. The local press featured schools which 
ini tiated the Sekolah Dalam Taman (' School in the Garden') 
projects in which pupils were encouraged to start a garden in 
the school compound from an environmental and educational point 
of . 18 Vl.ew. 
As the subject of the environment became a household word, 
public complaints on environment transgressions also increased. 
Industries were being questioned about their commercial ethics 
18 
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60 
as they continued to operate without taking into account the 
/~ 
need for instituting pollution control measures and installing 
anti-pollution devices. The media focused the environmental 
deterioration occurring in the squatter areas in the urban and 
semi-urban areas where the problem was even more serious as 
various types ·of wastes were disposed of indiscriminately. In 
activi ties related to the exploitation of natural resources such 
as timber and mangroves, the media played an important role in 
emphasizing the importance of preserving the national heritage 
by setting aside areas as protected forests, marine and coastal 
19 
recreational parks, wildlife sanctuaries and nature reserves. 
How successful all these efforts were in determining 
Malaysia's final position at UNCED remains uncertain. It is 
also unclear whether there was any correlation between the 
increasing public awareness at home and the official 
Contribution at UNCED. Unlike, the United States where the NGOs 
and the lobby groups can strongly influence the. official 
Position, there was practically no pressure group that mattered 
in the case of Malaysia. If there were criticisms, (and there 
were many), they were within the confines of the bureaucracy. 
Gurmit Singh, President of the Environmental Protection Society, 
Malaysia (EPSM) criticised Malaysians in general for their 
environmental apathy; claiming that only when something major 
happens would they get excited and start doing something about 
it. He cited the example of the RMIOO million project to clean 
the Klang River as ineffective and slow. While a large number 
of towns have greenery, drains .did not dramatically become 
-
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cleaner. In addition, while lead levels were reduced in.petrol, 
./ 
the continuing increase in private vehicle use offsets any 
possible air quality improvement in the cities. The biggest 
challenge, he believed, was to get more people to become 
interested in the environment movement. People had become 
discouraged fighting for environmental causes after a while 
20 
because they do not get to see immediate results. 
MOBILISING THE SOUTH 
This section describes the initiatives undertaken by Malaysia 
and a handful of like-minded countries towards mobilising the 
support of developing countries for a common position on the 
UNCED issues. This issue was addressed in regional and 
Political groupings and at various regional conferences. 
UNGA Resolution 44/228 stressed the importance of holding 
regional conferences on the environment and development, with 
the full cooperation of the regional commissions. It recommended 
that the results of such regional conferences be introduced into 
the preparatory process for the Conference, bearing in mind that 
regional conferences should make important substantive 
21 
Contributions to the Conference. 
The UN General Assembly recognises a number of geographical 
groupings within the'system. These include the African group, 
the Asian group, ASEAN (Association of South-east Asian 
-
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Nations), the Latin American Group, the Nordic countries, the 
~ 
Western European and others and the former Socialist states. 
In addition, the UN also recognises political and economic 
groupings such as the Commonwealth, League of Arab States, NATO, 
the Non-aligned Movement, Organisation of African Unity, the 
OECD, the EU and the Group of 77 which is' comprised of 129 
developing countries. 
22 
Malaysia, together with a few like-minded countries saw in 
these groupings an opportunity to launch a platform for 
building solidarity among the countries of the South. In 
particular, it concentrated on the Group of 77, which has become 
an important institutionalised group within the UN system. 
Marc Williams considers the G 77 as the central economic 
bargaining arm of the Third World coalition. It is concerned 
with reform of the international economic order and on 
international environmen.tal issues, the G 77 approaches specific 
problems from the perspective of the poorer members of 
international society. It is based on the premise that the 
Unfettered operation of market forces leads neither to 
efficiency nor equi ty and that this demands various 
interventions in the market in order to correct structural 
• 23 
lnequalities. 
The G 77 has no permanent secretariat. The chairmanship 
in New York rotates among regions every twelve months and in 
-
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Geneva, every four months with the chairing countries providing 
H 
minimal secretarial services. During the UNCED meetings, the 
G 77 met privately to discuss common positions on the important 
agenda items. The North have become accustomed to waiting for 
position papers or statements from the Group and over a number 
of issues such as finance and forests, the G 77 has been able 
to persuade the conference to use their text as a basis of 
discussion. 
In a coalition of 129 countries, there is bound to be 
Conflict- and a diversity of interests. But the fact that the 
G 77 as a group has survived and become more cohesive since its 
formation in 1964, shows that even if there were conflicts, they 
did not exist across the board. On the other hand, it is evident 
that where a country has no interest either way over an issue 
or where it has no antagonistic interest, it helps strengthen 
the coalition by supporting the stand of the group against its 
adversary. This is done not by remaining silent, but by 
attending the meetings and consultations and voicing its 
oPinions. As an illustration, the issue of desertification is 
one that is felt strongly by the African countries, but the 
Group as a whole were unanimous in wanting a convention. As 
eXplained by C. Raghavan, none of the countries of the South have 
the capacity or weight to act on their own. All are weak but if 
they act together, they can collectively bring some weight to 
bear on important issues. If the South does not stand together, 
they will all be hung individually. While they might be hung 
-24 
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collectively in the long run, the other side would have too many 
/'/ 
b d " 25 o 1es to dispose of. 
It is important to note that Malaysia's initial effort at 
mobilising the South was not a calculated move aimed at getting 
the maximum advantage in what was considered a tough negotiation 
with the North. Rather, it was drawn into the scene when, by a 
system of rotation, it was made chair of the G 77 in 1989 - the 
crucial year when the debate on the environment led to the 
26 
drafting of the UN resolution 44/228. Malaysia assumed its 
expected role, which included articulating common positions on 
the agenda items and undertaking other initiatives proposed by 
the group. In the same year, Malaysia also chaired and hosted 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kuala 
Lumpur, further providing it with an opportunity to promote the 
environmental agenda at the Commonwealth Summit. 
~alaysia's initial contribution to the UNCED debate 
It is relevant to trace Malaysia's initial contribution to the 
UNCED debate before examining its role wi thin the regional 
groupings in more detail. Malaysia's initial contribution to the 
debate on the proposed environment conference was reflected in 
the decisions of the Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting held in 
October 1989 and the'Ninth Summit of the Non-aligned Movement 
held in Belgrade in September 1989. Both these meetings 
~--------------------
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endorsed the candidacy of Brazil as host for the United/Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992. At the 
Forty-Fourth session of the UN General Assembly, Malaysia' s 
Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Ghafar Baba emphasised that on an 
important question such as the environment, there should be 
shared responsibility. Constraints, he emphasised, should not 
be imposed upon the development process in the developing 
countries which are conscious of the need to maintain and 
preserve their own environment while coping with poverty, 
hunger, social depression and recurrent natural disasters. He 
highlighted that the United Nations could be a very useful forum 
in bringing about a clearer understanding of the world' s 
environmental problems and therefore the work within the United 
Nations system should be encouraged. 
27 
For Malaysia, its first substantial contribution towards 
the UNCED process outside the United Nations was made when it 
hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
Kuala Lumpur on 18 to 23 October, 1989. In preparation for the 
Summit meeting of the forty nine countries, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Malaysia formulated the initial drafts of 
What was later known as 'the Langkawi Declaration on Environment 
28 
and Development'. The Declaration spelled out a programme of 
action which incorporated concepts of equitable sharing of 
responsibili ties and benefits of the developing countries' 
ability to respond to environmental challenges. It recognized 
that developing countries must be substantially assisted to -27 
UN document: A/44/PR.20, dated 5 October, 1989 . 
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sustain their development effort and that economic growth is a 
~ 
compelling necessity if sustainable development is to be 
attained. It further underlined that environmental concerns 
should not be used to introduce a new form of conditionality in 
aid and development financing or as barriers to trade. The 
Langkawi Declaration is said to consti tuteO the first formal 
meetings of minds of leaders from both the developed and 
developing countries of the Commonwealth. In addition, it 
incorporated the fundamental concept of interlinking 
environmental and development issues, which was later to become 
part and parcel of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development. 
29 
It was against the background of these discussions held at 
the various fora that the UNGA resolution 44/228 was drafted and 
adopted on 22 December, 1989. The final draft resolution was 
based on a text prepar;ed by the Group of 77 and China. As 
Chairperson of the Group, Malaysia found it daunting to 
Synthesize the different positions of the three main sub-groups: 
ASia, Africa and Latin America. Having nursed a common platform, 
the challenge for the Chairman was to effectively enunciate the 
G 77's position in a manner that would establish understanding 
and compromise on the part of the developed countries. It was 
also necessary to temper enthusiasm and not to go overboard in 
Championing the G 77 position to the extent of losing 
-29 ' 
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During the handing-over ceremony of the chairmanship of 
the Group of 77 from Malaysia to Bolivia on 3 January 1990, 
Malaysia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail, stated' that the common 
Position on the environment which culminated in the adoption of 
the resolution was the highlight of the Group of 77 for 1989. 
He underlined that the agreement by the other partners to accept 
the Group's position on the environment during the General 
Assembly was a matter of satisfaction and that global 
interdependence would be judged by the results of the 1992 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development. 31 
ASEAN meetings on the Environment 
ASEAN's stand on the a~vironment is formulated by the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME) which meets 
biannually in the different ASEAN capitals. The AMME is preceded 
by the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on the Environment (ASOEN) 
which sets the agenda of the forthcoming AMME meetings. The 
AMME is headed by the Minister of the Environment of the ASEAN 
COUntries and its officials come from the respective Environment 
Ministries and Agencies. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs are 
represented in the meetings and advise their delegations on 
international issues particularly in areas of contention. -
30 .. 
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The objectives of the AMME include initiating efforts on 
environmental and natural resources management, formulating 
policies and strategies on sustainable development, harmonising 
environmental quality standards, preventing and abating 
transboundary pollution practices and undertaking research and 
development and the promotion of the use of clean technologies. 
Taking the cue from resolution 44/228, the six members of 
the ASEAN countries
32 
took the opportunity to include UNCED 
matters in the agenda items of its meetings. The emphasis on the 
environment had earlier appeared in the ASEAN Summit Communique 
in Manila in December, 1987 in which it adopted the principle 
of sustainable development and the incorporation of 
environmental concerns into the economic planning activities of 
ASEAN. On 18-19 June, 1990, the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Environment (AMME) held in Malaysia, deliberated to produce the 
'Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and Development'. The 
KUala Lumpur Accord demonstrated the agreement of the ASEAN 
member countries to formulate a common ASEAN position to be 
PreSented to the Ministerial Level Conference on the Environment 
for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok in November 1990 and to the 
1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and 
Development. ASEAN's formal position on UNCED appears in the 
'Singapore Resolution on the Environment and Development,' which 
\>las adopted during the Fifth AMME held in Singapore on 18 
February 1992. 
--32 ---------
MMembers of ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
alaYSia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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During the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting of 17 Fe~Euary 1990 
held in Kuching, Sarawak, the members of ASEAN countries were 
able to engage the EU, which was its most active dialogue 
partner in terms of its economic cooperation programme, to 
consider assisting the upgrading of ASEAN's facilities, 
capabilities and expertise in the areas of management of natural 
resources and environment monitoring through technical and 
financial assistance. The ASEAN ministers also cautioned their 
partners against introducing new forms of conditionality in aid 
and development 
33 
financing. The latter's emphasis was 
particularly significant to tropical timber producing countries 
like Malaysia and Indonesia which were witnessing pressure from 
the European Parliament to ban the importation of tropical 
timber from Sarawak because of its allegedly excessive 
deforestation effects. The commitment made at the ASEAN-EU 
Ministerial Meeting wa$ reflected in the ASEAN-EU Communique 
where a great deal of effort was made by both sides to agree on 
a text negotiated at length by their officials. 
At the initial stages of the UNCED process, Malaysia 
appeared to be the only country among the members of ASEAN which 
was enthusiastic about the UNCED negotiating process. Al though 
Singapore's Ambassador Tommy Koh was elected Chairman of the 
UNCED Prepcom meetings and displayed his diplomatic skills as 
brilliantly as he did as Chairman of the Finance Committee at 
the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the other members of the Singapore negotiating team put on a low 
--~------------------33 
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profile in terms of deliberating on the various,/ issues. 
Indonesia's commitment to the UNCED process appeared less than 
serious at the beginning when members of its negotiating team 
not only changed at every meeting, but at times even 
contradicted its earlier positions. Brunei, Thailand and the 
Philippines appeared relatively late on the scene. It is not 
clear as to why these countries were initially indifferent to 
UNCED. One argument is that either they had no specific areas 
of interest to promote or defend, or because unlike Malaysia, 
they were not accused of environmental degradation by any sector 
in the international community. It could also be a reflection 
of the developing countries' limitations to participate in yet 
another international conference due to their lack of expertise 
d . 34 an avallable resources. These factors reappeared when the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to call for a day's 
debriefing for the heads of the diplomatic missions in Kuala 
Lumpur, the week following the Rio Summit. The debriefing was 
divided into two sessions, the morning, allotted for the Heads 
of Missions of the developed countries and the afternoon, 
allotted for the Heads of Missions of the developing countries. 
The morning session ended after four hours of discussion with 
many questions asked of the Malaysian delegation. On the other 
hand, although there'were more representatives present in the 
afternoon session, the debriefing lasted for fifteen minutes as 
there were hardly any contributions across the table.
35 
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Malaysia's special interest in UNCED was attributed to the 
fact that among the ASEAN countries, Malaysia was the only 
country which saw itself as unfairly targeted during the UNCED 
discussions particularly on its alleged aggressive deforestation 
activities. The European Commission was under strong pressure 
to act on the resolutions of the European Parliament to ban the 
importation of tropical timber from Sarawak. The Municipal 
Councils in the Netherlands and in Belgium had started banning 
the use of Malaysian tropical timber products in the 
Construction of their Municipal buildings. In Austria and the 
United Kingdom, pressure was r~fe among interested groups to 
36 
introduce legislation on Ecolabeling of tropical timber 
products which Malaysia conceived as being directed at 
restricting the imports of tropical timber from Malaysia. NGOs 
from the North, particularly in Germany, were advocating the 
boycott of tropical harQwood and promoting the use of temperate 
woods in view of the alleged large-scale deforestation and to 
the displacement of the Penans who dwelled in the forests of 
Sarawak. In Australia, the government had engaged a consultant 
firm in association with the Forestry Technical Service to 
assess the environmental and socio-economic impact of 
AUstralia's import of tropical timber products and to make 
recommendations on how Australia might adjust its role in the 
international timber market. The remarks made by Prince Charles 
at a meeting with scientists and environmental groups in London 
alleging that Brazil and Malaysia were involved 
---36 ------------------
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in 
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indiscriminate logging and-genocide of forest inhabitants did 
not go unnoticed. At the United Nations, a petition initiated 
by the World Rainforest Movement was presented, proposing an 
immediate ban on all imports of tropical timber and wood 
products from the virgin rain forests. In addition, the call by 
the Group of 7 at Houston to have a world forest convention was 
seen by Malaysia as a move to restrict the exports of its timber 
37 
products. 
Being the world's largest producer of tropical timber, 
Malaysia saw the above moves as attempts to impede its timber 
trade on environmental pretexts. 
Given the situation, Malaysia took every opportunity to 
introduce its text in every ASEAN resolution pertaining to the 
environment. In this regard, Malaysia made certain that the 
same negotiator attended the related ASEAN meetings. In 
eXceptional cases wher€ the negotiator could not attend, the 
leader of the delegation was fully briefed with an instruction 
to ensure that the Malaysian text got into the final document. 
The Malaysian Missions abroad were instructed to consult 
With and to keep its ASEAN counterparts constantly informed of 
the latest developments within the UNCED discussions. In 
preparation for the first INC on the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the Malaysian Permanent Mission to the United 
Nations in New York convened a meeting of ASEAN member 
COUntries on 11 February, 1991 to discuss a possible common 
POSition on the subject. Malaysia drafted an informal paper on 




members. At the meeting, the ASEAN member states agreed that the 
scope of ASEAN cooperation would be on a geographical rather 
than on a political basis. Once an ASEAN position was adopted, 
it was agreed that ASEAN should solicit the support of the other 
non-ASEAN members in the region such as Indo-China, Myanmar and 
the small Pacific Island countries in the South. 
It is worth noting that while on the whole the ASEAN member 
countries were willing to accept Malaysia's active role in 
developing a common stand for UNCED, there remained one issue 
in which Malaysia had difficulty right from the outset in 
promoting its views. This was the issue of marine pollution in 
the Straits of Malacca. 
The Straits of Malacca is one of the most heavily travelled 
waterways in the world, ranking behind only the Straits of Dover 
" 38 
l.n the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar. Its 
posi tion in the South. China Sea makes it an important and 
strategic international sea lane and its susceptibility to 
Pollution has become a major concern in recent years. This has 
been due to the increase in activity in this narrow Straits as 
a large number of ships, averaging 150 vessels, pass through the 
Strai ts daily. The pollution potential resulting from 
cOllusions, groundings, discharges from tank cleaning, leaks and 
Oil spills has caused great concern to Malaysia as the main 
fishing and tourism facilities are located along the Straits. 39 
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It was due to such apprehension that the Malaysian Prime 
Minister made a number of attempts to focus the attention of the 
world community on the problem. The concern was reiterated by 
the Prime Minister when he addressed the ASEAN Summit in 
Singapore in January, 1992: 
Whose responsibility is it to keep the international 
sea lanes safe? The littoral states collect no dues. 
Nor are they rich. On the other hand, maritime 
patrols by sea and air are expensive. The maintenance 
of equipment and personnel to fight spillage and 
other damages are equally costly[ •.. ] Is it too much 
to ask that those who use the passage and the 
maritime nations contribute towards the cost of 
keeping them free and safe? 
In formulating the ASEAN common stand on UNCED, Malaysia 
SUggested at the Fifth AMME held in February, 1992 that littoral 
states enact and enforce strict vessel effluent standards in the 
Straits, make tanker pilotage mandatory at the vessel's expense, 
require vessel owners to contribute to a fund for maintenance 
of oil spill clean-up facilities and enforce regulations against 
land-based pollution: The suggestion received strong opposi tion 
from Singapore and to a lesser extent from the Philippines, both 
of whom subscribe to keeping the Straits open and free. Wi thin 
minutes after the suggestion was made by the official head of 
the Malaysian negotiating.team, the meeting room was crowded 
With officials from the Singapore Legal and Marine Department 
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as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were determined 
to ensure that the suggestions did not materialise. After a long 
and difficult debate with its ASEAN counterparts, Malaysia had 
to contend with the following vague formulation: 
In addressing development and global issues, the AMME 
agrees that ASEAN member countries shall [ ... ] 
explore the desirability of having flag States 
contribute to and help ensure safe navigation for 
the protection of the maritime environment. 
On its own, Malaysia raised the issue of the Straits of 
Malacca at the various sessions of the UNCED Prepcoms. Its 
proposals for a universal management of coastal pollution were 
tUrned back by Europe which preferred the less constricting 
concept of regional control. Jacqueline Roddick observed that 
eVerywhere, Northern countries showed themselves conscious of 
the cost (to themselves) of a fundamental overhaul of the 
economic and technological system, cautiously willing to defend 
their own sovereignty on crucial issues, wary of accepting 
responsibility for past damage in a way which could encourage 
Claims for compensation, and apprehensive of giving power to 
institutional mechanisms to manage a new development in which 
they might for once find themselves on the receiving end of good 
adv' 40 lce. 
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Left with little choice, Malaysia had to be content with 
the final documents on Agenda 21 which made vague references to 
the protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, coastal areas and the 
protection, rational use and development of their living 
41 
resources. 
~ummit-level Group for South-South Consultation and Cooperation 
IGroup of 15) 
On 3 June, 1990, Malaysia hosted the first Summit of the Group 
of Fifteen (G 15) in Kuala Lumpur. The G 15 was formally 
inaugurated in Belgrade during the Ninth Summit of the Non-
aligned Movement held in September, 1989. At the Summit, a 
group of leaders from the South decided to form the Summit-level 
Group for South-South Consultation and Cooperation which was 
comprised of fifteen countries representing the Asian, African 
and the Latin American region. 
42 
The rational of the new 
grouping was that as the international economic environment 
became increasingly competitive and mercantilistic in nature, 
the interests of the developing countries became progressively 
neglected. In addition, the South professed that the agenda of 
the developed countries was being imposed upon the international 
economic and trading system at the expense of the developing 
----------------------41 
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Members of G 15 are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yugoslavia 
i~Uspended in 1991), Nigeria, Algeria, Se~egal, Eg~pt, 
51mbabwe, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Argent1na Jama1ca and 




countries. The Group of Fifteen thus aimed to bring about a 
collective voice and weight to bear on important global economic 
issues that affected them. It seeks to promote economic 
cooperation among developing countries to reduce its 
overdependence on the developed countries for both assistance 
and markets. 
44 
On the issue of the environment, the first summit of the 
Group of Fifteen affirmed that any global initiative aimed at 
OVercoming environmental problems required concerted 
international cooperation based on an equitable sharing of 
responsibilities which took into account existing asymmetries 
between developed and developing countries. In this connection, 
the Group declared that developing countries required 
substantial additional resources for pursuing their goals of 
Sustainable development, including access to environmentally 
sound technologies at affordable costs and the establishment of 
funding mechanisms. It also recognised the importance of 
COordinating its positions on issues of concern to them on the 
agenda of the forthcoming United Nations Conference in Brazil. 45 
It is interesting to note that apart from making official 
declarations on the environment which were reflected in the 
COmmunique, the Group of Fifteen never really coordinated their 
POsi tions on UNCED. This may be attributed to the fact that the 
Personal Representatives accompanying the Heads 
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States/Government were either not au fait with the/subject or 
did not consider the subject important enough to be deliberated 
in detail by the Group given the fact that there was already a 
permanent forum, i.e. the Prepcoms, to discuss UNCED. It was in 
such a situation that Malaysia was able to introduce its text 
on UNCED in the final documents of the G 15. Malaysia ensured 
that the same member of the UNCED negotiating team followed 
through all the meetings of the G 15. Malaysia even assisted 
the Technical Support Facility, which acts as the secretariat 
of the-G 15, to prepare the background document on UNCED for the. 
Summits. 
~he Beijing Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on 
~he Environment and Development. 
On 18-19 June, 1991, China hosted the Beij ing Ministerial 
Conference of Developing Countries on the Environment and 
Development which was attended by 41 countries. China had been 
an active member of the UNCED· preparatory process and had 
Contributed significantly to formulating the position of the 
South as reflected in United Nations resolution 44/228. 
Although a developing country, China is not a member of the 
Group of 77 but shares common views with the Group. 
The Beijing conference was significant, as among the many 
caucuses the South had thus far, none had come closer to 
bringing relevant substantive inputs that could account for the 
SOuth's contribution to UNCED. The ASEAN resolutions on the 
Environment and the G 15 common stand on the issue had 
disSipated by the time they arrived at the Fourth Prepcom. On 




light many differing aspects which were concentrated on until 
Rio: the concept of differentiated responsibility, the 
integrated approach to the environment and development, the 
concept of compensation, inputs and the approach of linkage 
politics. 
Being a populous country with one-third of the reserves of 
coal in the world, China relied on coal for 77 percent of all 
primary energy in 1985 and expects to still rely on coal for 67 
46 
percent of its energy production until 2020. Having abundant 
and therefore cheap fossil fuels, it has been a target of many 
NGOs' criticisms for carbon ~ioxide emission, which causes 
global warming. With the new wave of ecological awareness 
emerging in the 1980s, scientists, political leaders, NGOs and 
international organisations felt a common concern over the 
protection of the ozone layer. Failing to accept a share of 
responsibility and opting actively to aggravate the problem 
Would not be an easy course for China to follow. It was against 
this background that China found it important to host the 
Ministerial Conference aimed at intensifying efforts to consult 
and coordinate the positions of developing countries so as to 
safeguard the interests of China and the other developing 
COuntries as a whole. 
Malaysia did not miss the opportunity to participate 
actively at the Beij ing Conference, particularly in drafting the 
Beijing Ministerial Declaration on the Environment and 
Development. The Beijing Declaration based its formulation on -46 
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United Nations resolution 44/228 which had originated from the 
text of the Group of 77. Being a special conference of 
developing countries, the emphasis was tailored to their needs 
and problems. 
At the conference, the Ministers rei terated that 
environmental problems should not be viewed in isolation but 
addressed together in the process of development, by integrating, 
environmental concerns with the imperatives of economic growth 
and development. Poverty in the developing countries, they 
emphasised, was hampering the efforts to meet the legitimate 
needs and aspirations of their ,people and exerting even greater 
pressure on the environment. 
47 
The Ministers also agreed that the special situation and 
needs of the developing countries should be fully taken into 
account with each country being allowed to determine the pace 
of transition, based on the adaptive capacity of its economic, 
Social and cultural ethos and capabilities. In this regard, the 
least developed countries, disaster-prone as well as island and 
low-lying developing countries should be given special attention 
b 48 Y the international community. 
The.Beijing Conference called upon the need for a new and 
equi table international economic order to correct the 
inequalities in the" current economic relations confronting the 
developing countries particularly with regard to debt, 
financing, trade and the transfer of technology. It argued that 
-47 ' 
Beijing Ministerial Declaration on the Environment and 
'Development, adopted on 19 June, 1991, paragraph 3. 
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these inequalities constrained their capability to participate 
effectively in global environmental efforts. 
49 
The Conference considered it important to stress that 
developing countries have the sovereign right to use their own 
natural resources in keeping with their developmental and 
environmental priorities. This right is inherent in Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Conference (and later reiterated in the 1992 
Rio Declaration) which accepts that States have, in accordance 
wi th the UN Charter and the principles of international law, the 
Sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
O
• 50 
wn env1ronmental policies. Related to this, the conference 
affirmed that environmental considerations should not be used 
as an excuse for interference in the internal affairs of the 
developing countries or to introduce any forms of conditionality 
in aid or development financing or to impose trade barriers 
affecting the export and development efforts of the developing 
countries. 
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In order to deal with the rapidly aggravating environmental 
Problems of the developing countries, the Conference called for 
a Special 'Green Fund' to be established to address problems not 
cOvered ,by specific international agreements, such as water 
Pollution, coastal pollution affecting mangrove forests, 
Shortages and degradation of fresh water resources, 
deforestation, soil loss, land degradation and desertification. 
-
49 
ibid., paragraph 5. 
50 
Patricia Birnie (1993), op.cit., p.349. 
51 
Beijing Declaration, op.cit., paragraph 6. 
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It stressed that the Fund should be managed on the basis of 
equitable representation from all countries, with easy access 
for developing countries. 
52 
The Beijing Conference continued to blame the developed 
countries for their unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption and for over-exploiting the world's natural 
resources. It accused the developed countries for their 
excessive emissions of green house gases both in historical and 
cumulative terms and in terms of current emissions. It 
underscored that, in· view of their main responsibility for 
environmental degradation, it must therefore take the lead in 
eliminating damage to the environment. This was .to be done by 
providing adequate, new and additional financial resources and 
the transfer of technology on preferential and non-commercial 
terms to developing countries. 
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A very important aspect of the conference was that 
developing countries at Beijing agreed that on their part, they 
too should contribute to the process of environmental protection 
by stepping up technical cooperation and the transfer of 
technology among themselves. Developing countries were also 
invited.to contribute on a voluntary basis, to the existing 
fu d 54 n s. 
-
S2 
Beijing Declaration, op.cit., paragraph 13. 
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Beijing Declaration, op.cit., paragraphs 7, 8, 12, 13, 21. 
S4 
Beijing Declaration, op.cit., paragraphs 10,' 22, 30. 
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The Beijing Ministerial Conference constituted one of the 
early attempts by developing countries to consult each other 
with the objective of arriving at a common position on UNCED 
issues. However, these positions although significant, were not 
comprehensive as UNCED had just entered into its second 
substantive discussion at the Precom meetings. The draft 
conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity as well 
as the Earth Charter were still in the initial process of 
formUlation at other fora and were therefore not discussed at 
the Beijing Conference. It was due to this limitation that the 
Chairman of the Conference informally suggested to the Malaysian 
M" " lnlster of SCience, Technology and the Environment who headed 
the Malaysian delegation, that a follow-up conference was 
necessary and that Malaysia might wish to host a second 
Conference as a follow-up to Beijing. 
The idea was pursued informally among the members of the 
delegations attending the Conference. The Head of the Malaysian 
delegation was convinced that there was general support from the 
other developing countries that a second conference was 
necessary and cautiously welcomed the idea of Malaysia hosting 
it Sometime during the months approaching the Earth Summit. 
It was only in early 1992 that the matter was raised at the 
Mala'7 " h d t d h ..r Slan Cabinet. The Environment Minister a no pursue t e 
idea " I t lmmediately after Beijing as the feeling was preva en at 
home that the Malaysian Prime Minister intended to boycott the 
Earth Summit. The Prime Minister was not encouraged by the 
cOnt.rnents made by international NGOs and some sectors in the 






Sarawak and ignoring the needs of the Penan communities through 
its excessive logging. Interviewed by the local press on 26 
August 1991, the Malaysian Prime Minister said it would be 
pointless for Malaysia to attend the Summit if the international 
environment movements had already decided to oust Malaysia from 
55 
the world. Echoing the views of the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of the Environment remarked that if the Prime Minister 
did not attend the Summit, neither could other officials. 
Whep. asked by the press to comment on the statement of the 
Prime-Minister, Ambassador Razali Ismail, the Malaysian chief 
negotiator, admitted that the statement had caught the attention 
of the Summit Secretariat which felt that the problem could be 
d . 56 ~Scussed at the conference itself. Malaysia had, by the Third 
Prepcom, played a predominant role and had been appointed as 
spokesman on Forests and Biological Diversity by the Group of 
77. Its presence at Rio was crucial as no other country would 
want to defend Malaysials interests at the Summit if it were 
absent. Ambassador Razali explained in a telephone press 
interview from Geneva where he was heading the Malaysian 
negotiating team at the Third Prepcom that the Prime Ministerls 
statement was not a final decision and that it was a good 
tactical decision as it gave Malaysia the choice of attending 
the Summit or otherwise. He added that while the campaign by the 
NGOs was a concerted effort to embarrass Malaysia and to II make 
it squirm and lose economicallyll and which might continue at 
----------------------55 ' 
. 'Dr.Mls stand on Earth Summit causing big stirl: 
~ Straits Times, 26 August, 1991. 
56 
~w Straits Times, 26 August, 1991. 
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Rio, the campaign was not a big issue and could be handled in 
due course. He added that the Malaysian delegation had to be 
resilient in facing such campaigns and continue to fight for 
what the country believed was important to be put forward in Rio 
as a number of countries were counting on Malaysia to highlight 
their problems. He continued that the Maiaysian delegation at 
the UNCED discussions were also receiving a lot of support from 
its own NGOs attending the same meetings, which had helped to 
prOject a positive image of the country. 
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Meanwhile, as the dates of the Rio Summit were drawing 
nearer, the National Steering, Committee continued its regular 
meetings to refine the Malaysian positions in preparation for 
Rio. The Cabinet continued to receive feedback on the results 
of the Prepcoms and the two INC meetings. Before Malaysia's 
formal announcement to attend UNCED, two Under-Secretary-
Generals of UNCED and UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong 
himself had come to Malaysia to persuade the Prime Minister to 
change his mind. It was only at the close of the Second 
Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on the 
Environment and Development which Malaysia hosted on 26-29 
April, -1992 that the Prime Minister announced that it was 
necessary for Malaysia to be at Rio to formally present the 
views of the countries of the South. 
, ~----------
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The Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on the 
Environment and Development. 
The Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on the 
Environment and Development was held in Kuala Lumpur on 26-29 
April, 1992. The Conference was held along the lines of the 
Beijing Ministerial Conference, aimed at" exchanging views and 
refining positions for the Rio Summit and the two INCs on 
Climate Change and Biological Diversity. It was intended to 
provide the opportunity for Malaysia to gather the support of 
other developing countries in addressing common concerns and 
ensuring that the outcome of UNCED would be beneficial from the 
Perspective of developing countries. The Conference, which took 
place three weeks after the end of the final Prepcom, was 
convened to allow developing countries to make political 
calculations on what would be in store at the Rio Summit, as 
Well as the implications, including the minimum position that 
the developing countries could agree upon that would constitute 
a successful outcome of the Summit from the point of view of the 
developing countries. 58 
The Second Ministerial Conference was attended by 55 
developing countries. Observers from Australia, Canada, the EU, 
Japan, Norway, Sweden and the United States had also flown in 
to Kuala Lumpur to' attend the Conference. From the International 
Organisations, the UNCED Secretary-General, Maurice Strong and 
MUstaffa Tolba, the Executive Director of UNEP addressed the 




WMO, ITTO, IFAD, the ASEAN Secretariat, the African National 
Congress and NGOs were also represented at the Conference. 
The Conference provided the developing countries the 
opportunity to assess the results of the Fourth Prepcom which 
had shown identifiable progress in some areas, particularly 
relating to land and terrestrial-based environmental issues, 
toxic chemicals, hazardous wastes and water-related issues. Some 
progress had also been achieved in the area of institutions, 
legal instruments and the Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development but the overall progress on the critical cross-
sectoral issues was limited. 
59 
The question of new and 
additional financial resources remained unresolved and proved 
to be the biggest disappointment for the developing countries. 
Commitments on financial resources were crucial for the 
developing countries as there was little faith that the 
environmental challenge could be met without adequate financial 
sUpport. By the end of the Fourth Prepcom, the developed 
cOuntries had remained uncommitted and unwilling to respond 
ei ther in terms of actual numbers or other tangible commitments. 
Added to this, the developing countries had to compromise upon 
the insistence of the developed countries that the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) shall remain the sole mechanism for 
funding environmental proj ects wi thin the framework of decisions 
to be taken at Rio as well as for the Framework Convention on-
Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Di versi ty. These 
-
S9 
'Outcome of Fourth Preparatory Committee of UNCED - An 
Assessment', Conference document: SMCED/SOM/INF.3. 
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outstanding problems preoccupied the minds of the~participants 
at the Kuala Lumpur Conference. 
The Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries 
was set to insist that there should be new and additional 
funding and that it should be provided in addition to, and 
separate from, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) target 
Commi tments of the developed countries (i. e. 0.7 percent of 
GNP). A specific and separate fund for the implementation of 
Agenda 21 should also be established with developing countries 
contributing on a voluntary basis. 
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It is relevant to note that the above formulation of the 
Declaration was a result of a very difficult, exhaustive and 
strenuous negotiation which continued until the late hours of 
the three-day conference and appeared to divide the developing 
countries at the Second Ministerial Conference. Some countries 
headed by China, India, Kenya, Ethiopia and Malaysia insisted 
that the developing countries should maintain its position of 
additional and separate funds.
51 
These countries insisted that 
in the event that the GEF was to be another appropriate funding 
mechanism after Rio, there must be a maj or transformation of the 
GEF, with universal membership encouraged and access and 
disbursement provided under agreed criteria which should be 
democratic in nature. It also specified that in seeking 
-60 
'Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Environment and 
Development', 26-29 April, 1992, paragraph 12. 
51 
The decision of G 77 and China on Financial Resources 
SUbmitted at the Fourth Prepcom appears in UN document 
A/CONF.151/PC/L40/rev.1. 
89 
modifications of the GEF, the role of the World Bank should be 
limited to that of being the repository of its funds. 
Among the developing countries, Brazil and the other Latin 
American countries were not too happy with the above 
formulation. Brazil appeared determined that as host, it wanted 
to ensure a smooth conference at Rio and was therefore hesitant 
not to be harassed with difficulties of reconciling North-South 
posi tions particularly when it was aware that the developed 
countries were not at all flexible on the issue of funding. The 
Latin American countries on the other hand' were reconciling 
their economic relations with the United States and the OECD, 
and, with NAFTA in the pipeline, countries like Mexico, 
Argentina and Chile appeared to be working on the assumption 
that by cooperating with the North, they would be able to make 
them more reasonable and responsive to the needs of the South. 
This assumption proved incorrect as seen from the outcome at 
Rio. The absence of any binding or specific commitment on new 
and additional financial resources to finance the programmes 
under Agenda 21 confirmed to the developing countries that the 
North were, right up to Rio, not willing to concede on the 
issue .. 
While the issue of financial resources was a difficult one 
to resolve, the' Second Ministerial Conference had little 
difficul ty in formulating the South's position on the other 
UNCED issues. These re"late to the Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development, Agenda 21, transfer of technology, 
institutions, the proposed conventions on Climate Change and 
Biological Diversity and the iss~e of forests~ 
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By the Fourth Prepcom, the Malaysian PrimeYlinister had 
become discouraged by the criticisms Malaysia was getting from 
the international community on its so-called large-scale 
deforestation activities. In his opening speech at the Second 
Ministerial Conference, he delivered his hard-hitting and frank 
views on the subject: 
We in Malaysia are fully aware of the role that the 
tropical forests are playing in preserving the 
-delicate balance in the environment. We are aware too 
of the thousands of species of flora and fauna that 
are to be found only in our forests. We are aware 
that trees absorb carbon dioxide and give back the 
precious oxygen without which we will all drop 
dead.[ ... ] But we are also acutely conscious that we 
are a developing country which needs the wealth 
afforded by our forests. We do not cut down our trees 
foolishly. We need living space, we need space for 
agriculture, and we need the money for the sale of 
our timber. If it is in the interest of the rich that 
we do not cut down our trees then they must 
62 
compensate us for the loss of income. 
On the issue of the Penans, the Prime Minister remarked: 
-
62 ' 
Keynote Address by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' 
Seri Dr.Mahathir Mohamad at the official opening of the 
Second Ministerial Conference of'Developing Countries on 
Environment and Development, Kuala Lumpur, 27 April, 1992. 
Stop making an issue of the Penans. Promote temperate 
timber if you must but accept competition by tropical 
timber. You advocate open markets and free trade. Now 
live up to your own creed. Stop linking trade and aid 
to developing countries. Stop arm twisting. 63 
91 
The extent to which the G 77 was able to rearticulate the 
South's. common position at the Rio Summit can be seen in 
Subsequent chapters. At this juncture suffice it is to say that 
on certain issues as Energy and Climate Change, there was a lack 
of unanimity. 
MALAYSIA'S 'INITIATIVE FOR THE GREENING OF THE WORLD' 
At the Second Ministerial Conference, Malaysia challenged the 
North by announcing a comprehensive programme for the greening 
of the world. In that proposal, known as the 'Initiative for the 
Greening of the World', it called upon the global community, in 
speCific terms and as an initial step, to target at least 30 per 
cent of the earth's terrestrial area to be greened by the year 
2000.
64 
It considered the target achievable considering that the 
world has already 27.6 per cent of its land under forest cover 
and needed only an increase of 2.4 per cent, or an average 
hectare increase of 0.3 per cent per year for eight years. 
-
64 
'An Initiative for the Greening of the World' pu~lished by 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Env1ronment, 
MalaYSia, 27 April, 1992. 
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Towards this end, Malaysia called upon all countries to set 
national greening targets with those not having suitable land 
area instead contributing adequate funds to developing countries 
with available land. A Global Green Fund should be established 
which would serve to finance reforestation and afforestation 
programmes as well as forest rehabilitation and maintenance, to 
support the global greening target. In proposing the initiative, 
Malaysia announced that while the minimal national target that 
was being suggested was 30 per cent, Malaysia undertook to set 
a higher standard for itself. As a contribution to the global 
Commons, Malaysia which had 56.2 per cent of its land mass under 
forest, pledged that at least 50 per cent of its land area would 
remain permanently under forest cover. The 50 per cent national 
target constituted the final challenge which Malaysia tabled 
before countries that were willing to back their strong words 
with real deeds. It hoped that the greening of the world would 
inspire a new spirit of international cooperation and 
partnership in which global resources could be fairly shared. 
If successful, it could solve at least partially an important 
en . 65 Vlronmental problem. 
A. considerable amount of effort was put towards the 
'Greening of the World' initiative. To be acceptable to the 
international community, the intended proposal had to be 
SUbstantiated by authentic data. In this context, research was 
carried out by ISIS of Malaysia and the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and the Environment on the practicality of the 
-----------------------65 
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initiative. Data on the total forest cover by_country (see 
Appendix) was taken from the 1989 Environmental Data Report of 
UNEP, the 1990 FAO Report on Global Overview Status and Trends 
of World's Forests and the 1991 World Development Report of the 
World Bank. The figures showed that only five developed 
countries (Austria, Finland, Spain, Sweden and Japan) had more 
than 30 percent of their total land area under forest cover as 
compared to 45 developing countries. 
There are some who saw the Malaysian proposal as an attempt 
to reprove the North which had largely destroyed their· own 
temperate forests in the search for national economic 
development, and now sought to lecture the tropical forests 
66 
countries to 'do as I say, not as I have done'. Roddick, on 
the other hand, saw the Malaysian initiative as a willingness 
to look at principles which could provide the basis for 
• 67 
lnternational agreereents. Her view is shared by Grubb et ale 
Given the fact that countries differ greatly in their current 
and historic forest cover, land resources and population 
densities, Grubb et ale did not consider it a very practical 
Proposal. Nevertheless, the willingness to talk in terms of 
targets, mechanisms and monitoring requirements contrasted 
Sharply with other countries' refusal to countenance any such 
intrusion on their sovereignty. The fact that this proposal 
could in principle form an opening gambit for negotiations on 
-
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yMark F. Imber, Environment, Security and UN Reform, (New 
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Rouse in·the Winds of Change' mimeo, 1995. 
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a binding agreement, combined with the Malaysian advocacy of the 
need for strong international supervision of global 
environmental problems, served to emphasise that their 
government's intense opposition to a forest convention of the 
form proposed by the developed countries was not based upon an 
approach of absolute sovereignty, but in large part upon 
differing perceptions of equity. 
68 
Amidst intense opposition, Malaysia's initiative on 
"Greening of the World" found itself in the final formulation 
of the Rio text on Forests. The North had fought hard to ensure 
that this proposal did not get into the final document, 
particularly where the proposed funding was concerned. However, 
upon the insistence of Malaysia and the other developing 




Efforts should be undertaken towards the greening of 
the world. All countries, notably developed 
countries, should take positive and transparent 
action towards reforestation, afforestation and 
69 
forest conservation, as appropriate. 
Michael Grubb et al., . The Earth Summit Agreements: A 
~de and Assessment, (London: Earthscan, 1993), p.36. 
69 . 
AdoPtion of Agreements on the Environment and Development: 
Non-legally binding authorati tati ve statement of principles 
for a global consensus on the management, conservation and 
SUStainable development of all types of forests; 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 dated June, 1992. 
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MALAYSIA AND THE ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Antarctica is an issue which Malaysia had tried to promote in 
the UNCED discussions and at regional conferences but without 
much success. At the First Prepcom at Nairobi, Malaysia took the 
floor to request that the Secretariat of UNCED report to the 
next Prepcom in Geneva on "Pollution-related problems and the 
status of living resources in Antarctica". Malaysia explained 
that the underlying fabric of resolution 44/228 was to provide 
the global opportunity within the United Nations to discuss all 
matters pertaining to the environment and development. In this 
regard, Malaysia claimed th~t there was sufficient scientific 
eVidence of the specific role and influence of Antarctica on the 
global environment. In reiterating its request, Malaysia 
70 
underscored the following arguments: 
The ozone hole was indeed discovered over the Antarctica, 
thereby providing. the international fillip to control 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). While the CFCs emanated from other 
parts of the world, Antarctica is now exposed to excessive 
ul tra-violet radiation which is harmful to not only human beings 
but also adversely affects all other living and non-living 
resOurces. Antarctica holds about 70 per cent of the world's 
aVailable fresh-water resources and about 90 per cent of the 
world's ice, which warrants discussion on the subject. The 
Antarctic is a fragile environment, vulnerable to the impact of 
human activities. The ability of the ecosystem to recover from 
~-.------------------70 
Intervention notes by·Malaysia at the First Prepcom, 
Nairobi, 5-31 August, 1990 on 'Antarctica: The need for 
relevant information on specific agenda items.' 
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change induced by humans is less than that of ecosystems 
elsewhere because of the extreme conditions and the simpliCity 
of the ecosystem. Any change in the Antarctic environment would 
have unpredictable impacts on the climate and environment in 
other parts of the world. The threat to global environment and 
ecosystems posed by the destruction of the environment and 
ecosystem of the Antarctic would be beyond question. 
Antarctica's importance also derives from its unique 
characteristic as the last wilderness of mankind. It is a global 
sCientific laboratory of immense value, with its uncontaminated 
nature providing a baseline against which one can measure 
Pollution and the extent and effects of global climate change. 
It enables research important to the study of global processes 
and the changing environment. The region holds many secrets of 
the earth's past. It may also be the best monitoring zone for 
global pollution from which to observe the degradation of the 
earth's natural system. The polar regions, being sensitive to 
Changes in the environment may act as warning signals to changes 
in the total energy flux of the . earth and to changes in the 
atmosphere. 
Antarctica therefore serves as a crucial area for mankind's 
efforts in trying to understand such phenomena as global warming 
and the thinning of the ozone layer. The melting of the 
Antarctic ice alone would raise the sea level significantly, 
~iPing out not only low level countries but centres of 
POpulation at coastal areas in many parts of the world. 
There were two underlying reasons why Malaysia raised the 
need to include Antarctica in the UNCED agenda. The first was 
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in keeping with the argument it started ten years earlier. At 
the 37th UNGA, the Malaysian Prime Minister asserted that the 
days when the rich nations of the world could take for 
themselves whatever territory and resources they had access to 
were over. Henceforth, all the unclaimed wealth of the earth 
should be regarded as the common heritage" of mankind. The second 
reason was to counter the North's preoccupation with the forest 
convention. As early as the First Prepcom, the intention 
appeared to have been determined. Rio was going to be about 
forests. Biodiversity was going to be about forests. And so was 
the greenhouse effect. 
Malaysia's statement on the subj ect stirred resentment 
particularly among the members of the Antarctic Treaty 
Consul tati ve Parties (ATCP) who strongly refused to allow 
Antarctica to be discussed within the UNCED process. A number 
of countries withi~ the G 77 were equally not keen to become 
embroiled in a debate which had proved futile as seen in the 
Previous UNGA discussions on the subject. Members of the G 77 
felt that it would be more worthwhile to concentrate on issues 
that were of concern to the developing countries such as the 
71 
cross-sectoral and development issues. 
The Group of 77 as a whole was not supportive of Malaysia's 
initiative because Antarctica was not a North-South issue and 
because it would implicate many developing countries which were 
party to the Antarctic T~eaty including Argentina, Brazil, Chile 




Tommy Koh and the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the 
Uni ted Nations informally advised the Malaysian negotiating team 
that it would be best if Malaysia did not pursue the matter 
which was not only difficult but also sensitive. Given the fact 
that it was the first substantive meeting to prepare for UNCED, 
Malaysia backed down to avoid a confrontation and long debate 
and even conceded that in any future discussion on Antarctica 
and the environment, the word 'Antarctica' would be replaced 
• 72 
w1th 'Polar regions'. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to meet the challenges to its economic well-being and 
its sovereign right to development, Malaysia had no choice but 
to assume an active role in the UNCED negotiations. A pro-active 
rOle was no longer a luxury it could not afford, but a necessity 
it could not do without. Although it had not intended to take 
sUch a serious role at the outset, its position as the rotating 
chairman to the G 77 at the time the UN resolution 44/228 was 
drafted, its role as host of the Commonwealth Summit, and the 
G 15, motivated it to get the most out of the process. 
As a developing country, the most valuable benefit of 
engaging in the preparatory process, from the national to the 
regional and the 'international level, was the contribution to 
the country's national experience. Whilst individually, the 
officers on the ground became seasoned in their trade and 




parts, i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the_participating 
missions and ministries mastered their lessons in cooperation, 
coordination and optimum utilisation of resources. For their 
well-earned effort, the Cabinet, in deliberating the impact of 
the Rio Summit, placed on record their satisfaction and 
congratulated the members of the National Steering Committee for 
having worked so well together as a cross-ministerial team.
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The preceding account demonstrates that preparation at the 
national level was an important aspect of the UNCED negotiation. 
It shows that in order for a country to exert its influence at 
the international front, a considerable amount of groundwork is 
required at the domestic level. This chapter has shown how a 
small, developing country such as Malaysia can effectively 
Organise and exert pressure in an international negotiation. 
Through its strategies of coalition-building, Malaysia entered 
the environmental negotiations with the purpose of defending its 
Own corner of interests as well as exercising some form of 
global leadership. The subsequent chapter will further 
illustrate how, given its limited capacity, Malaysia was able 








This chapter aims at explaining and analysing the process and 
substance of the UNCED negotiation. It is useful to analyse the 
negotiation in terms of its process, which was enormous. The 
preparations far exceeded almost all normal conceptions of a 
1 -
conference, as did the extensive documentation. Weiss, Forsythe 
and Coate portrayed the process itself, which was begun in 
response to the Brundtland Commission Report and the UNGA 
Resolution 44/228, as the most significant product of UNCED. 
Maurice Strong remarked that in many important aspects, "the 
process was policy" and the "process of building consensus" was 
Considered just as important as the outcome of UNCED or as any 
set of declarations or treaties. 
2 
Described as the largest conference the United Nations had 
3 
eVer held, UNCED provided a valuable learning experience in 
mul tilateral negotiation. The agenda of the conference was 
1 
See Shanna Halpren, 'UNCED: Process and Documentation'; 
Providence, RI: Academic Council on the United Nations 
SYstem, 1992 cited in T.G. Weiss, D.P. Forsythe and R.A. 
Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994). 
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~d Changing World Politics, (Oxford: Westview Press, 
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3 
See Tommy Koh, 'The Earth Summit Negotiating Process: Some 
Reflections in the Art and Science of Negotiation', in N.A. 
RObinson (ed.) Agenda 21 and UNCED Proceedings, (New York, 
London, Rome: Oceana Publications Inc., 1992), p.xiii. 
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extensive, the issues negotiated were complex and the large 
number of the participants to the conference affected the nature 
of the negotiating process. In addition, UNCED provided a rich 
laboratory for studying negotiating behaviour. 
From the outset, the Preparatory Committee concentrated on 
drafting a comprehensive agenda for actio"n (Agenda 21 comprising 
forty chapters and sub-headings), a declaration on the 
environment and development (The Rio Declaration) and a 
statement on forest principles. Alongside the negotiation 
process, two conventions on Biological Diversity and on Climate 
Change were being negotiated concurrently in time for signature 
at the Summit. These agreements were negotiated continuously 
oVer a span of two and a half years. 
UNCED however was not confined to process alone. As Winham 
explained, in multilateral negotiations, there is an interplay 
between 'substance '. and 'process' and while important lessons 
could be learned by studying the negotiation process, ultimately 
" process' can never wholly be divorced from 'substance'. UNCED 
Was also a negotiation of substance. The issues, which were 
bUil t on technical foundations, were far more numerous and 
complicated than anyone had expected, thereby demanding enormous 
preparatory work on the part of the negotiators. Yet, the 
substance cannot' be fully intelligible in the absence of an 
understanding of how the agreements came about. 
UNCED was a diplomatic conference and almost all the 
members of delegation were diplomats. Practically every delegate 
----'------------------" Gilbert R.Winham, International-Trade and the Tokyo Round 






received instructions from their government, not only from their 
foreign offices but also from environmental agencies and other 
governmental bureau whose domains were affected by the decisions 
taken at the UNCED meetings.
5 
The complexity of the process and 
the substance of the UNCED negotiation were intensified by the 
involvement of the NGOs in the UNCED process. The contributions 
of the NGOs, particularly the scientific, business and the 
professional groups, and their interactions with the government 
delegations and the Secretariat provided a rich source of 
learning experience for all delegations, especially those of the 
developing countries. 
However, in explaining the substance of the negotiation, 
only a selected number of issues will be discussed in this 
chapter. These issues have been selected on the basis of their 
importance to Malaysia in particular and to developing countries 
in general, given their limited capacity and varying interest 
in negotiating. Issues such as Institutional Arrangements, 
Transfer of Technology and Financial Resources and Mechanisms 
are cross-cutting issues which affected the whole agreement 
reached at Rio. The issues on Forests, Biological Diversity and 
Climate Change affected the national interests and challenged 
the sovereignty of these states while the negotiation on the Rio 
Declaration was important as it provided a basis and guideline 
for formulating future bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
on the environment and sustainable development. 
-----------------------s 
indian Ambassador Chinmaya Gharekhan interviewed by Earth 
~it Times, 26 March, 1992, p.4. 
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PART I: ELEMENTS AND PROCESS 
The UNCED Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) was organised into 
three working groups. Working Group I dealt with atmosphere, 
land resources (which included forests, soil loss and 
desertification), biological diversity and biotechnology. 
Working Group II was responsible for oceans, freshwater 
resources and wastes and Working Group III was involved with 
legal and institutional issues. Cross-sectorial issues such'as 
technology transfer, financial resources, international economy, 
trade, health, education, poverty and population were dealt with 
in the plenary, chaired by ~ommy Koh. 
UN working groups meet in three types of sessions: formal, 
informal (also referred to in UN parlance as "formal-informals") 
and informal-informals. In formal sessions, delegations, 
particularly ministers, make for-the-record statements which are 
translated into the various UN languages and are open to NGOs. 
The formal-informal are negotiating sessions which are 
translated but not transcribed. Informal-informals, a 
terminology first used at UNCED, are conducted in English. They 
range from open-ended meetings held in conference rooms, without 
translation, to small meetings held in the Chair's office, 
involving a limited number of delegations and sometimes referred 
to as "Friends of the Chair". Deliberations in the informal-
informals are usually confidential and are more confrontational 
because diplomats have ~ tacit understanding that all positions 
taken are tentative. In addition to these meetings, ad hoc 
meetings are held from time. to time to discuss particular 
104 
issues. Informal contacts are also held in the~coffee lounge 
where much of the real work of the Prepcom apparently occurs. 6 
Under ground rules proposed by the Prepcom chair, NGOs were 
allowed to speak at formal sessions and were also allowed into 
informal sessions but without speaking rights but were totally 
barred from the closed-door negotiation sessions of the 
informal-informals. The procedural rule determined that not more 
than two working group meetings could be held concurrently. This 
procedure was to enable countries with small delegations to keep 
up with the multitude of meetings held throughout the day. 7 
However, because of the size of the agenda and the limited time 
allotted to complete the negotiations, many of the ground rules 
and procedures were often ignored for the sake of expediency. 
As a result, countries with small delegations were unable to 
participate in some substantive discussions as more than one 
informal-informal meeting was taking place concurrently with 
other formal and informal meetings. In addition, because of the 
inconsistency of policy of the different working groups with 
regard to the access of NGOs to their informal sessions, tension 
grew between the NGOs and the governments as the sessions 
commenced. It was observed that informal-informal sessions of 
Working Group I and III varied in their hospi tali ty to NGO 
observers, while' those of Working Group II were consistently 
closed. 8 
-6 
~th Summit Bulletin, Vol.O No.1 dated 28 Aug, 1991, e-
~ail: written by 19oree in <en.unced.news> in 
19c:enb.library. 
7 
~Earth Summit Times, 5 March, 1992. 
8 
~h Summit Bulletin, Vol.O, No.2, 3 Sept. 1991. 
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The Secretariat assumes an important role in determining 
the success of any multi lateral negotiation. Wi thin a short span 
of time, the UNCED secretariat under Maurice Strong had the 
arduous task of writing very complex, consensus documents and 
producing voluminous, detailed and integrative reports that 
provided the background for the Prepcom deliberations. During 
the UNCED negotiations, tensions between the Secretariat and the 
governments were manifest on several fronts. There was a great 
deal of suspicion and resentment on the part of the government 
delegations that the Secretariat appeared to have its own agenda 
and was playing too large a.role in drafting the documents. At 
the Third Prepcom, many developing countries complained that the 
Secretariat documents spoke in a language that was essentially 
biased in that development aspects were being subsumed and 
neglected while more and more emphasis was given to 
environmental degradation in developing countries. 
9 
The Ecologist claimed that the corporate sector enjoyed 
Special access to the Secretariat throughout the UNCED process. 
This view was shared by the Third World Resurgence which 
asserted that the UNCED Secretariat under Maurice Strong ensured 
that references to the need for tighter regulation of companies 
Were avoided or erased from official documents and replaced by 
clauses which enhanced the role and acti vi ties of the TNCs. This 
Was particularly evident when Maurice Strong appointed the Swiss 
millionaire Stephan Schmidheiny, the Chairman of the newly 
created Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD), as 
----------------------9 
plhlrd World Resurgence, published by Third World Network, 
enang, Malaysia, No.14/15, Oct/Nov. 1991, p.25. 
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his personal advisor." Nicholas Hildyard illustrated how the 
special partnership with the Secretariat enabled the corporate 
interests to block discussion of the environmental impact of the 
transnational Corporations (TNCs). Recommendations drawn up by 
the UN's own Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), 
would have imposed tough global environmental standards on TNC 
activities. These were shelved and a voluntary code of conduct, 
drawn up by the BCSD was adopted instead as the Secretariat's 
. t. 10 lnpu lnto UNCED's Agenda 21. 
Winham has explained that the negotiating process is in 
fact a programmed set of. operations that has evolved from 
considerable experience. It consists of tabling a position, 
decomposing and aggregating the relevant information wherever 
Possible, and then setting about, point by point, to reconcile 
the different positions of 
11 
the parties. The negotiators 
Proceed towards agreement initially by tabling a position that 
is exploratory at best. To facilitate discussion, an interested 
party might produce a 'non-paper' or an 'approach paper' to 
explore the views of the negotiators. At this stage, negotiating 
teams rarely have a concept of what a final, acceptable 
agreement might look like, as serious thinking of what is 
aCCeptable is often done after serious negotiation has begun. 
Over time, and· through a process of 'trial and error', the 
-10 
On the influence of the corporate sector on the UNCED 
SeCretariat see The Ecologist: Whose Common Future?, 
"~London: E~rthscan publications Ltd., 1993) p.1; Third 
~ Resurgence, No. 24/25 Aug/Sept., 1992, p.3 and 
lhcholas Hildyard, 'in Wolfgang Sachs, Global Ecology, 
(London: Zed Books, 1993), p.28. 
11 
Gilbert R.Winham (1986), op.cit., p.99. 
107 
negotiators accumulate a settlement which is acceptable to all. 
This is particularly true of the UNCED negotiations. 
In an elaborate negotiation such as UNCED, one would 
consider strategy an important element in determining the 
success of a negotiator's position. However, this belief is 
disputed by the study conducted by the US State Department's 
'Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy' held in April, 1977.
12 
The 
Seminar produced a 'Checklist for Negotiators' which summarised 
the views of senior government officials on the actual conduct 
of- negotiation. The Checklist reflected· the practitioner's 
disinclination to think in terms of strategy. Practitioners tend 
to see negotiation as an application of common sense and are 
generally unwilling to commit themselves to any kind of 
strategy. This is because negotiations are not only fluid, 
unstructured and complicated, they are also too diverse across 
the board and even too diverse day by day for any planned 
strategy to be very useful. The first problem for the negotiator 
is to structure the situation; hence the emphasis on preparatory 
Work and the establishment of a negotiating framework rather 
than on strategy. 
·UNCED progressed through this first stage quite typically 
and moved on to the second stage. Here, strategy becomes 
relevant after' the negotiations succeed in defining and 
Clarifying the main outlines of the interaction. As 
disagreements become apparent, notably as the deadline 
approaches, negotiators employ methods of bargaining, trade--12 
I See Gilbert R. Winham, 'Practitioners' Views of 
(
nternational Negotiation', in World Politics, 32, No.1, 
Oct.1979), pp. 111 - 135. 
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offs, (also referred to as log-rolling or horse-trading) and 
linkages as tactics to resolve outstanding issues in a package 
deal. 
As in most large scale negotiations, the UNCED process 
progressed in stages and moved expeditiously as the deadline 
neared. Winham considers the time dimension of crucial 
importance to a negotiation as it forces negotiators to think 
of completion of parts wi thin parts of an overall agreement. An 
obvious deadline is likely to be advantageous to the process, 
lacking it, there is less pressure to resolve the issues. 
Deadlines are also necessary as senior members of the 
governments cannot be detained indefinitely in an exercise that 
Sometimes appears to be leading nowhere. 
13 
After five weeks of negotiation at the fourth and final 
Prepcom, held in New York in March/April, 1992, tension became 
apparent among the negotiators as many issues were still 
unresol ved as the Summit in Rio approached. There were 32 
documents which had to be considered and approved by the plenary 
and the negotiators were aware that bringing a large number of 
Unresol ved texts to Rio would put in question the success of the 
Summit as many heads of state and government might be 
diScouraged from attending.
H 
In a negot'iation as diversified and complicated as UNCED, 
the need for a chair or leader to conduct orderly and efficient 
interaction became ext~emely important. Ambassador Tommy Roh was 
-----------------------13 
14 
?ilbert R. Winham, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', 
ln World Politics, 30, Oct. 1977, pp. 87 - 114. 
'ROh to Plenary: Time is running out', Earth Summit Times, 
31 March, 1992. 
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elected as chair of the Prepcom and Main Committee of UNCED 
following the UN decision to convene the Summit. Koh brought 
some unusual credentials to the position. Educated in Singapore, 
Harvard and Cambridge, he had served as dean of the University 
of Singapore's law school in his early thirties. He had been 
the youngest ambassador ever appointed to the United Nations, 
and in 1978 was appointed to chair the special Law of the Sea 
15 
negotiating group dealing with financial arrangements. Twenty 
years earlier, he had established a good working partnership 
with Maurice Strong in preparing for the Stockholm Conference 
on Human Environment. 
During the last week of the Fourth Prepcom, Tommy Koh 
reminded the delegates that apart from the clean text of the Rio 
Declaration, the rest of the documents contained 350 bracketed 
POints or disputed language. It was the task of the Main 
Commi ttee to remove the brackets and to find acceptable language 
in time for the Summit. A number of ground rules were proposed 
to expedite this work. Koh suggested that all statements except 
those by visiting ministers be limited to three minutes. Silence 
means consent: delegates did not need to ask the floor if they 
agreed with a proposal. They were encouraged to let their 
Spokesperson speak on their behalf and only to take the floor 
if there was no group position or if they disagreed with the 
group's representative. In addition, they were reminded to 
-15 
Raiffa H, The Art and Science of Negotiation, (Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), p.282. 
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concentrate on points of substance and to submit drafting 
h 
. 16 
C anges 1n writing rather than take the floor. 
In reflecting on his task as chair of the Prepcom and Main 
Commi ttee, Koh asserted that his strategy was to maintain 
pressure on the delegates until they agreed to compromise. As 
such it was not unusual for Prepcom sessions to continue through 
the night and end at 04:00 or 06:00 the following morning .. Koh 
was aware that a good chair must avoid the temptation of keeping 
everything under his wings. When it becomes clear that delegates 
are unable to deliver, it is the responsibility of the chair to 
do the unpleasant job of replacing them with someone else. This 
was evident during the Fourth Prepcom when he replaced 
Ambassador John Bell of Canada as chair of the Finance issue 
with Deputy Foreign Minister Andres Rozental of Mexico. At the 
Summit, he replaced Rozental with Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil. 
He also replaced'Ambassador Utheim of Norway with the Dutch 





~rth Summit Times, 31 March, 1992, p.8. 
17 
NTommy Koh, 'Some Reflections on the Art and Science of 
egotiation' (1992), op.cit. 
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PART II: SELECTED ISSUES BEFORE UNCED 
THE RIO DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
In his opening statement at the First Prepcom in Nairobi in 
August 1990, UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong called upon 
governments to consider drawing up an agreement which could guide 
people and nations on their conduct, rights and obligations 
towards the environment. He pointed out that this agreement could 
be built from the Stockholm Declaration whereby consideration 
could be given to incorporating agreed principles into a brief 
document in the form of a Charter, "an 'Earth Charter' which 
could be presented at UNCED on a single page in clear and 
cogently worded language". 
18 
Although conceived at the First Prepcom, it was only at the 
Third Prepcom that the drafting of the Charter began to take 
shape. This task· was given to Working Group III which was 
concerned with legal and institutional issues. Bedrich Moldan of 
Czechoslovakia chaired the Working Group which was to formulate 
a Chair's consolidated draft based on the views presented by 
gOvernments • 
. To assist the negotiation, the UNCED Secretariat had 
compiled pre-existing statements from relevant documents and 
Previously adopted principles drawn from the United Nations and 
other regional agreements. These included the World Charter for 
Nature (1982), the Declaration on the Right to Development 
-18 
,United Nations document: A/CONF.151/PC 5/Add.1, 
Introductory Statement made by the Secretary-General 
Of the Conference at the First Session of the Preparatory 
COmmittee, 6 August, 1990'. 
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(1986), the Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment (1972), 
the New International Economic Order (1974), the Brundtland Legal 
Principles (1987), the Langkawi Declaration (1989), the Basel 
Convention (1989), the Bergen Declaration (1990) and the Houston 
Summit Communique (1990). 
19 
At the meeting, the G 77 reminded the delegations that the 
Earth Charter should incorporate the reaffirmation of the 1972 
Stockholm principles as well as the relevant guidelines provided 
by the General Assembly Resolution 44/228. It stressed the 
importance of integrating environmental concerns with development 
issues and emphasised tha~ the human person should be protected 
by a guarantee of rights to development and freedom from hunger, 
disease and poverty, underlining that no environment could be 
safe if the human state were in misery. 
20 
The G 77 reiterated that the right to development is an 
inalienable human· right and therefore the development needs of 
all developing countries should be treated as a priority. 
Recalling principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, it stressed 
that all countries have the sovereign right to utilise their own 
natural resources pursuant to their own environmental policies 
19 
Nicholas A. Robinson (ed.), Agenda 21 - UNCED Proceedings, 
~.cit., (1992), pp.xcvii - cxxvii. 
20 
For deliberations by the G 77 and the North, see 
~rth Summit Times, an independent newspaper published by 
Thodore W. Kheel with Katsuhiko Yazaki and the Kyoto Forum, 
New York, issues dated March 10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 
29, 30, 1992; and Earth Summit Bulletin, e-mail, written by 
,enb in igc:enb library and by 19oree in <en.unced.news>, 
New York, 1991,1992, Vols.O no.1, 0 no.2, 1 no.1 to no.27, 
2 nO.1 to 2; and the United Nations document, A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. IV) "Report of the United Nations' Conference on 
EnVironment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 28 September, 
1992' • 
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and their development and economic priori ties. It emphasised that 
the special situation and needs of the developing countries 
should be fully taken into account. Towards that end, access to 
and the transfer of environmentally sound technology at 
preferential concessional terms as well as research, free 
exchange and the transfer of scientific knowledge must be 
provided to developing countries to facilitate the solution of 
environmental problems and promote growth and development~ 
21 
The G 77 further stressed that while protection of the 
environment was in the common interest of mankind, the developed 
Countries should bear the main responsibility on the basis of 
their historical and current contribution to global 
environmental degradation. It illustrated that the largest part 
of the current emission of pollutants into the environment, 
including toxic and hazardous wastes, originates in developed 
Countries, and ~herefore those countries have the main 
responsibility for combatting such pollution. It further 
stressed that the protection of the environment is a common but 
differentiated responsibility of governments and its application 
to developing countries should be in accordance with their 
respective capabilities and responsibilities. On the subject of 
nUclear weapons, the G 77 underlined that countries are 
responsible for the damage caused to the global environment by 
the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass 






While the developing countries were emphasizing development 
and sovereignty rights, the North was acknowledging the 
importance of environmental concerns. The CANZ Group and the EU 
introduced the precautionary principle stating that where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. In 
addi tion, proposed acti vi ties which were likely to have a 
significant adverse effect on the environment should not be 
undertaken without prior assessment of the environmental risks. 
There was also a call for countries to acknowledge 
responsibility over activities that damage the environment of 
neighbouring countries, referring particularly to the problem 
of acid rain, and to pay adequate compensation to the victims 
of international or transboundary environmental interference. 
The EU continued- to stress the importance of including the 
polluter-pays principle, underlining that the polluters should 
bear the costs of the pollution they cause, including the 
expenses of carrying out the necessary pollution prevention and 
23 
Control measures to protect the environment. 
, The North also spoke of the need for the democratisation 
of both the environment and decision-making. To this end, wider 
participation from .the public was essential and communities 
should have access to information and legal redress including 
Government and industry information concerning the environmental 
. Consequences of their planned actions. The United States in 





mechanisms to attain sustainable development. Under the 
influence of their NGOs, the United States called for the 
harmonisation of regimes for international trade and 
environmental protection. 
24 
Following these general statements, the UNCED Secretariat 
was given the laborious task of incorporating the views and 
proposals into a Chairman's Consolidated Draft (L.8). 
25 
At the Fourth Prepcom 
At the first meeting of the Fourth Prepcom held on 5 March, 1992 
in New York, Bedrich Moldan tabled the outline of his own 
reference text of the Earth Charter which was developed from 
government proposals and circulated during the intersessional 
period. Moldan had hoped that his text would provide a useful 
reference point which could expedite negotiations and improve 
the chances that-the Fourth Prepcom would agree on an Earth 
Charter. 
However, there was little support from the developing 
countries who viewed his text as favouring the viewpoints of the 
developed countries. Developing countries maintained that 
negotiations should resume around the Chairman's Consolidated 
Draft (L.8) document, which they argued had properly addressed 
development concerns, while the G 77 came up with a new text 
which they insisted should serve as the negotiating text. This 
-
, 2S 
United Nations document, A/CONF.151/PC/WG 111/L.8 
entitled 'Rio de Janeiro Charter/Declaration on the 
Environment and Development'. The "L" code which appears at 
the end of the document number denotes a limited and draft 
document to be tabled for discussion. 
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spurred the North, particularly the United States and the EU, 
to come up with their own drafts. 
On the second day of the negotiations the G 77 tabled their 
document (L.20) and requested that it be used as the exclusive 
negotiating document while at the same time inviting other 
countries to include their proposals in the G 77 text. The G 77 
text was received with ambivalence by the North which a~gued 
that while giving first reading to a G 77 text might be the 
standard practice, they could not accept the argument that the 
G77 text should automatically be relied on to the exclusion of 
others - let alone without a formal reading of any other 
country's proposed text. By then, the United States had tabled 
its document (L.21), together with Japan (L.22), Canada (L.23), 
Australia (L.24), EU (L.25), Argentina (1.26), Norway, on behalf 
of the Nordic countries (L. 27), and the United Kingdom and 
Denmark (L. 28). As the heated discussion continued, Prepcom 
Chair Tommy Koh was called in to help to mediate the procedural 
wrangle. After hours of closed-door talks held between Tommy Koh 
and the authors of the draft texts, a compromise was reached 
under which the G 77 document was accepted as the main basis for 
discussion "with all other texts to receive equal 
Consideration." 
Negotiations on an Earth Charter resumed the following day 
in an informal session with the G 77 L.20 being used as the 
starting point. It drew harsh criticism from the United States 
. and Canadian delegations who saw it as not conducive to 
Productive negotiations. According to the North, the G 77 text 
Was as negative as it was accusatory, singling out the 
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industrialised countries for 'unsustainable / patterns of 
production and consumption', categorising warfare that causes 
environmental damage as 'a serious war crime', calling for 
developed countries to pay 'liability and compensation' to the 
victims of environmental damage. It was also perceived as 
unbalanced as it tended to over-emphasise the development 
issues. The most contentious was the principle pertaining to the 
protection of the environment and natural resources of people 
under occupation. Many delegates felt that the injection of 
political considerations was inappropriate when discussing 
UNCED. The North maintain~d that the G 77 revised text was too 
detailed, too accusatory and politicised. Many in the North 
fel t that the position of the South had been sufficiently 
covered and that they were· in favour of a more balanced 
document. There was also a need to frame principles in a 
Positive language as the revised text continued to apportion 
blame on the developed countries. The Chair enforced a tight 
deadline for·amendments before commencing the next operating 
procedure. 
On. 24 March, the Working Group moved into an informal-
informal session to discuss the next course of action. It was 
decided that Co-Chairs should be appointed to oversee the 
Process in an informal contact group. Mukul Sanwal of India and 
Ole Holthe of Norway were elected for the task. The contact 
group was to elect its spokesperson and meet continuously in a 
. Closed session until negotiations were complete. By 26 March, 
the two Co-Chairs were able to identify twelve areas of 
agreement. A smaller group was established to start drafting the 
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precise wording of the so-called agreed principles while the 
larger contact group continued to discuss the still contentious 
principles. 
The drafting process proved to be an extremely difficult 
task as the negotiations entered into a deadlock over North-
South differences, especially the North's complaint against, and 
the South's insistence on, including repeated references to each 
State's common but differentiated responsibilities for the 
environment and overemphasising the industrialised countries' 
responsibility for damaging the environment. The complexity of 
the task of drafting a workable charter is illustrated by the 
following paragraph taken from an informal document circulated 
on 21 March, 1992 (Proposed deletions or text for replacement 
are shown in square brackets, and proposed additions and 
alternative wording in bold): 
[The [special (delete, Poland)] situation and needs 
of [developing (delete, Poland)] countries, 
particularly the least developed countries, and those 
most vulnerable to environmental change (AUS),[their 
right to achieve [their (delete, Poland)] [full 
economic potential] , sustainable development 
(Austria),. and the eradication of poverty (delete 
EC)], and the protection of their environment (AUS, 
NZ) shall be fully taken into account in [any 
international (delete EC)] action taken with respect 
l 
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to environment and development. (delete, CAN, Japan, 
• 26 
Russl.a, USA)]. 
Richard Nusser described the progress of the working text as 
"short on inspiration and long on hyperbole, weighted with 
brackets, proposed additions, revisions, deletions, alternative 
27 
wordings, boldface, italics and parentheses". 
By 30 March, the only principle approved had been that 
"women have a vi tal role in environmental management and 
development and their full participation is therefore essential 
to achieve sustainable dev~lopment'. With barely three working 
days left to the close of the Fourth Prepcom, the negotiation 
on the Earth Charter had reached a crisis point. Apart from the 
difficulties regarding the principles to be agreed, there were 
also fundamental differences on whether the text should be 
called the .. Ear·th Charter' or the .. Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development'. Added to that, there was still 
disagreement on whether the Earth Charter should be a separate, 
free-standing document or if it should form a preamble to Agenda 
21. 
As serious differences remained, the Chair announced that 
a final effort to negotiate the Charter would be made through 
a bargaining session at which States were expected to find a way 
of balancing conflicting interests in a "horse-trading' session 
in which the two principle factions would develop a "trade-off 
.---------------------26 
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package' for the remaining controversial issues, with each 
faction entitled to put forward roughly fifty percent of the 
principles that they favoured. 
The contact group met immediately to commence ' horse-
trading' but the exercise proved futile. While the North was 
willing to compromise on certain principles such as the right 
to development, the G 77 was unwilling to trade any of its 
preferred principles. On the morning of 31 March, the Co-Chairs 
reported to the Prepcom Chair that they had gone as far as they 
could and were unable to make any further progress. They 
suggested that he take over the negotiation. 
Tommy Koh was prepared to chair the negotiation provided 
that the Co-Chairs prepared a compromise text to serve as a 
28 
basis for the next drafting session. Only 16 countries would 
be represented in the small, closed group, eight to represent 
the North and eight to represent the South. The North was 
represented by the United States, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
Germany (EU), Australia (CANZ), Norway (alternating with 
Sweden), Japan and Russia. The South was represented by 
Pakistan, India, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
China. Tommy Koh insisted that the group produce a negotiating 
text by 18:30 on 1 April, 1992. By 18:15 of 2 April, a clean 
text containing 27 principles, (A/CONF.151/PC/WGIII/L33/Rev.1) 
was agreed upon ad referendum. Ironically it became the only 
unbracketed text of the Fourth Prepcom to go to Rio. 
-28 
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Although Working Group III was relieved to have been able 
to negotiate an unbracketed text for Rio, many delegations 
expressed disappointment with the language, the overall content 
and the hasty manner in which numerous principles were 
addressed. But far from being a perfect text, each side did 
achieve success in enshrining those principles that were of 
particular importance to their respective political agendas. 29 
Middleton, O'Keefe and Moyo were more critical of the outcome. 
They commented that with the exception of principle 3 on the 
right to development, principle 4 on the integration of 
environmental protection, and sustainable development and 
principle 5 on the essential task of eradicating poverty, the 
rest of the document reflected an environmental bias where the 
Northern infatuation with the -market' prevailed. This is 
particularly evident in principle 16 of the Declaration which 
reads: 
-29 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the 
internalisation of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear 
the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
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Before the text was adopted at the 19th plenary meeting on 
14 June, 1992 at Rio, there were strong rumours that the United 
States would reopen negotiations on 
31 
the Declaration. The 
Uni ted States had objected strongly to principle 23 which called 
for the protection of the environmental and natural resources 
of 'people under oppression, domination and occupation.' 
However, in a late compromise involving the United States, 
Israel and the Arab states, this phrase was retained in the 
Declaration but all (ten) references to people under occupation 
were removed from Agenda 21. The United States accommodated its 
other objections by issuing a statement of its reservation to 
several principles. It maintained that development was not a 
right (principle 3) but a goal which could be misused to justify 
human rights violations. It also could not accept any 
interpretation of principle 7 that would imply a recognition or 
acceptance by the 'Uni ted States of any international obligations 
or liabilities, or any diminution on the responsibilities of 
developing countries. On principle 12, it argued that in certain 
situations, trade measures may provide an effective and 
appropriate means of addressing environmental concerns. 
M9laysia's Assessment 
Malaysia assumed a moderate role in the negotiations on the 
Earth Charter. Although it participated in the deliberations, 
it did not take ~ leading position when negotiating with the 
,North, usually allowing the spokesperson of G 77 to negotiate 
on its behalf and on behalf· of the developing countries. 
-31 
Stanley P. Johnson (1993), op.cit. 
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Malaysia did not want the text reopened/at Rio unless 
other Groups reopened it for discussion. In the event that the 
text was to be reopened, Malaysia was prepared to consider 
appropriate amendments such as strengthening principle 12 which 
related to international economic systems and unilateral action 
by member states. It considered the draft text a weak 
delineation of the commitment of the North, favouring that these 
commitments be more clearly defined, particularly with regard 
to principle 7 on the common but differentiated responsibilities 
of States. 
32 
When asked to comment on the South's attitude of 
apportioning blame on the North and insisting on accusatory 
wording throughout the Earth Charter negotiations, a member of 
33 
the Malaysian negotiating team for Working Group III explained 
that such an attitude reflected the reality of North-South 
negotiations. He -added that this was the sad thing about the 
dynamics of negotiation, which many of the pragmatic and 
moderate members of the South realised but could not do much 
about as the decisions made were based on consensus. He 
eXplained that it was difficult to take a realistic approach as 
the South would eventually be left with nothing to defend as the 
North continued to cut down its position further. It was for 
this reason he'added that the South was compelled to take the 
maximalist' approach and proceed to negotiate downwards. 
In its feedback to the Government, the National Steering 





negotiating for an Earth Charter a rewarding task. It explained 
that although the Declaration was not a legally binding 
document, it was adopted at the UNCED Summit level and therefore 
would have the moral authority of the international community. 
Although the declaration of principles did not envisage precise 
action to be undertaken, it provided the guidelines which States 
could follow, particularly in relation to formulating and 
adopting legislation. The Declaration could also be the basis 
for formulating bilateral and multilateral arrangements which 
Malaysia might find useful. 
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FOREST PRINCIPLES 
At the G 7 Houston Summit held in July, 1990, the United States 
proposed a convention on the world's forests to be negotiated 
expedi tiously in- time for UNCED. This call was taken up by 
Maurice Strong during the First Prepcom. He suggested that 
forestry could be considered as a protocol in either the Climate 
Change Convention or the Convention on Biological Diversity. His 
Suggestion sparked the debate on Forests which was to become the 
most contentious and disputed issue in UNCED. It was also to 
become the only issue in which Ministers took over negotiations 
from the diplomats. 
~t the First and Second Prepcom 
As early as the First Prepcom, the developing countries became 





States in particular, were making attempts/to deflect the 
deliberations on the environment and development in favour of 
global legal instruments on the environment. An instrument 
dealing with forestry topped the agenda, ostensibly based on the 
claim that deforestation constituted the most serious 
environmental problem currently facl.ng mankind and, in the 
process, implying that the threat of greenhouse gas emission was 
second to deforestation. 
Caught in their own web of varying and often conflicting 
priorities compounded by poor preparation, the developing 
countries were faced with an onslaught to which they were 
uncertain how to react. Among the developing countries, Malaysia 
initially suspected that the enthusiasm of the G 7 constituted 
an infringement of the country's sovereign right to exploit its 
forests and was therefore a question of paramount national 
interest. India, on the other hand argued that the G 7 initiative 
had something to do with their reluctance to take firm action to 
reduce their own greenhouse gas emissions and that they were 
Using the tropical forests as a convenient carbon sink for their 
own gaseous wastes.
35 
A few developing countries, notably Chile, 
Mauritania and Mexico were already in favour of a global forest 
convention although none had yet put forward a clear and 
Unambiguous definition of what the convention would entail.
36 
Porter and Brown noted that although Brazil, which is the 
home to about 30 percent of the world's intact tropical forests, 
-
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was the natural leader of this veto coalition, the role had 
actually been exercised by Malaysia. Malaysia's leadership role 
may be explained by the fact that it had been increasingly 
singled out by the NGOs as the worst offender in the destruction 
of tropical forests. Malaysia also has long had a flair for 
strongly criticising the economic policies of industrialised 
countries in international fora. 
37 
Thus at the First Prepcom, Malaysia led the discussion on 
forests on behalf of the developing countries. In trying to 
mobilise the developing countries to accept a common position, 
Malaysia reminded the G 77 meeting held during the First Prepcom 
at Nairobi that the issue of deforestation must be placed in a 
balanced perspective. An analysis and assessment of the 
Preparatory Committee had indicated an overwhelming trend, in an 
effort by the industrialised countries, to focus on 
deforestation. This was evident in their insistence on a legal 
instrument and the establishment of a small group within this 
Prepcom to pursue this subject. While they were not forthcoming 
on a binding instrument on technology transfer and funding, the 
industrialised countries had insisted that deforestation deserved 
a special committee. Malaysia elaborated that these countries had 
corne under strong domestic pressure through their own NGOs and 
interest groups, both public and vested, on environmental 
POllution. These pressure groups had become vote banks and 
-37 
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po1i tical leaders have had to respond. It pointed out that 
industrial pollution caused over the centuries in these countries 
had been the leading and major factor in the deterioration of the 
global environment. However, since they could not agree among 
themselves on how to address the issue of carbon dioxide 
emission, they had found common cause in deforestation, with the 
emphasis on tropical rainforests. This helped to remove the 
pressure on them and to deflect it to tropical rainforest 
countries, which were all developing countries. Their underlying 
message was that developing countries did not know how to manage 
their forest resources and therefore they would have to take the 
lead. In its effort to gain solidarity with the South, Malaysia 
warned the members of the G 77: 
-
38 
The issue is of interest to all of us. We need total 
and full support to strengthen your hand at the 
meeting with those outside our group. Our position 
should be to first obtain relevant data and encourage 
dialogue through existing mechanisms. Any legally 
binding instruments such as the proposed forest 
convention should not be concluded in haste 
without taking into consideration their implications 
38 
on developing countries. 
Introductory statement made by Malaysia at the G 77 
meeting on the subj ect 'Combatting Deforestation', Nairobi, 
25 August, 1990. 
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An engrossing observation made at the First Prepcom was the 
interest proj ected by the FAO on the forest debate. 39 The FAO 
made an offer to provide a forum for negotiation and drafting of 
a global forest convention although it had received no clear 
mandate, either from its Committee on Forestry (COFO) or from 
wi thin the UNCED process. It went on to produce a document 
enti tIed 'Possible Main Elements of an Instrument for the 
Conservation and Development of the World's Forest' which it 
tried to push at two of its meetings in Rome in September and 
November 1990. The FAO's document highlighted three basic 
principles which should form the basis of a forest convention: 
sovereignty, stewardship and burden-sharing in which countries 
with tropical forests undertake to act as global stewards over 
their forests on behalf of the international community, which in 
turn undertakes to share the burden of conservation. 
Malaysia resisted the ini tiati ve made by the FAO, suspecting 
that it had been manipulated by the developed countries. The 
Suspicion grew when at the Second Prepcom, the UNCED Secretariat 
Produced a draft document A/CONF.151/PC/65 which drew heavily on 
• 40 
and replicated exactly the language used 1n the FAO draft. The 
PC/65 document repeated the three principles of the FAO draft and 
highlighted the ability of forests to act as 'sinks' and 
reservoirs' for carbon and other greenhouse gases. Malaysia's 
Ambassador to Italy and the FAO, Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, who 
-39 
Caroline Thomas The Environment in International 
~ations, (Lond~n: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1992), p.265 and internal document. 
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See David Humphreys 'The Forest Debate of the UNCED 
Process I, Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International 
~, Vol. 7.1, Summer 1993, pp. 43 - 54. 
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by then had received instruction to lead/ the Malaysian 
negotiating team on Forests issues, commented that Malaysia was 
perplexed as to why important technical agencies like FAO were 
being utilised to promote the hasty agenda of some countries to 
formulate a forest convention. She reminded participants that UN 
agencies including the FAO should confine their role to providing 
technical inputs when requested and not to taking decisions on 
principal issues considered in the main UNCED process. 
41 
The decisions taken at the Working Group I of the Second 
Prepcom were significant for Malaysia and other developing 
countries as they highlighted two main points, namely that all 
steps should be taken towards a "non-legally binding 
authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on 
the management, conservation and development of all types of 
forests" and "the United Nations Conference on the Environment 
and Development· process was the most appropriate forum for 
conclusive decisions pertaining to global consensus on 
42 
forests". 
As the United States continued to press for a forest 
convention at the Second Prepcom, Malaysia, with strong Support 
from the G 77, created its own ad hoc working group on forests. 
Their mandate was not to negotiate an agreement but to determine 
What aspects of the issue needed further study. Malaysia insisted 
that the tropical forest countries be compensated by developed 
-
41 
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countries for all direct and opportunity costs/forgone to the 
extent that any convention would commit these states to halting 
or substantially slowing deforestation by reducing timber 
extraction, agricultural development projects, or simple 
conversion of forests for subsistence farming. With the support 
of the G 77, Malaysia repeated the' point made at the first 
official negotiations on Climate Change in February 1991 that 
tropical forest countries would oppose negotiation of a forest 
agreement until developed countries, including the United States, 
had committed themselves to reducing energy consumption and to 
providing funding and technology transfer for developing 
countries to control their greenhouse gas emissions. It also 
called upon the UNCED Secretariat to produce more balanced 
information about the importance and rate of loss of tropical 
forests on one hand, and of temperate and boreal forests, on the 
43 
other. On the principle of compensation, the United States and 
the other industrialised countries indicated their unwillingness 
to provide tropical forest countries with the resources they 
would need to forgo development of their forests, arguing that 
the sustainable management of forests was in the economic 
interests of tropical countries. 
At the Third ahd Fourth Prepcom 
At the Third Prepcom held in August-September 1991 in Geneva, 
Ghana, the chair of the G 77, presented a proposal, L. 22 entitled 
'A non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for 
a global consensus on .the management, conservation and 
-
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development of all types of forests'. The title of the G 77 
draft repeated verbatim the text used in Decision 2/13 of the 
Second Prepcom. 
The L.22 document emphasised that the subject of forestry 
was related to the entire gamut of the environment and 
development issues including the right to development. It called 
for efforts towards the' greening of the world' by all countries, 
particularly developed countries, and stressed the need for new 
and additional financial resources to be provided for developing 
countries through a global fund to enable them to manage 
sustainably, conserve and. develop their forests. There was also 
a call for the transfer of environmentally sound technology to 
developing countries and international cooperation in the areas 
of scientific research as well as the removal of tariff barriers 
and all forms of unilateral actions to restrict or ban the use 
of timber and other forest products. 
44 
The significant outcome of the forest negotiation at Prepcom 
Three was the marriage of two documents, PC/65 and L.22. This was 
also the beginning of a long series of difficult and strenuous 
negotiations between the developed and developing countries which 
lasted until the final days of UNCED at Rio. Al though the Working 
Group agreed that negotiation should from then on "take place on 
a set of . authoritative principles on the management, 
conservation and sustainable development of forests", there was 
-
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still significant support from developed countries to negotiate 
basic principles upon which a subsequent convention could be 
based. This was reflected in the consolidated document 
A/CONF.151/PC/WG1/CRP.14/Rev.2 which read as follows: 
The UNCED process is the most appropriate forum for 
conclusive decisions pertaining to global consensus on 
forests [which should form the basis for [any 
subsequent preparations and adoption of a legal 
instrument on forests] [all other negotiations 
45 
involving forests]].. (The proposals in dispute are 
highlighted in the square brackets). 
As the debate proceeded, the position of the North and South 
began to harden. The South began to formulate language which 
apportioned blame on the North while the North emphasised the 
concept of forests as global commons. The text that was taken to 
the Fourth Prepcom was heavily bracketed around clauses which 
reflected aspects of North-South contention. 
The negotiation on the forest principles resumed on 17 March 
1992 in New York during the Fourth Prepcom. After a faltering 
start due to procedural problems over the method of applying the 
consolidated text (CRP.14), the open-ended informal-informal 
45 
See UN Document A/CONF.151/PC/WG1/CRP.14 Rev.2 preamble 
paragraph (c) dated 13 December, 1991 entitled 'A non-
legally binding authoritative statement of principles for 
a global consensus on the management, conservation and 
development of all types of forests'. 
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contact group began a paragraph-by-paragraphfliscussion on the 
seventeen principles of the consolidated text.
46 
After ten days of political rhetoric, the contact group 
resumed negotiation on the second reading of the principles. 
Although the meeting agreed to avoid mutual recriminations and 
finger-pointing, there were still" difficulties with the 
principles pertaining to compensation, financial resources, 
47 
trade, and the transfer of technology. 
Three days before the close of the Prepcom, there was a turn 
of events which disrupted the entire effort- of the Working Group. 
Gary Larsen, the delegate.for the United States, pushed aside the 
Statement of Principles by proposing the possibility of a future 
convention. Canada and Austria strongly backed the United States' 
Position. Interest groups were mounting pressure on their 
governments to introduce legislation against indiscriminate 
logging and deforestation. In calling for the negotiation of a 
forest convention after the Rio Summit, the North demonstrated 
its lack of interest in the completion of the negotiations on the 
Forest Principles. Malaysia's Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, 
recognised as the leading spokesperson for G 77 on the forests 
issue, responded that the G 77 would not entertain the idea of 
a Convention and did not want it mentioned in the text, even in 
brackets. Infuriated by the latest United States move, Ambassador 
Ting said that this was yet another indicator of how the 
-
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developing countries had been treated during the entire 
discussion. "We have been resisting this since Nairobi, but they 
keep bringing it up every time.· If the non-legally binding 
principles don't work, then we can think about a convention - but 
this is preempting the process. They are not even giving us a 
48 
chance." 
In explaining why the bracketed portions could not be 
resolved, Ambassador Ting elaborated: 
-48 
We are not here to score points along the North-South 
di vide. The subj ec~ of our forests is above such 
polemics. We wish to underline the supremacy of our 
sovereignty over our forests. We are certainly not 
holding them in custody for those who have destroyed 
their own forests, and now try to claim ours as part 
of the heritage of mankind [ ••. ] Our message is clear; 
we are prepared to play our part in the great 
environmental effort. We are prepared to sustainably 
use our sovereign forest resources. However, we 
require financial resources and technology to carry 
out our environmental obligations. But we are not 
prepared to accept such outright pressure, which 
completely ignores the fundamental principle of 
u 
sovereignty. 
See Earth Summit Times, New York, 30 March, 1992. 
49 
Statement by Ambassador Ting Wen Lian at the United 
Nations Briefing for the Press on 2 June 1992 at Rio de 
Janeiro. 
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The final Fourth Prepcom text containedZ3 sets of square 
brackets. As negotiations had reached an impasse, the heavily 
bracketed text was taken to Rio to be negotiated. The text did 
not carry any provision for a negotiation on a future forest 
convention. An examination of the forest debate at that point 
focused on whether the state or the wider international community 
should have the more legitimate stake in combatting 
so 
deforestation. Caroline Thomas anticipated that agreements 
would be difficult to reach because of too many conflicting 
interests at the international, national and commercial levels. 
The motives for a convention also varied among developed 
countries: some were concerned over the contribution of tropical 
deforestation to global warming. Some countries were concerned 
Over its impact on biological diversity while the Northern NGOs 
Considered the protection of the lands of the indigenous people 
to be important.-
At Rio 
Negotiations on the forest principles began on 4 June 1992 and 
ended at 03:00 on 12 June when agreement was finally reached. 
The acceptance of the principles was welcomed by many at the Rio 
SUmmit as there were increasing doubts that there would ever be 
a consensus on the issue. 
In the run-up to the Summit, pressure was mounting on the 
need to reach an agreement on financial resources, technology 
transfer, the unilateral boycott of "unsustainable" forest 
products, the Malaysian ini.tiative on the "greening of the world" 
-So 
Caroline Thomas (1992), op.cit., p.280. 
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and on forests playing the role of carbon sinks; But the single 
most contentious issue was over the preamble: the North insisted 
that it should include a commitment to an enforceable future 
51 
forest convention. By 11 June, the negotiation had again 
reached an impasse. Klaus Topfer, the German Federal Minister for 
the Environment, was invited to preside over negotiations at the 
ministerial level. 
A new turn of events, which was intended to influence the 
decision for a post-Rio convention, came with President Bush's 
announcement on 1 June that the United States would immediately 
commit US$150 million to.international forest aid and would be 
willing to increase the amount to US$2. 7 billion if other 
countries followed suit. In reiterating Bush's commitment, 
William Reilly, the head of the US official delegation informed 
the plenary that reaching an international accord on principles 
to preserve all forests was the top priority of the United States 
at the Rio Summit. 52 The announcement did little to entice the 
hardliners like Malaysia and India which continued to stick 
firmly to the line that if the world had the forest principles, 
1· t 53 would not need a forest convention. 
Another captivating development that took place in the midst 
of the forest debate at Rio was the tactic employed by the United 
Kingdom to link a convention on desertification with a forest 
convention. The African countries had been pressing for a 
desertification convention since the First Prepcom but without 
-
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success. The UK had in mind that by offeringa~desertification 
convention, the African countries would break rank with the other 
developing countries in opposing a forest convention. 54 The 
hardliners which included India, Indonesia and Malaysia had been 
observing the move nervously as the UK approached Gabon and Benin 
in particular, on the possible 'trade~off'. Both these countries 
had no intention of accepting the deal but did not indicate this 
openly to the UK. Meanwhile, the United States, tired of being 
vilified as Conference's 'bad guy', came out in favour of the 
desertification convention. The UK rapidly dropped the idea of 
linkage and changed its ~osition in support of the convention. 
This, according to Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, was an instance 
where developing countries were standing absolutely united.
55 
Malaysia's Assessment 
Few realised that while Malaysia had been leading the G 77 on the 
forest debate since the first Prepcom, it quietly stepped to the 
rear of the formation during the negotiation at Rio. Throughout 
the Prepcom process, Ambassador Ting Wen Lian had been adamantly 
defending the sovereign rights of states to manage their own 
forests and had resisted attempts by the North to establish an 
,international treaty on forests. Her fiery rhetoric had earned 
56 





Interview with Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, Kuala Lumpur, 1 
October, 1994. 
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debate resumed at Rio, Malaysia decided that/it was time for 
other developing countries to step forward. Malaysia felt that 
the North had mistakenly seen Malaysia as standing alone against 
57 
the convention. The leading role was taken over by India and 
Indonesia, which continued to defend the position of the G 77. 
The attempt to resort to a convention was eventually dropped by 
Klaus Topfer when Amir Salim, Indonesia's Minister for the 
Environment, demanded an explanation as to why the Chair was 
still insisting on a convention when the Group of 77 had clearly 
and repeatedly said that it was not interested in one. 
The Forest Principle~ were quickly condemned by the NGOs as 
a "chain-saw charter" for fostering the conversion of forests to 
plantations and other commercial uses without setting any targets 
for conservation. The principles were said to ignore the rights 
of local peoples and instead legitimised the policies of the 
transnationals, multilateral banks and UN agencies - those who 
had contributed most to the crisis of all types of forests. 
58 
Commenting on the difficulty of having a forest convention, 
Ola Ullsten, the former Swedish Prime Minister remarked: 
In the long run, the disappearance of forests is a 
poli tical problem. These issues touch on national 
sovereignty. We cannot impose our views. on how we 
57 
Debriefing by Ambassador Razali Ismail to the Malaysian 
delegation at Rio, 11 June, 1992. 
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believe forests should be husbanded, we' can only 
o S9 
conV1nce and advise. 
The failure on the part of the industrialised countries to 
secure a forest convention at Rio indicated that they had failed 
. 
to convince the developing countries of the need for one. 
Malaysia's proposal on the initiative of "greening the world" 
required that countries commit themselves to having 30 percent 
of their land mass covered with trees.(See Appendix) The 
difficulty for the North lay in the fact that while Malaysia 
already had 56.2 percent.of its land mass under forest cover, 
Europe and the United States did not really have a "log to stand 
on" in lecturing the Third World about the fate of the 
o f 60 ra1n orest. 
A small international conference of ecologists and 
sCientists held oat Wood Hole Centre in Virginia in February, 
1992,examined the obstacles blocking an effective international 
Convention. While most people agreed that forests were necessary, 
there was no understanding of the scale of the need for forests, 
the kind of forests, the areas required, whether plantations 
might serve the same purpose, whether all the existing forests 
Were required or whether some forests were more important than 
others. There was also no agreement about how to. value any of the 
public uses of forests as opposed to selling them off as timber 
and whether such uses could and should compete with profits from 
-
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timber. A similar view was expressed by the/Malaysian Prime 
Minister during a BBC interview at Rio: 
The thing is that you really do not know how much and 
which part of the forest needs to be saved or which 
square inch of the forest would yield this wonderful 
substance [biological diversity]. But if you are 
specific about it, then we can save that part of the 
forest. Losing species has been going on since the 
beginning of time. We don't have dinosaurs now ~ I 
don't know that if we did have them we might regard 
them as a very essential part of the ecology. But we 
don't have them and we still survive. So we may lose 
some things, but to say that just in case something 




Unlike the. debates on the Rio Declaration or on the forests 
principles, the negotiation on Institutions was less contentious 
and more straight-forward. When the issue was presented by 
Maurice Strong at the First Prepcom, the majority of countries 
appeared uncertain and therefore not inclined towards the early 
formation of the Third Working Group to discuss any institutional 
-
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arrangements for the period after UNCED. At the Third Prepcom, 
states still did not make any radical proposals for institutional 
reforms and were more inclined to 'wait-and-see'. The G 77 was 
able to forge a common position only on generalities rather than 
on specifics, while no concrete proposals emerged from the 
63 
industrialised countries. Such negotiation behaviour is not 
uncommon, according to Winham who argues that negotiators enter 
into negotiation precisely to find out what the issues are; it 
is largely a matter of trying out new combinations of ideas in 
64 
an effort to move the negotiation along. 
To facilitate discussions on the subject, the Secretariat 
65 
prepared a document on Institutions which made suggestions on 
the possible need to examine the role of existing institutions 
such as UNEP, the World Bank, IMF, UNDP and regional institutions 
as well as the NGOs. The document was intended to be an 'eye-
opener' for the 'Prepcom in their discussions about the post-
UNCEDperiod, with a view to drafting a chapter on Institutional 
Arrangements for Agenda 21. The Prepcom was invited to consider 
the extent to which the UN system could be strengthened to enable 
it to integrate the environment and development dimensions into 
their programmes and to see how such agencies could best be made 
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UN document, A/CONF.151/PC/36 entitled 'Progress on 
Institutions' dated 31 January, 1991. 
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At the Third Prepcom, a large numbe~_/of delegations 
expressed themselves against the creation of new institutions 
which might run the risk of extra administrative overhead costs 
and duplicate existing United Nations agencies. The meeting 
instead called for the revitalisation and reform of existing 
institutions to meet the challenges of UNCED. 
As the central agency of the United Nations system on 
matters of the environment, there was general agreement and 
support for strengthening the mandate, operations and funding of 
UNEP. UNEP, which was the creation of the Stockholm Conference 
twenty years earlier, ha~ not been able to take on operational 
responsibilities due to lack of funds and expertise particularly 
wi th respect to the developmental side of the environmental 
questions. To this end, some delegations suggested that the 
UNDP, as the central UN funding agency, be fully utilised to 
assist and integrate the development aspects in all environment-
related activities undertaken in developing countries with UN 
funding. It was also suggested that UNEP take steps to reinforce 
and intensify its liaison and interaction with UNDP and the World 
Bank. 
As the discussion proceeded into the Fourth Prepcom, the 
meeting agreed that attention should be given to the need for 
programme coordination and a high-level body to provide policy 
COordination. Some delegations expressed support for the General 
Assembly remaining in charge of overviewing new global 
initiatives on the environment and development. Others argued 
that UNGA negotiations on the environment had too often focused 
on procedural issues and rhetoric rather than on useful debate. 
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They added that General Assembly involvement was most effective 
when limited to giving ~umbrella' approval for a broad area of 
work, with the detailed work pursued in the relevant technical 
forum. One possibility was strengthening the link between the 
General Assembly and UNEP by having UNEP report directly to the 
General Assembly rather than through the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). 66 
The idea of setting up a new Commission was first suggested 
by the delegation from Bangladesh, who envisaged that at the 
global level the General Assembly could exercise its authority 
through ECOSOC and a new. Commission which might be called the 
"Commission on Sustainable Development" (CSD). The Commission 
would coordinate the entire range of activities relating to the 
67 
interpretation and implementation of Agenda 21. It was ironic 
that while many countries found the suggestion attractive and 
Politically feasible, Malaysia, which was later to be elected as 
the first Chair of the newly created Commission on Sustainable 
Development, strongly opposed the idea which it considered 
"premature if not a disturbing trend, given the view that 
ecological considerations provide a basis for intervention in the 
68 
internal affairs of sovereign states." 
The idea of creating the Commission on Sustainable 
Development received the support of many delegations during the 
-
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final days of discussion at the Fourth Prepcom. Malaysia's 
Ambassador, Razali Ismail, who was appointed by Tommy Koh to 
chair the Committee on Institutions during the Fourth Prepcom, 
invited the meeting to focus its attention on the mandate and 
operations of the proposed Commission. It was generally agreed 
that the Commission would monitor implementation of Agenda 21 
within the entire UN system. It would also coordinate periodic 
national reports on environmental performance and the 
implementation of Agenda 21, focusing particularly on issues of 
financial resources and technology transfer. 
When Malaysia was approached by the Prepcom Chair to lead 
the Committee on Institutions, Ambassador Razali took the task 
of putting up a 'non-paper', drawing upon the ideas of the 
various delegations. Determined to minimise the critical areas 
of disagreement, he identified the 'difficult' and potential key 
players and devoted time to tackling them on a one-to-one basis. 
He conducted informal discussions and led them through the 'core 
group-approach' which he maintained even after UNCED. By the end 
of the Fourth Prepcom, the committee completed its work of 
drafting a chapter on International Institutional Arrangements 
for Agenda 21. His success in getting an early resolution was 
attributed to the trust that the group had for him. The network 
that he had built over the years, his credentials in the Security 
COuncil and. his positive attitude had helped to make his 
h 69 C airmanship effective. 
Negotiations on Institutions proceeded smoothly throughout 




settled at Rio. The difficult areas pertained to'the power of the 
proposed Commission to compel national reporting on environmental 
performance. Earlier at the Fourth Prepcom, the developed 
countries had argued that the creation of a new bureaucracy in 
the form of a commission could only be justified by new worldwide 
reporting obligations. The proposal was met with reservations by 
certain countries, particularly China and India which, according 
to Ambassador Razali Ismail, were worried about "exposing the 
machinery of their governments" to the review of an international 
organisation. They expressed fears that it might be used as a 
"weapon to knock the South into shape" as the existing Human 
70 
Rights Commission had tried to do. The final wording of the 
text thus resulted in a weak provision on national reporting, in 
which the Commission was: 
to consider information provided by Governments, 
including for example, information on the form of 
periodic communications or national reports regarding 
71 
the acti vi ties they undertake to implement Agenda 21. 
Another area of d~spute concerned the power of the 
Commission to report directly to the General Assembly rather than 
to the Economic and Social Council. Some delegations felt that 
a Commission reporting to ECOSOC would not be effective and 
70 
Comments by Ambassador Razali Ismail made to the Earth 
~ummit Times, Rio de Janeiro, 7 June, 1992. 
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See paragraph 38.13 (b) of UN document 
A/CONF.151/L.3/Add.38 dated 11 June, 1992, entitled 
'International Institutional Arrangements'. 
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independent, given the fact that ECOSOC oversees more than 200 
bodies. Prior to the Summit, the Chair offered a compromise text 
which allowed the Commission to report to the General Assembly 
through the Economic Council. 
Many delegates from the developing countries were equally 
unhappy with the provision on the appointment of a high level 
body of eminent people to advise the Intergovernmental bodies, 
the Secretary-General and the United Nations system on the 
environment and development. Such a role was considered an 
invasion of sovereignty, as frequently happens in the Human 
Rights Commission. UNCED .nevertheless accepted in principle the 
need for an expert advisory body, but left the Secretary-General 
72 
to make recommendations leading to appointments. 
The Committee on Institutions was the first to complete its 
Work at Rio. In what was being hailed as "a quiet but crucial 
triumph", UNCED" approved the framework for a high-level 
73 
commission on sustainable development on 9 June 1992. The speed 
with which the entire negotiation on Institutions was concluded 
was attributed, in part, to the issue itself, which was 
Comparatively less difficult and less controversial. A glance 
across issue areas indicates that the substance negotiated in the 
debate on Institutions accounted for the differences in the 
negotiation process. 
The Earth Summit Times, however, commented that the debate 
on Institutions simply did not reflect the quality of imagination 
and the level of ambition" needed to develop new forms of 
-72 
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governance to guide the planet through the next few turbulent 
decades. Too much time was spent on the ECOSOC question - should 
the high level body be ECOSOC, report to ECOSOC or report to the 
7. 
General Assembly through ECOSOC? 
75 
Matthias Finger commented that UNCED did not produce any 
institutional outcome, neither did it lead to the strengthening 
of UNEP, which was an institutional outcome of Stockholm, twenty 
years earlier. As governments did not want any new institutions 
emerging from UNCED, the new CSD would have to deliver the 
impossible task of monitoring Agenda 21, which was comprised of 
over 2,500 recommendations in about 150 programme areas. 
Chatterjee and Finger commented that one year after the Rio 
conference, even the most modest hopes had been disappointed. 
The monitoring of what is believed to be the solution to the 
global crisis was handed over to a powerless commission that has 
no money and is bogged down in the UN bureaucracy. What is more, 
gOvernments have asked the Commission to report to ECOSOC, which 
has a reputation among the NGOs as "a moribund and useless 
bOd " 76 Y . 
~aysia's Assessment 
In response to the above comments, Ambassador Razali Ismail 
clarified that the CSD was thought of by some, including the 
NGOs, as a kind of an international ombudsman that could level 
-----------------------7. 
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charges' here and there. This was an ideal,/ but unworkable 
si tuation which could not work in a world with much disparity and 
inequali ty. The South was obviously not prepared to barter away 
its independence and sovereignty to an international vehicle 
which might be dominated by the North. But as the discussion 
evolved the CSD became, not a body that governs the activities 
of others, but a monitoring body with sufficient political 
77 
support. 
Recalling Malaysia's contribution to the deliberations on 
Institutions, Ambassador Razali admitted that at the beginning 
Malaysia had considered the idea of a Commission "premature" and 
a "disturbing trend". 78 Malaysia, he commented, might have taken 
very strong and firm positions on issues but had never been 
obstinately uncompromising; when it had seen that there was 
something good emanating from the deliberations, it adapted 
accordingly. Thus, when it accepted the responsibility of putting 
together the institution, it built into the CSD enough provisos 
to ensure that it would not become a commission on global 
79 
governance. The outcome was that the CSD became a working 
77 
Interview with Ambassador Razali Ismail, Permanent 
Representati ve of Malaysia to the United Nations in New 
York and Chairman for the-Committee on Institutions and 
consequently Chairman of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development for 1993 -1994, in Kuala Lumpur, 17 August, 
1994. . 
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See paragraph 88 of the UN document on 'Institutional 
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Chatterjee and Finger explain global governance as a 
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to some sort of global management that is a-political, a-
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commission, monitoring the excesses of the South and at the same 
time allowing it to look at the 'backyard' of the North. 
Ambassador Razali remarked that the CSD needed time to win 
the confidence of governments. This would be better served as it 
progressed. This, he said was already evident as national 
governments were voluntarily beginning to provide reports of 
their activities to the Commission. 
80 
It comes as no surprise that the CSD received so much 
cri ticism from the NGOs. The CSD was in the first place a 
creation of practitioners who belong to the UN network. Most of 
the negotiators were dip+omats from New York who were familiar 
with the activities and the problems of the UN and had stayed 
long enough to feel a sense of belonging to the organisation and 
to upholding the nation-state system. As the new Commission began 
its work, the Chair underlined the fact that the Commission was 
a body of governments and that while the NGOs participation in 
the CSD was welcomed, they would not replace governments as the 
voice of the people. 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
The negotiation on technology transfer is a clear example of 
where the South conceded to the North before it barely had 
started negotiating. Unlike the negotiations on Forests, Finance 
Or the conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity, 
the South had no clear position on technology transfer beyond 
-
80 
Personal interview with Ambassador Razali Ismail. 
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rei terating the concept agreed upon in UNGA _Resolution 44/228 
(15(m»: 
To examine, with a view to making recommendations on 
effective modalities for favourable access to, and 
transfer of, environmentally sound technologies, in 
particular to developing countries, including on 
concessional and preferential terms, and on modalities 
for supporting all countries in their efforts to 
create and develop their endogenous technological 
capaci ties in the field of scientific research and 
development, as well as in the acquisition of relevant 
information, and, in this context, to explore the 
concept of assured access for developing 
countries to environmentally sound technologies, in 
its relaticn to proprietary rights, with a view to 
developing effective responses to the needs of 
developing countries in this area. 
Unlike the negotiations on issues such as Forests or 
Finance, the G 77 did not insist that its text A.CONF/151/PC/L.46 
be used as a basis for negotiation. Instead, it allowed the 
Chair, Ambass'ador Bj omar Utheim of Norway to come up with a 
consolidated text based on the discussions held in previous 
meetings on the issue. As late as the Fourth Prepcom, the contact 
group on technology transfer. was still unsure of how to proceed 
With the overlapping pr.oposals received from the various 
delegations. It was the United States which came forward to 
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assist in formatting and rearranging the ideas presented into a 
negotiating document. 
There were three areas of disagreement that could not be 
resolved by the end of the Fourth Prepcom. The first concerned 
intellectual property rights (IPR), in particular the North's 
insistence that they be safeguarded. The second was on the terms 
of transfer in which the North would continue to support transfer 
at commercial and market rates through the concept of "technology 
cooperation". The third area of difficulty, which spilled over 
from the negotiation on Atmosphere during the last week of the 
Fourth Prepcom, was Saudi Arabia's insistence on including the 
word "safe" to mean environmentally "safe" and sound technology 
so that "safe technology" would be implicit in all subsequent 
references. The Saudis' proposal was opposed by the United States 
as it implied an anti-nuclear approach to the North's nuclear 
technology. 
81 
From the very beginning, the idea of "preferential and non-
Commercial" transfer of technology posed a challenge to the 
industrialised countries. Industries in the North were reluctant 
to invest huge sums in research and development of new products 
only to have their results given away to companies in developing 
countries that could then undercut potential markets. The United 
States was representing its industry when it insisted that the 
concept of "technology cooperation" be applied in discussing the 
issue of technology transfer. The concept was introduced by the 
Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) under the 
-81 
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chairmanship of Stephan Schmidheiny. It advocated that a 
sustainable transfer would occur as the parties entered into a 
more complex and evolving relationship, establishing a form of 
partnership for technological cooperation through an increase in 
direct investment, joint ventures and joint R&D programmes. 
This implied the need to facilitate the roles of market 
mechanisms, the private sector, trade expansion, and intellectual 
property rights (IPR) in promoting further advances in technology 
82 
development, cooperation and transfer. The South on the other 
hand, was suspicious of the term "technology cooperation", 
arguing that it was not p~ssible to have cooperation as advocated 
by the United States unless countries were on an equal footing. 
The contention on the above areas was reflected in the 
alternative titles of the chapter which were taken to Rio in 
brackets. They were: 
-82 
[Environmentally [safe and] sound technology: transfer, 
cooperation and capacity-building] 
or 
[Transfer of environmentally [safe and] sound technology: 
requisite cooperation and capacity-building thereunder] 
or 
[Cooperation in and related to the access to and the 
transfer of environmentally [safe and] sound technology] 
or 
bStephan Schmidheiny, Changing Course, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
~.I.T Press, 1992). 
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[Cooperation in and related to the transfer of 
• 83 
envlronmentally [safe and] sound technology]. 
The final title agreed at Rio was the "Transfer of 
environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity -
building", which reflected the consensus reached on 13 June 1992. 
The entire text was a weak reflection of the negotiating position 
of the South on the subject. From the outset, the South had 
glaringly left many contentious phrases unbracketed. An obvious 
example was paragraph 34.4 which read: 
There is a need for favourable access to and the 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in 
particular to developing countries, through supportive 
measures that promote technology cooperation and that 
should enable transfer of necessary technological 
know-how as well as building up of economic, 
technical, and managerial capacities for the efficient 
use and further development of transferred technology. 
Technology cooperation involves joint efforts by 
enterprises and Governments, both suppliers of 
technology and its recipients. Therefore, such 
cooperatIon entails an iterative process involving 
Government, the private sector, and research and 
development facilities to ensure the best possible 
results from transfer of technology. Successful long-
term partnerships. in technology cooperation. 
----------------------83 
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necessarily require continuing systematic training 
and capacity-building at all levels over an extended 
• 84 
per10d of time. 
In spite of the South's opposition to the concept of "technology 
cooperation", it allowed the above language to prevail. Neither 
the Chair of the G 77 nor any of its members sat down to draft 
an alternative wording, or even to insist that the paragraph be 
retained in brackets. 
Another contentious paragraph, which was left unbracketed 
from the beginning, relat.ed to the issue of IPR. Paragraph 34.10 
on the need to promote patent protection and IPR reflected the 
interest of the North. Again, the G 77 neither made any effort 
to suggest alternative language to counter the North's draft, nor 
insisted on brackets. 
By the time the contact group on Technology Transfer 
finalised its work on 10 June, 1992, the South had acquiesced to 
the North on three more issues. These related to the negotiation 
on paragraph 34.11 on the South's demand for "assured access to 
environmentally sound technologies"; paragraph 34.14 on the terms 
of·transfer and paragraph 34.18(e)(iv) on the abuse of IPR in 
the case of privately owned technologies. The South announced 
that it was willing to accept the suggested watered-down language 
in these paragraphs in order to arrive at a consensus. The end 
result was a document on technology transfer which uses loose 
terms such as "mutually agreed on" measures of technology 
-
84 
See UN documents A/CONF.151/4 (22 April, 1992) and 
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transfer, and the promotion, faci1i tating....- and financing of 
enhanced access to environmentally sound technologies "as 
85 
appropriate". 
The outstanding issue on "safe technology" as suggested by 
Saudi Arabia was resolved in the compromised text on Atmosphere. 
All references to the phrase "safe and" were deleted against the 
Saudis' will, but the latter were given the right to place on 
record their formal reservations to the section. The Saudis were 
given an earlier option to accept the solution of deleting the 
-phrase with a reference inserted in the chapter to Agenda 21 to 
state that wherever technology was referred to in the document, 
it should be assumed that such reference implied environmentally 
safe and sound technology. They, however, chose the former option 
which made their stand less effective. 
86 
The meeting on technology transfer broke down on 31 March 
when the G 77 complained that there was no reason to resume the 
meeting as there was no political will to resolve issues. The 
United States delegations were under explicit orders from the 
White House to do everything possible to keep any North-South 
issues involving resource transfer or other demands for reform 
of the global economic system off the agenda. The United States 
pr evailed.
87 
This does not explain why the South had to concede 
So early in' the negotiations, as reflected in their less 
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determined attitude compared to the negotiations on the other 
issues such as Forests or Finance. 
The answer perhaps lies in the fact that many who were 
present at the technology transfer meetings lacked the authority 
to negotiate seriously the contentious issues on IPR and the 
terms of transfer. One of the obvious things about the 
suitability of the delegations from the developing countries, 
beyond a handful of countries, was that there was very little 
technical backup to assist them in the negotiations. This was 
-particularly the case of the African delegations in which one 
could see a delegate switching from one contact group to another, 
listening and not contributing very much. This consequently led 
to the dilution of their positions and interests. As for the 
substance negotiated, it must be asked, for example, whether the 
South had any idea of what information it wanted or what it would 
do wi th the state-of-the-art technologies it demanded. Middleton, 
88 
O'Keefe and Moyo commented that the transfer of technology to 
the South was not a simple matter. Much contemporary technology 
cannot just be transferred like a lump of ore; it needs an 
industrial environment in which it can be used and developed and, 
above all, a supporting climate of indigenous research and 
development. Even in the most advanced of developing countries, 
the latter exists only in fragmented and sectoral form, and it 
is frequently not to be found at all in the poorer states. 
It could be observed in the UNCED Prepcoms that the official 
negotiators of the South often "tapped the brains" of the 
Southern NGOs in formulating their positions on the various 
-
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89 
issues. However, the position of both differed on the issue of 
technology transfer. The G 77 has been cautioned by the Southern 
NGOs that long-term relationships, as advocated by the North, 
were not particularly a good thing as they would put the South 
in an adverse position from which it could not escape. The 
unquestioning call for more technology might result in more 
financial commitment which would further lead to more. reverse 
transfers of finances from South to North, thus aggravating the 
indebtedness and dependency of the South .. The NGOs' way out was 
-to go slowly and to scale down the industrialisation process. 
The direction to take was deindustrialisation: encouraging local 
communities to manage their own socio-economic activities and 
resources. The Southern NGOs also reminded the delegates from the 
South of the need to bring the parallel process of the Uruguay 
Round into the UNCED discussion. Al though UNCTAD had been working 
for two decades on a code of conduct on the transfer of 
technology, no efforts were made by the official delegates to 
incorporate it formally into the UNCED process. 
90 
A possible explanation of the South's weak bargaining 
Position on the technology issue lies in the fact that a number 
of developing countries were representing the governments of the 
89 
These Southern NGOs include the Third World Network, APPEN 
(Asia Pacific People's Environmental Network) ANEN 
(African NGOs Environmental Network) and ANGOC (Asian NGO 
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Chatterjee and Finger, The Earth Brokers (1994), op.cit., 
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"Southern elites" whose main consideration was to boost trade and 
economic growth in the South. As for newly industrialised 
countries like Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and to a certain extent 
Malaysia, there was a matter of principle involved: technology 
transfer was a separate issue from financial aid. They were 
already industrialising; therefore what was needed was guaranteed 
91 
access to new technologies, on terms they could afford .. 
Malaysia's Assessment 
-As it was difficult to get the technical'agencies to attend all 
five weeks in the last. round of the Prepcom, their technical 
briefs became increasingly relevant. This was in fact the case 
for Malaysia. The Malaysian delegation was not big enough to be 
represented in all the meetings, including the ones on technology 
transfer. In addition, the Malaysian delegation was already 
Convinced that 'the North would not concede the demands of the 
South and therefore decided to focus its efforts on making 
technology transfer a condition for its participation in the 
, 92 
Biological Diversity and Climate Change convent1ons. 
Gurmit Singh, NGO President of the Environment Protection 
Society, Malaysia, (EPSM) who attended the Fourth Prepcom 
Commented that there were a number of views about the technology 
debate which 'the EPSM could not share with the official Malaysian 
delegation. He commented that it would not do Malaysia any good 
to continue blaming the North for their excessive C02 emissions 
-91 
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when Malaysia, with its current life style and consumption, is 
copying the development pattern of the North. The technology 
debate, he asserted, tended to focus on the transfer of 
environmentally sound technology in terms of 'high technology' 
which must be transferred from the North to the South. He 
emphasised that not all environmentally sound technology is 'high 
technology' and neither is it a monopoly of the North~ Agenda 
21's chapter on technology has actually taken the big countries 
of the South off the hook from sharing their technology with the 
. h h 93 -other South countries or even W1t t e North. 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS 
The negotiation on financial resources and mechanisms required 
for the successful implementation of the UNCED decisions proved 
to be the most difficult of all UNCED negotiations. Negotiations 
which took shape during the Fourth Prepcom continued at Rio with 
agreements reached only at 19:00 on 13 June, 1992. By then, most 
of the Heads of States and Governments had left. 
The Secretariat estimated that an annual average level of 
US$125 billion would be required to implement Agenda 21 during 
the 1993-2000 period. This represented US$70 billion more than 
the present Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows of US$55 
93 
Personal interview with Gurmit Singh, President of EPSM, 
on4 October, 1994. 
160 
billion per year, thus reinforcing the ne/ed for "new and 
additional financial resources." 
94 
To ensure the prompt implementation of Agenda 21, Maurice 
Strong suggested that countries take the following measures: 
- Replenishment of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
at four to five times its present level of funding; 
- New funds in the form of an "Earth Increment" to increase 
International Development Association (IDA) funding; 
Increased funding to UNDP for technology transfer; 
- More funding to.UNEP, the relevant UN agencies and the 
Regional Economic Commissions; 
- Increased bilateral assistance to developing countries; 
- A programme of debt reduction for developing countries; 
- Incentives for private investment in sustainable 
developntent; 
9S 
- Private support for NGO programmes. 
The fundamental question was: where would the money come from? 
Drawing from the agreement reflected in UNGA Resolution 
44/228, the developing countries tabled a document on financial 
resources (A/CONF.151/PC/L.41) which they insisted should be the 
basis of discussion at the Fourth Prepcom. Document L.41 called 
for new and additional funding which did not constitute a 
94 
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reallocation of existing multilateral or bilateral financial 
flows for development purposes. It called for a separate fund for 
each convention and a general fund (Fund for the promotion of 
sustainable development or "Green Fund") to cover activities not 
included in the separate conventions or the GEF drawn from 
mandatory contributions of developed countries. It asserted that 
the governance of the funding mechanisms should be transparent, 
democratic and unconditional and would be of a compensatory 
nature. Resources were to be made available through greater 
- market access, better terms of trade ,'remunerative commodity 
prices, transfer of· technology on preferential and non-commercial 
terms and the efficient and urgent addressing of debt problems 
and the alleviation of poverty. 
While industrialised countries acknowledged the need for new 
and additional financial resources, they saw it as proceeding 
through the GEF mechanism. The resources, they argued, were new 
in that the GEF was a new fund and that the resources were not 
diverted from elsewhere. They were not inclined to increase the 
levels of development assistance and, despite making general 
Commitments to meeting the UN target of 0.7 percent GNP for ODA, 
Were unwilling to agree ~n a schedule to meet the target. Japan 
and the United States called for better deployment of existing 
resources, arid like most developed countries, were opposed to the 
creation of new funds including the "Green Fund" or separate 
funds which the G 77 proposed. 
The Nordic countries, on the other hand, took a moralistic 
view of the issue. At the Fourth Prepcom, they proposed a 
"financial package" which called for established targets of ODA 
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as a· percentage of GNP, the use of existing mechanisms for 
implementing Agenda 21 and the strengthening of the Multilateral 
Development Banks and UNDP. They also urged the implementation 
of the Paris Club agreement of December 1991 for debt relief to 
the poorest countries, new and additional resources to be 
administered by the GEF and meeting agreed contributions to the 
96 
Montreal Protocol fund. 
John Bell, the issue coordinator for Finance, allowed 
countries to conduct informal consultations while he held private 
- consultations with the chairs of the' regional groups in an 
attempt to craft a comp~omise document based on the views of both 
the industrialised and developing countries. However, after two 
days of informal consultations, Bell resumed an informal-informal 
meeting on finance without a Chair's text. Instead, he allowed 
the G 77 to table their negotiating text, L.41/Rev.1. The revised 
text did not G.iffer very much from the earlier text and the 
industrialised countries expressed disappointment that it did not 
reflect the full extent of discussions carried out earlier. The 
Uni ted States referred to it as "one-sided, unbalanced and 
unrealistic" thus compelling John Bell to request written 
comments in order to improve the L.41/Rev.1 text. 
Negotiations resumed a week later in a small contact group 
at Ambassadorial level. It was hoped that elevating the 
representational level of the meeting would induce more 
commitment on the part of the negotiators. However, as it entered 
its final weeks, negotiations at the Prepcom became more 
difficult as positions from both the North and South continued 
-
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to harden. Bell summed up by saying that /:there was a strong 
signal by almost all the industrialised countries that they were 
not interested in a new fund to support Agenda 21, but that 
there would be greater availability of funds through all existing 
channels of bilateral and multilateral development assistance.
97 
Bell conceded that the negotiation"had come to a stalemate and 
that he was unable to resolve the problems in time for the 
plenary of the Fourth Prepcom. 
Prepcom Chair, Tommy Koh took over the negotiations and 
- called upon a group of countries to draft a "non-paper' to resume 
negotiations. He appointed Mexican Ambassador Andres Rosental to 
coordinate the new round of talks and to come up with the results 
before the close of the Fourth Prepcom. Representatives from 
Japan, EU and the Nordic countries met to draft a new text which 
was transmitted to the G 77. Realising the difficulties· of 
getting the North to agree to their demands, the G 77 agreed for 
the first time to drop their demand for a" separate fund but 
explici tly urged that a "properly restructured" GEF be one of the 
channels for funding projects. They also agreed to lengthening 
their demanded time frame for achievement of 0.7 percent of GNP 
going to ODA from 1995, as in previous G 77 proposals, to the 
end of the century. 
Unfortunately, talks broke down following the EU's 
insistence on its formula identifying the GEF as the only 
multilateral mechanism. The G 77 decided that it was pointless 
to resume negotiations and that it would take its own text to 
Rio. 
97 
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At Rio 
Tommy Roh replaced Ambassador Andres Rosental with Brazilian 
Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, whose task at Rio was to seek 
consensus on the 'Means of Implementation' section of the 
Financial resources chapter of Agenda 21. The other remaining 
sections of the chapter were coordinated by the Brazilian Finance 
Minister Marcelio Marques Moreira under a separate sub-contact 
group. Meanwhile, discussion on the financial passages in the 
various chapters of Agenda 21 was deliberately avoided, pending 
-the outcome of general discussions on the financial question. 
On 4 June, 1992, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero opened the first 
meeting by presenting a Chair's working paper for consideration. 
The working paper contained the following points: i.e. special 
efforts must be made to meet the full incremental costs for 
developing countries; economic conditions for free trade were 
essential; developed countries should 'reaffirm' commitments to 
reach 0.7 percent of GNP for ODA (with no mention of a target 
date); mechanisms and sources of funds should include 
multilateral development banks and such funds as the IDA 
replenishment; multilateral institutions for capacity-building 
and technical cooperation; strengthening of bilateral assistance 
programmes; debt relief; private funding and private investment; 
innovative financing; a transparent and accountable GEF; funding 
for incremental costs of Agenda 21 activities; and review and 
98 
monitoring of Agenda 21 financing. The industrialised countries 
reacted favourably to the Chair's text and were hopeful that it 
Would be used to propel, . rather than protract, discussions over 
-
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the G 77 L.41/Rev. 1 text. Much to the surprise of the North, the 
G 77 did not totally reject the Chair's draft. Instead, it 
responded by requesting the North to comment on a series of 
issues which included: credible assurances for new and additional 
funding; commitments to reach 0.7 percent of GNP for ODA by the 
year 2000; a pledging conference to be called at the next UNGA; 
a monitoring mechanism for financial flows to deyeloping 
countries; and the need for a supportive international economic 
climate. 
99 
Wi th four days left before the Summit was to come to a 
close, a decision was taken to reduce the size of the informal-
informal contact group to 18 countries. At 04:30 on Wednesday, 
10 June, after an eighteen-hour marathon session, the contact 
group emerged with a final 'Chair's draft' that contained 
brackets over only four outstanding issues. The first was over 
the ODA for Agenda 21: there was still no consensus on the 
timetable for industrialised countries to meet the UN target of 
0.7 percent of the GNP for ODA. The second issue was on the IDA 
funding: there was no agreement on the need to increase the IDA 
replenishment levels. Thirdly, there was no agreement on the text 
concerning the governance of the GEF and finally, dispute 
remained over the types of resources required to implement Agenda 
21: the United States continued to insist that much of the new 
and additional funding would be neither grant nor concessional 





As the Main Committee officially ended on Thursday morning, 
11 June 1992, the outstanding problems were passed to the Chair 
of the Plenary, the Brazilian President Collor de Mello, who 
requested Ambassador Ricupero to continue seeking agreement on 
the outstanding issues of the IDA, GEF and the types of 
resources. At the same time, Jan Pronk, the Minister of 
Development Cooperation from the Netherlands, was assigned 
responsibility for conducting bilateral consultations' on the 
issue of targets and timetables for ODA. 
On Friday afternoon, 12 June, 'Ambassador Ricupero reported 
to the General Committee that consensus had been reached on the 
sentence that dealt with the provision of new and additional 
resources in paragraph 10 of the Chair's text. This was arrived 
at after considerable pressure had been put on the United States 
by the rest of the OECD members. The United States was persuaded 
to agree to widespread references concerning the need for "new 
and additional resources" for developing countries, as long as 
100 
Specific numbers were not mentioned. A compromise text was also 
reached on the word' condi tionali ty' in the sentence dealing with 
GEF •. A further problem pertaining to 'debt relief' which had 
emerged at the last minute was also resolved by the time the 
Plenary met at 00:45 on Saturday, 13 June. 
The issue over the IDA replenishment was resolved after what 
Was arguably the decisive address of Lewis Preston, the new 
President of the World Bank group at the Rio Summit. Preston made 
the crucial announcement· that he would propose an "earth 
-
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increment" for the tenth replenishment of IDA/(IDA-10) covering 
the period 1993 to 1995, an amount additional to the volume of 
resources needed to maintain the funding level for the ninth IDA 
(IDA-9). Since IDA-9 was funded at US$15.5 billion, this meant 
that Preston would be seeking an earth increment on top of a 
floor of about US$18 billion for the three-year period. In 
addition, he would propose an annual allocation of the World 
Bank's net income as the World Bank's own contribution to augment 
whatever earth increment might be forthcoming from donor country 
t . b' 101 - con rl utlons. 
Richard Gardner described Preston's statement as providing 
the essential minimum of prospective funding that enabled the G 
77 to agree on an Agenda 21 financing text. The formula was 
deceptively simple - "special consideration should be given to 
Preston's statement as a way of helping the poorest countries 
meet their sustainable development objectives as contained in 
102 Agenda 21". Stanley Johnson commented that for the first time 
the words of the head of the World Bank group were referred to 
as part of the official consensus, which was a new way of making 
.. 103 
soft law'. 
Consultation continued at 15:30 on Saturday to discuss the 
remaining issue pertaining to the ODA. Agreement was difficult 
as the EU could not arrive at a consensus. France and the 
Netherlands were supportive of a target of 0.7 percent of GNP for 
-
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ODA by the year 2000 but Britain and Germany~were not. Agreement 
was finally reached just before 19:00 on Saturday, 13 June. The 
text read: 
Developed countries reaffirmed their commitments to 
reach the accepted UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP for 
ODA and, to the extent that they may not yet achieve 
that target, agree to augment their aid programmes in 
order to reach that target as soon as possible and to 
ensure a prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 
21. Some countrie~ agreed or had agreed to reach the 
target by the year 2000[ ••. ] Those which have already 
reached the target are to be commended and 
104 
encouraged. 
The negotiation on finance proved not only to be the most 
difficult but also the most disappointing for the South. Only 
US$2.5 billion in additional aid was pledged, small compared to 
Maurice Strong's hope for US$10 billion, smaller still compared 
to the estimated US$125 billion cost of Agenda 21. 
The Perspectives captured the mood of the event, commenting 
that the rich countries eventually prevailed, as they must, and 
that at the 'end of the day they could not be made to give away 
resources against their will. This in a way justified the 
statement made by President Bush on the eve of his departure for 
Rio that "the time for the open-cheque book is over". The 
-
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prevailing political doctrine in many of the/rich countries with 
their focus on tax cuts and retrenchment of public services was 
not conducive to increased aid. The economic recession, capital 
requirements of Eastern Europe, restructuring of the European 
Union and electoral uncertainties in the United States and 
elsewhere all contributed to reducing the likelihood of any 
lOS 
precipitous increases in foreign aid at that time. Even the 
presence of the Heads of States at Rio could not alter the 
si tuation, as they themselves were subj ected to negotiating 
- limits set by their own domestic cabinets or legislatures. 
One lesson learnt ~rom the finance negotiation was that the 
concept of development aid had changed since the days of the NIEO 
of the 1970s. The North had reexamined its aid policy, pushing 
for special priority areas and expecting accountability and 
responsibility for the amount that they gave. This appeared to 
be the only way that the South could rise to their expectations. 
Raising taxes to give money to poorer countries was not a vote 
winner in most industrialised countries. It was also obvious that 
donor countries would not agree to large-scale transfers unless 
they had faith that the money would be well used. That meant both 
that conditions would be attached to transfers and that they 
would have to be managed by an institution in which donor 
106 
countries had some faith. 
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Malaysia's Assessment 
Malaysia participated actively on the issue of finance. It took 
an active part alongside certain developing countries such as 
China and India to pen the finance language found in UNGA 
Resolution 44/228, the Beijing Declaration, the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration and the UN negotiating documents, L.41 and 
L.41/Rev.l. It participated in the Washington parallel meeting 
on the GEF held outside the UNCED process and was also 
represented in the final informal-informal contact group of 18 
- countries which crafted the Agenda 21 chapter on finance at Rio. 
However, finance .was not entirely a question of deep 
national interest for Malaysia but one in which it negotiated 
to promote the interest of the South. Compared to several 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Malaysia 
107 
is financially less dependent on the North. As such, it felt 
free to criticise the North for their 'historical culpability' 
and to insist that the North compensate the South financially. 
In short, Malaysia chose to become an advocate for the South, 
particularly for countries which could not speak openly for 
108 
themselves. 
The landmark resolution 44/228 was significant to Malaysia 
and the countries of the South because it established the first 
contact between the North and South on a subject that was of 
special importance to the North. The South saw this as an 
107 
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Dimbleby, BBC World Service, 1310 hours, 14 June, 1992, Rio 
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opportunity to extract financial aid flows from the North. Since 
it could not get development aid directly from the North on the 
basis of the old arrangement (ODA, IDA), it might intimidate the 
North with the notion that the problems in the South could be 
transplanted to the North. This worked for a while because of the 
prevailing trend in which the Green Party and the NGOs were 
pressuring their governments to do something about the state of 
the environment. But there was a certain amount of naivety on the 
part of the South to think that in the process of two and a half 
~ years in preparing for Rio, the North 'would give in to their 
demands and that there would be an actual pledging and a 
commi tment in terms of specified financial amounts at Rio. 
109 
Nothing of that sort happened. Michael Grubb felt that a 
Confrontational approach was not likely to work in the developing 
countries favour. Many developing countries had overrated the 
bargaining power which environmental issues gave them. While 
developed countries were concerned, there was very little 
indication that they were ever frightened enough to be subjected 
to crude "greenmail" (i. e. the implicit threats about the global 
environmental consequences of unconstrained development, used as 
a lever to extract more financial and technological transfers). 110 
-
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THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ~.-/. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change, like the Biological 
Diversity Convention, was negotiated separately from the UNCED 
process through an Intergovernmental Negotiating Commi ttee (INC) '. 
Although the INC met at different times and was generally 
represented by different people from the UNCED Prepcoms, the 
issues, particularly the cross-cutting issues of finance and 
technology transfer, were linked to the ones discussed at the 
UNCED Prepcoms. The negotiation on the Climate Change Convention, 
- which is a framework and not a full convention, was completed in 
fifteen months in the rush to meet the Rio Summit deadline. It 
was opened for signature at Rio, where 154 countries signed the 
Convention, and comes into force after the 50th ratification. 
The concern about potential global warming and climate 
change had been brought to the attention of the world community 
by scientists Gince the 1972 Stockholm Conference. A series of 
conferences and workshops on climate-related issues was organised 
to arouse public attention to the consequences of human-induced 
climate variations. Among them, studies conducted by the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) indicated that the burning of 
fossil fuels, deforestation and changes of land use had increased 
the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by about 15 
percent during the last century, were increasing at 0.4 percent 
. th f 111 Per year and were likely to increase 1n e uture. At the 
Toronto Conference on 'The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security' held in June 1988 and attended by more than 300 
111 
WMO, World Climate Conference Declaration and supporting 
Documents 2, Geneva, 1979 cited in Caroline Thomas, 
(1992), op.cit., p.174. 
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scientists and policy-makers from 48 countries, United Nations 
organisations and NGOs, the conference called upon governments 
to take the necessary action to reduce the C02 emissions by 20 
percent by the year 2005, with an eventual aim of cutting 
emissions by 50 percent. 
As a response to the Toronto Conference, UNEP and the WMO 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in 1988. The IPCC was an advisory body of scientists and 
officials that dealt with the impacts of and response strategies 
- to climate change. Under the chairmanship of Professor Bert Bolin 
of Sweden, the IPCC represented one of the most massive 
scientific exercises ever undertaken by the United Nations 
system, which provided the basis for an understanding of and 
response to global warming and other important climatic issues. 112 
An IPCC impact report released in 1990 stated that unless 
emissions of greenhouse gases were reduced significantly, the 
world would face unprecedented global warming. Global warming 
would lead to rises in sea level, unpredictable weather patterns 
and droughts and decreased agricultural producti vi ty. Because C02 
is most responsible for global warming, the IPCC concluded that 
C02 emissions needed to be reduced by 60 per cent in order to 
stabilise current carbon levels in the atmosphere. The IPCC had 
also assessed that the industrialised North accounted for the 
majority of the carbon dioxide emissions with the United States 
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While many expected the IPCC to serve as the 
.. prenegotiation' forum for a climate change convention, this 
function was abruptly taken away by the decision of the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990 to 
establish the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC-FCCC) under its 
control. This unexpected move was seen by many as the ~eginning 
of the poli ticisation of the climate change issue in which 
scientists would take a back seat while the representatives of 
- governments negotiated to draw up a convention to limit emissions 
of greenhouse gases th~t could be signed at the Summit in Rio. 
In reality, developing countries felt that the IPCC was dominated 
by experts from developed countries whose conclusions were likely 
to be skewed in favour of those countries' concerns. 
Unlike the various UNCED issues discussed at the Prepcoms, 
the climate change issue transgressed the North-South divide. The 
posi tions of the industrialised countries differed on 
commitments, finances and technological transfers. The former 
Soviet Union and the former centrally-planned economies of 
eastern Europe had their own position. Among the developing 
countries, the positions of the oil-producing countries, the 
small island states, the newly-industrialised countries (NICs) 
and the least developed countries varied according to the issues 
at stake. 
For a while, the elements of uncertainty in the scientific 
findings provided the North with an excuse to evade the issue. 
At the 44th UN General Assembly, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher demanded more precision before serious action could be 
175 
contemplated. While she nodded in the direction of the dangers 
of global warming, she stressed that, "put in its bluntest form, 
the main threat to our environment is more and more people and 
their activities". 
114 
Among the countries of the North, the United States was the 
major opponent of any move to agree on any targets to stabilise 
or reduce carbon dioxide emissions. It advocated a "go slow" 
approach, justifying its position on the grounds· of the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding global warming and the high 
- costs that the US economy would incur if reductions were made. 
The guidelines issued tc? the US delegates negotiating the Climate 
Change Convention were that it was, 
not beneficial to discuss whether there is or is not 
global warming, or how much or how little warming. In 
the eyes ~f the public, we will lose this debate. A 
better approach is to raise the many uncertainties 
that need to be understood on this issue, and that 
many fundamental questions remained unanswered and 
more work is needed on the economic impacts of 
d 'bl 115 potential global changes an POSS1 e responses. 
Unlike 'the United States, the European Union, the Nordic and 
CANZ group of countries had made specific commitments to 
114 
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stabilise or reduce C02 " 116 eml.SSl.ons. At /i ts meeting on 29 
October, 1990, the Council of the EU indicated its willingness 
to take actions aimed at reaching stabilisation of total 
emissions of carbon dioxide to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
Together with the Nordic countries it believed that 'new and 
addi tional ' financial commitments' must be made to developing 
countries; the United States, Canada and Japan on the other hand 
were against this. 
As for the developing countries, the oil producing and 
- exporting countries headed by Saudi Arabia, opposed suggestions 
to set targets to reduce C02 emissions or to impose carbon or 
energy taxes as a means of achieving reductions in C02 emissions. 
The small island states formed an alliance (AOSIS) to determine 
their stand on the impact of a sea level rise while the NICs 
argued for recognition of their special circumstances due to 
their recent industrialisation and their dependence on energy-
efficient technology. The uncompromising position that all 
developing countries' commitments were conditional upon the 
provision of technology and finance from industrialised countries 
was advocated by countries such as China, India and Malaysia. 
By the final rounds of the INC, it became obvious that three 
areas of contention blocked the chances of arriving at an 
agreement. These were the issue of commitments to be made by the 
governments, the financial mechanisms to be used and the 
reporting required. 
116 
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On the issue of the commitments of developed countries, the 
Uni ted States remained adamant against setting targets and 
timetables to cut back carbon dioxide emissions. It continued to 
disavow the interpretations of scientific evidence in order to 
forestall commitments to set targets on C02. It applied the 
'comprehensive' approach through which it was argued that there 
should not be a focus on C02 alone but on other greenhouse gases 
as well and that sources and sinks should be considered together. 
It even went to the extent of linking President Bush's potential 
- attendance at the Rio Summit with progress made in the INC which 
did not include specific:: targets and timetables on C02 emissions. 
The heavily bracketed language of the consolidated working 
document on the draft article on 'specific commitments' which 
arrived at the fourth INC on 19 December 1991 reflected the 
opposing interests of the different groups of countries: 
The developed country Parties shall [make 
efforts]/[commit themselves] to take immediate steps 
towards reducing emissions of all anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol [between the years 2005 and 
2010]/[as early as possible]/[after the year 2000]/[by 
the year 2000] [and as a first step shall reduce such' 
emissions by 25 percent by the year 2010, using 1990 
as the base year] taking into account the most 
authoritative scientific advise available and setting 
targets to reduce and limit all emissions of 
117 
greenhouse gases. 
On the issue of financial mechanisms, the 
178 
developed 
countries were united in preferring the GEF as the mechanism 
through which the financial and technological resources would 
flow to the South. The developing countries, on the other hand, 
insisted that there should be a fund established under the 
Convention which assessed contributions of adequate, new and 
- additional financial resources separate from the agreed aDA level 
to meet the incremental costs of developing countries. They 
continued to argue on the basis of historical culpability that 
those who caused the global warming problem should bear the main 
burden for compensating those who suffer from it. All developing 
countries' commitments would therefore be completely conditional 
on finance and technology from the North. Similarly, the 
reporting requirements that were to apply to developing countries 
should relate to the availability of finance and the transfer of 
technology . 
. After a fast-track session of five INCs, the negotiations 
ended in New York on 9 May 1992 with a convention which does not 
contain any specific commitment on the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases or financial resources. The commitments of the 
developed countries were watered down to accommodate the United 
States, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. There was also 
no specific commitment on new and additional financial resources 
117 
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and the developing countries were left with/no choice but to 
accept the GEF as the financial mechanism on an interim basis. 
The text of the Convention does not commit the developed 
countries to achieving the stabilisation goal but only to 
reporting progress they make towards the goal of returning 'their 
anthropogenic emissions of C02 and other greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol to their 1990 levels' - a 
subtle but important distinction. While the article on Protocols 
could save the Framework Convention from being labelled as 
- "meaningless" and "useless", it was as Michael Grubb described, 
"skeletal and unenthusiastic", with no timetable or structure. 
Some negotiators suggested that the protocols may never be 
invoked, arguing that it is easier to make progress by amending 




In reporting on the results of the INC negotiation, the National 
Steering Committee informed the Government of Malaysia that the 
posi tion of the developing countries disintegrated as the meeting 
proceeded. Many developing countries yielded under the pressure 
of developed countries to accept the GEF as the financial 
mechanism which they had earlier criticised for its restricted 
scope and lack of transparency and governance. Some leading South 
Countries such as Pakistan (then Chair of G 77) and China 
accepted the GEF as an interim arrangement. The Alliance of Small 
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Island States (AOSIS), led by Vanuatu and consisting of several 
Caribbean and Pacific islands which had been widely acclaimed as 
being successful at getting their message across in the 
negotiations, was the first to yield on the question of 
commitment on stabilisation of C02 and other greenhouse gases. 
The Latin group, as expected, was supportive of any form of 
convention and persuaded other developing countries to a<:=cept the 
condi tions of the North. India, which had been vocal and 
uncompromising at the beginning, also yielded to Northern 
- pressure. India's moderating position can be explained by the 
fact that it was facing.a financial crisis and was forced to take 
an IMF loan of US$1.8 billion in January, 1991. Its economic 
vulnerability and dependence on the Northern aid would provide 
an occasion for the North to exploit it. To avoid this from 
happening, the negotiators were given periodic instructions to 
tread carefully and to avoid isolation during negotiations. 117 
Malaysia remained the only country that formally spoke 
against the Convention at the final session of the INC while a 
number of other developing countries expressed their reservations 
in private. Malaysia, one of the few countries that did not sign 
the Convention at Rio, called the Convention "fundamentally 
flawed because it contained no commitment on the part of the 
developed countries but instead offered ambiguous indications 
that the commitment might take place under equally obscure 
Circumstances [ ... ] We have a text in which key parts have been 








Malaysia's interest in the area of climate change was in 
many ways influenced by the Climate Change debate. Serious 
research on climate change had been limited until the 1980s when 
researchers such as Sham Sani, Chong Ah Look, K.C Goh, Jacobson, 
Koopmans, H.D. Tjia, Todorov, Walker and Zainab Siraj, ~aught by 
the interest shown in the international arena, conducted studies 
on climate variations and the implications for Malaysia. Reports 
- by these researchers contributed greatly to Malaysia's interest 
in the climate change ~egotiations while the implementation of 
a UNEP-assisted proj ect enabled the assessment on socio-economic 
impacts and possible policy responses. 
Although it did not sign the Framework Convention at Rio, 
Malaysia undertook a comprehensive study of the implications of 
being a party to the Convention and eventually joined the others 
in signing the Convention a year later. Some critics amongst the 
Malaysian NGOs argued that Malaysia had no moral justification 
for changing its position. Having opposed the Framework 
Convention and being the only country which spoke up against it, 
it was regrettable that Malaysia became a party to a Convention 
it had claimed to be fundamentally flawed. This reversal, 
according to the head of the Malaysian negotiating team on 
Climate Change, was made because it would be easier to influence 
the Convention from the inside than from out and that this could 
only be done by being a party to the process. Shifting positions 
118 . 
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after the negotiations are over is not an uncommon practice among 
governments as, over time, new factors such as changes in policy, 
leadership or interests can influence governments to reconsider 
their positions. 
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
The growing awareness of the importance of biological diversity 
as a genetic resource for improvement of crops and livestock and 
- in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceutical products, as well 
as the rapid reduction in biodiversity brought about by 
deforestation led to the negotiation for a convention on 
Biological Diversity. In 1988, UNEP, with the assistance of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), initiated a series of expert meetings which 
gave rise to· a document outlining possible elements for a 
convention. These meetings were conducted separately from but 
parallel to the UNCED Prepcom meetings. The first formal draft 
was considered in February 1991 by an Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC) which was also known as the Third Ad 
Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts. Four subsequent 
meetings of the INC were held during the next two years 
Culminating "in the adoption of the Final Act on 20 May 1992 in 
Nairobi. The legally-binding Convention was then ready to be 
Signed by the Heads of State and Government at Rio de Janeiro. 
It had three obj ecti ves: to conserve and to sustainably use 
biological diversity and. to share its benefits. 
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Developing countries rejected the ~oncepts of "common 
her1'tage" and "free access" 1'n relat1'on to the1'r genet· 1C 
resources. Although biodiversity had always been regarded in the 
past as a common heritage of mankind which was freely accessible 
to the North, the rise of patents and other IPRs led the South 
to insist that access to their resources would be dependent on 
access to technology and a share in the benefits derived from the 
technological exploitation of their resources. 
Malaysia reminded the meeting at the First Prepcom that the 
- biotechnology industries had not generally borne the costs of 
conserving germplasm. It stressed that the costs had been 
considerable and were usually underwritten by either the public 
sector or the rural population existing on traditional 
subsistence in areas of high genetic diversity. There were 
instances where corporations and other insti tutions in 
industrialised· countries had exploited the rich genetic diversity 
of developing countries as a free resource for R&D, then 
patented the results and sold them back to the developing 
119 
countries at excessively high prices. Malaysia also cautioned 
the meeting about the lack of scientific data on environmental 
risk during field testing and the release into the environment 
of genetically engineered organisms and plants. It called for 
adequate regulatory measures to avoid count~ies, particularly 
developing countries, from becoming increasingly attractive as 
sites for firms and other entities to test genetically modified 
-
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organisms and plants in ways which were prohibited in their home 
120 
countries. 
Access to germplasm, according to the G 77, should be on 
"mutually agreed terms", with "the national sovereignty of 
states affirmed over their natural resources" and with "the 
authority to determine access to genetic material resting with 
national governments in accordance with national legislation". 
The G 77 felt that the question of access to genetic resources 
by developed countries should be linked with that of access to 
- and transfer of technology, including biotechnology, and with 
that of IPR. The t:ran~fer of such technologies should be on 
"preferential and non-commercial" terms with no restrictions such 
as patents and IPR impeding such transfer. The South insisted 
that since technologies (including biotechnology) were in the 
hands of the private sector in the developed countries, 
governments of the North should create appropriate conditions 
through legislative, administrative and general policy measures 
to encourage the private sector to facilitate access to and 
121 
transfer of such technologies. 
On the question of funding, the South called for "new , 
addi tional and adequate" financial resources from developed 
countries for the dual purposes of conservation of biological 
diversi ty and access to and the transfer of technology. It 
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of the Multilateral Trust Fund of the Montreal Protocol to 
fulfill such obligations. Such a trust fund was to be a 
democratic mechanism that could provide mandatory funding on the 
basis of UN assessments, with equal donor-recipient 
representation giving an effective veto to either group.122 
The United States and most of the industrialised countries 
disagreed that new financial transfers were necessary and 
suggested reorienting existing aid programmes towards the 
conservation of biological di versi ty. They took every opportun~ ty 
- to exclude from the draft convention expressions such as 
"preferential and non-commercial basis" for access to technology 
and showed no intention of negotiating on any of the issues in 
the areas of IPR or patents. Instead, they appealed to countries 
to expand and increase protected areas and other biological 
reserves in order to maintain and enhance biological diversity. 
France warned that it would not sign a convention which did not 
include a "Global List" of important areas, which developing 
countries saw as a potential threat to their sovereignty. The EU 
called for an international code of conduct relating to 
environmentally sound use of biotechnology and, together with the 
United States and other developed countries, opposed the South's 
idea of linking biological diversity with biotechnology on the 
basis that nbt all biotechnologically derived products were from 
123 




For the North's position, see Earth· Summit Bulletin, 
Vol. 0, No.1, Vol. 2, No.1 and Michael Grubb et al., (1993), 
~. cit., p.83. 
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For diverse reasons Malaysia and the United States announced 
at the final INC meeting at Nairobi that they could not sign the 
Final Act, which was an administrative procedure to acknowledge 
the conclusion of the negotiating process. At Rio, the United 
States repeated that it would not sign the Biological Diversity 
Convention which it considered "seriously flawed" because of its 
provisions on financing, IPR and safeguards on gen~tically­
engineered products. The United States felt that the provision 
on the financial mechanism offered too much power to the 
- Conference of Parties, that the benefit-sharing provisions were 
incompatible wi th exist~ng international regimes for IPR and that 
the requirement to regulate the biotechnology industry would 
stifle innovation. 
The Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention on 
Biological Diversity held its first meeting in Geneva in October 
1993. By then., 165 countries had signed the Convention with 31 
ratifications. This means that the Convention has corne into force· 
and will be legally binding on the ratifying countries. The 
content of the compromised Convention is subject to 
interpretation. Some argue that it is a weak Convention which is 
"ecologically flawed" as nothing in the text compels countries 
to protect their biological diversity. The developing countries 
Were naive to think that they could force concessions from the 
North by virtue of their possession of genetic resources. The 
development of biotechnology in which scientists have learned to 
modify the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) of organisms without 
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having to depend on external genetic characteristics have 
seriously weakened the bargaining power of the South. 124 
Middleton, O'Keefe and Moyo commented that the Earth Summit 
saw the preservation of biological diversity primarily as an 
environmental issue. What should be at stake is development. The 
text cannot determine the nature of partnership between the rich 
North and the gene-rich countries. It is beyond the competence 
of the UN officials to work out rules ensuring that the 
developing countries do not simply wind up as junior partners 
- completely under the control of their Northern 'seniors' and of 
Northern markets, b~t t? have done so would have ensured the non-
125 
attendance of the United States. 
In a situation where consensus is the name of the game, no 
one party can extract everything or lose out completely as a 
resul t of agreeing to a convention. UNEP Director-General, 
Mostaffa Tolba acknowledged that the treaty establishes "the 
minimum on which the international community can agree" but added 
that "the process of international law requires us, for better 




Malaysia expressed its reservation over a number of core issues 
Pertaining to the text of the Convention. In particular, it was 
124 




Earth Summit Times, 1 June, 1992, Rio de Janeiro. 
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not happy that the Convention did not adopt the G 77 position for 
a separate Biodiversity Fund. On the transfer of technology, it 
considered that the language 'under fair and most favourable 
terms', including concessional and preferential terms, was a 
weakened version of the position articulated in UNGA resolution 
127 
44/228. Malaysia, together with' the other countries of the 
South was also not happy over the last minute changes that the 
United States was able to manipulate in the draft convention at 
Nairobi. These included changes in definitions such as 'country 
- of origin', 'in situ conditions' and 'ecosystem' which have been 
so defined that they lend themselves to convenient 
interpretations which suit the interests of the North. For 
example, these definitions would mean that all genetic material 
stored in gene banks and botanical gardens situated in the North 
would be automatically considered as coming from the countries 
from where they are stored, and not from which countries from 
which they were collected. The ability of the North, in 
particular the United States, to exclude the issue of ownership 
and rights over genetic resources presently in 'gene banks' 
further weakened the position of the South. This meant that the 
Convention would deal with access of genetic resources to be 
collected in the future, whilst excluding the hundreds of 
thousands of samples already housed in 'gene banks' and botanical 
128 
gardens located in the North. 
127 
Personal interview with Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, 1 
October, 1994, Kuala Lumpur. 
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Why then did Malaysia join the 153 other/ nations in signing 
the Biological Diversity Convention in Rio? 
The developments at Rio contributed to the reversal of the 
Malaysian position. Although, many countries in the North had 
expressed unwillingness to sign the Biological Diversity 
Convention for reasons similar to the United States, the United 
States was left isolated on the eve of the Summit when countries 
like France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan refused to go 
along with the United States' decision to reject the Convention. 
- The publicity mounted by the media and NGOs, which interpreted 
the US position as bei~g hostile not only to the Convention but 
also the whole Rio agenda, had seemingly encouraged the US's 
allies to distance themselves from the US position. 129 
Malaysia's chief negotiator, Ambassador Razali Ismail 
commented that" if the United States consider that the Convention 
gave in too much to the developing countries, then the Convention 
must be of some benefit to the developing countries. Malaysia 
therefore would review its decision with a view to signing the 
Convention.,,130 Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, who led the Malaysian 
negotiating team on the Biological Diversity debate, equally felt 
that the Convention was in many ways good for the South. She 
commented that on the question of finance, the South managed to 
ensure that 'the GEF did not become the mechanism identified for 
the Convention. Instead, the North would have to be content with 
the South's formulation of Article 39 which states that: 
129 
R.N. Gardner (1992) op.cit., p.12. 
130 
Press interview with Ambassador Razali Ismail, Utusan 
~alaysia, 10 June, 1992, Rio de Janeiro. 
Provided that it has been fully restructured in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 21, the 
Global Environmental Facility of the UNDP, UNEP and 
the IBRD shall be the institutional structure referred 
to in Article 21 on an interim basis, for the period 
between the entry into force 'of this Convention and 
the first meeting of the Conference of Parties or 
until the Conference of Parties decides which 
insti tutional structure will be designated in 
accordance with Article 21. 
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This Article placed the Conference of Parties as supreme on 
the matter of finance. As long as the rules under which the 
financial mechanism operates are under the formulation of the 
two-third maj ori ty rather than on consensus, the North would have 
difficulty in-imposing a veto over any provisions it did not 
1 -k 131 1 e. 
For developing countries including Malaysia, their 
involvement in the Biological Diversity negotiations provided 
them with new insights into a subject which in the past had been 
taken lightly or for granted. The negotiations awakened many 
gene-rich' countries that more should be done at the national 
level to pr6tect.their own biological resources. Having signed 
the Biological Diversity Convention, Malaysia found itself 
compelled to formulate its own national biological di versi ty 
Policy and to strengthen its institutional and legal frameworks. 
-
131 
Personal interview with Ambassador Ting Wen Lian, 1 
October, 1994, Kuala Lumpur. 
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Towards this end, the Malaysian Institute·· of International 
Studies (ISIS) conducted its first workshop in a series of post-
UNCED national workshops on Biological Diversity in Kuala Lumpur 
in February, 1993, which among other things aimed at ensuring 
that its obligations made at UNCED run parallel to its 
commitments at home. 
CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made to examine the process and the substance 
- of the UNCED negotiation. A comparison across issues revealed 
that the process of ne~otiation follows a pattern: negotiations 
often begin with the compartmentalisation of the issues into the 
different working groups. Formal meetings include the 
introduction of the Secretary-GeneralIs report which is normally 
prepared by experts commissioned by the Secretariat. The meeting 
then moves int.o smaller groups known as 'formal-informal', 
'informal-informal', 'ad hoc group' or 'Friends of the Chair', 
which may either be restricted in number or open-ended. 
Negotiations take place in the informal-informal, where in the 
absence of the NGOs, negotiators sit down until pre-dawn hours 
tabling proposals, consolidating their views, and introducing new 
Wordings to the negotiated text through a process of 
confrontation, convergence and compromise. This process involves 
the insertion and the removal of 'square brackets' which reflect 
disputed areas kept aside for further bargaining. The texts are 
normally negotiated paragraph by paragraph and sometimes go into 
a process of a second and third reading. The ultimate objective 
is to arrive at a document agreed upon by consensus. Negotiators 
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are given very limited time to complete their/work and a deadline 
helps to remind them of their task. 
Taking UNCED as a case study, the above description has to 
be applied in its multiplicity. With two conventions, a non-
legally binding set of principles on forests, a declaration on 
an earth charter and forty chapters of Agenda 21, the task of 
arriving at agreement on such an enormous and complicat~d agenda 
within a span of two and a half years over four Prepcoms and two 
INCs reflects the complexity of the negotiation. Such complex~ty 
- is further aggravated by the large number of negotiators and the 
presence of NGOs at t~ese meetings. To facilitate the smooth 
running of the meetings, the Secretariat assumed an important 
role in providing administrative and technical backing. The Chair 
and its bureau ensured that the negotiators completed their tasks 
in time for Rio. 
The Perspectives commented that it would be difficult to 
believe that governments would ever allow such a complex agenda 
as that of UNCED to come together again. Negotiators tend to 
concentrate on the process itself rather than the on the final 
product. Governments, asserted the Perspectives, seemed only to 
be listening to each other in order to fix the texts, not to 
change their positions. With so many issues under consideration, 
there were endless talks about scheduling new meetings and few 
about resolving the substantive issues of bridging the North-
South divide, setting concrete targets and timetables or making 
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commi tments. In short, it was a meeting> of process over 
132 
substance. 
Jim MacNeill, the former Secretary-General of the Brundtland 
Commission which recommended the convening of UNCED observed that 
the raised. expectations generated by the size of the whole 
exercise and the hype emanating from the conference Secretariat 
itself (such as Maurice Strong's repeated statements that it was 
"the most important meeting in the history of mankind") pressured 
the negotiators to ensure that UNCED succeeded. It could fail, 
- he added, because governments under pressure of time, end up 
It d ., . th f 133 compromising away diffi~u ec~s~ons ~n e name 0 consensus. 
MacNeill's concern was raised again at Rio when the 
Norwegian Prime Minister, Mrs. Brundtland, boldly questioned the 
consensus rule. Consensus meant that the 'lowest common 
denominator' would rule the day. 
The streRgth of this working method is that it can be 
claimed afterwards that everyone is on board. But one weakness 
of the consensus ruling is that countries with strong and deviant 
views may allow themselves to be swayed by some clever 
manipulation of text while nothing of sUbstance has changed. 
This tends to reinforce the emphasis on process over the 
134 
sUbstance in the proceedings. The intransigence of the United 
States to agree on a timetable for carbon dioxide emissions and 
132 
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to sign the Biological Diversity Convention, the intense 
opposition of Malaysia to a forest convention and the refusal of 
Saudi Arabia to agree on the Agenda 21 chapter on Atmosphere 
question the worthiness of the consensus rule. 
In a conference as large as UNCED it is hard to find a 
solution that will be readily accepted by everyone. Thus, once 
an acceptable solution is found, there is strong pressure not to 
delay progress by searching for the 'perfect' one. In certain 
instances, the Chair introduced rules to prevent a party from 
- reopening a discussion. Thus, accommodating diverse interests 
often leads f d k d .. 135 to unsatis actory an wea eC1S1ons. Winham 
explained that this phenomenon is common in today' s negotiations, 
which are devices to prevent conflict and shape destiny rather 
136 
than to resolve a crisis. 
The UNCED negotiation was in many ways an interplay between 
the North and ·South. Negotiators built coalitions in the name 
of G 77, CANZ group or EU, resulting in the negotiations being 
concluded between regional interest groups rather than between 
individual countries. Because of the element of the North-South 
divide, the UNCED negotiation became a highly politicised affair 
where many of the contentions were symptoms of the nation-state 
trying to maximise its own self-interest wi thin the process. This 
135 '. 
This argument is raised by Knut M1dgaard and Ar1ld 
Underdal in 'Multiparty Conferences; complex setting and 
Processes' in Daniel Druckman's Negotiations, (London: Sage 
Publishers, 1992), p.336. 
136 
G.Winham (1977), op.cit. 
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is hardly surprising as the negotiators' were instructed 
delegates, not independent players in a bargaining game. 
Governments were, however, not the only actors in the UNCED 
process. Scientists and technical experts helped to create and 
structure the substance of the negotiation without which the 
negotiation would have been meaningless. Over 3,200 NGOs were 
accredited to UNCED and among them, whether they represented the 
business lobby group or the environmentalists, they influenced 
the process in many ways. How much they made a difference is. an 
- entirely different matter, which will be examined in the next 
chapter on the role of non-negotiating actors. 
Finally, UNCED 'set the stage' for a remarkable comeback by 
the G 77. In the run-up to Rio, the South had mobilised to mount 
a united front on the issues that were crucial to them such as 
finance and forests. From a position of weakness, with little 
involvement in· early negotiations on international environmental 
issues, UNCED incubated the growing articulation of the South's 
needs, giving increased sophistication and urgency to their 
137 
arguments and a solidarity over many issues. 
This does not in anyway imply that the South got what they 
wanted at Rio. The UNCED negotiations revealed their weaknesses 
in many areas such as technology transfer, international trade 
and bio-technology and the reality that no amount of 
"greenmailing" could induce the North to part with their money. 
137 
The views are shared by June D.Hall and A.J. Hanson, A New 
Kind of Sharing, (Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre), 1992, p.299 and Helge Ole Bergesen, 
.. Empty symbols or a process that can't be reversed? A 
tentative evaluation. of the institutions emerging from 
UNCED', International Challenges, Vol.12, No.3, 1992. 
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In addition, the fact that the South was reluctant to address 
other serious issues such as population revealed that many 
problems would continue to remain unresolved. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AT THE RIO SUMMIT 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an insight into what actually happened' at 
the summit'. It begins with a brief description of how the 
conference was organised and examines the behaviour, conduct and 
performance of actors in resolving issues at the Rio Summit. 
- Unlike the preparatory meetings held before Rio, the 'Earth 
Summit' was not only attended by negotiators but also by non-
negotiating actors who, while perhaps not making a substantive 
difference, certainly made their presence felt at Rio. The role 
of these actors, namely the Heads of State and Government, the 
media and the Non-governmental Organisations is analysed. The 
final part of this chapter explains the outcome of the 
Conference. 
THE ORGANISATION OF THE CONFERENCE 
The Rio Conference was divided into two main bodies: the Plenary 
Session and the Main Committee. In addition, two days were set 
aside for a Summit segment organised for Heads of State and 
Government.' This was followed by a Round-table meeting of the 
Heads where the agreements were signed. 
To facilitate a smooth and speedy process, a two-day pre-
Conference consultation was held to discuss the agenda and rules 
of procedure, the elections of officers and the Credential 
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Committee and other organisational events such as the signing 
ceremony and the official opening and closing of the conference. 
Brazilian President Collor de Mello was the natural 
candidate for the Chair of the Conference who would also preside 
over the Plenary. As expected, Tommy Roh of Singapore chaired 
the Main Committee while Algeria was elected the Rapporteur-
General of the conference. 
The first obstacle to arise at the Rio conference was the 
nomination of the 39 Vice Chairs of the Conference who were to 
- represent the five regional groups. The African group had tabled 
12 nominations for its 11 seats. The issue was only resolved 
when Colombia agreed to give up its seat in the Latin American 
and Caribbean group to the African group. The Asian group also 
posed a similar problem. The Plenary session had already 
scheduled an afternoon for a secret ballot to take place when 
Pakistan announced that both Pakistan and Japan had voluntarily 
withdrawn from the nomination list. This turn of events was 
significant as it avoided an unprecedented and an unwelcome 
consensus-breaking vote from being taken wi thin the UNCED 
process. 
The General debate took place in the Plenary while the Main 
Commi ttee continued its unfinished business left from the Fourth 
Prepcom. The Main Committee was divided into eight contact 
groups to deal with finance, forest principles, technology 
transfer, atmosphere, fresh water, legal instruments, 
institutions and biodiversity and biotechnology. Each group had 
its own Chair appointed by Tommy Roh while the unresolved issues 
which did not fall into the eight groups were dealt with by the 
199 
Main Committee. The meetings were opened/to all interested 
delegations unless the Chair decided that an ad hoc or 
restricted closed-door meeting was necessary, as was the case 
for finance. To enable small delegations to participate 
effectively, the Chair applied the same rules as in the previous 
Prepcommeetings in which not more than two contact groups could 
meet at the same time as the Main Committee and the Plenary. 
Regional groups including the G 77 were advised to schedule 
their meetings so as not to coincide with the sub-committee or 
- contact group meetings. 
NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOUR IN RESOLVING ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT 
When the fourth and final Prepcom ended in New York in April 
1992, the only "clean' text that was taken to Rio was the "Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development". The rest of the 
documents contained some 350 bracketed or disputed phrases to 
be resolved during the 12 - day Conference. This represented 15 
percent of all the issues which remained to be resolved. 1 
Settling these outstanding issues presented a challenge to the 
negotiators who had the task of finding acceptable solutions in 
time for their Heads of State and Government to accept by the 
close of the Summit. 
Depending on the issue at stake, negotiators at the Summit 
found it imperative to compromise. So long as no major national 
interest was jeopardised, delegations found it better to go 
along with the charade than to break up the negotiations. In 
a multilateral negotiation as large as UNCED, every member of 
1 
Earth Summit Times, 31 March, 1992. 
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the delegation cannot expect to benefit from the range of 
/-
proposals tabled by them. At Rio, the realisation that the 
negotiations must soon be concluded further increased the 
momentum of the exercise and the pressure to reach an agreement. 
This was particularly evident as UNCED had received a great deal 
of publicity at the public level thereby increasing the 
awareness of the political value that could be lost if the 
negotiations failed. 
The task of concluding the negotiation at the frantic final 
- stages fell to the more senior members·,of the delegations who 
could include the Permanent Secretaries of the various 
ministries or the Ministers themselves. Since the Secretariat 
had announced an unprecedented turn-up of over 100 Heads of 
State and Government, members of the delegations increased in 
size with Permanent Secretaries, political secretaries, 
ministers and-parliamentarians attending the UNCED meeting for 
the first time. This 'new category of delegates' meant that new 
methods might evolve to deal with what had become' old' problems 
in the negotiation. This presented both an advantage as well 
as a disadvantage to the overall negotiations. 
The advantage of keeping senior political people (or people 
with the authority to make decisions) away from the negotiation 
until late in the game is that it helps delegations to avoid 
becoming committed to single interpretations of difficult 
problems. This creates flexibility and freedom in making 
2 
deCisions and in solving issues. Since practitioners (who are 
-
2 
G.R. Winham 'Negotiation as a Management Process' (1977), 
QJ2.cit. 
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mostly civil servants) are subservient ~to their political 
masters, the decisions of the latter tend to prevail. This may 
not be a bad thing as agreements may never be reached if the 
hard-line practitioners are given their way. The disadvantage 
it poses is that when the substitute for the professional 
negotiator is a politician, he is fikely'to be accustomed to the 
ways of politics where his primary p:t"eoccupation is not to 
understand the contending positions but to seek victory, either 
for his own country of for his narrower political and personal 
3 . 
- gains. Such action could mean a 'diplomatic defeat' for, his own 
negotiators who had been pursuing a particular stance until his 
arrival. That such situations frequently prevailed at the Rio 
Summit was hardly surprising. 
The fact that many issues were resolved before the arrival 
of the Heads of State and Government was the result of the 
willingness on the part of this 'new category of negotiators' 
to compromise. As an illustration, a political battle was 
avoided in the last days at Rio because Israel and the PLO 
managed to corne to an agreement not to pursue the issue of 
'people under occupation' at length. Steve Smith explains that 
this flexibility in attitude may be accounted for by the fact 
that governments tend to adopt communi tarian logic in their 
foreign policies and pay lip-service to cosmopolitan appeals. 
Signing declarations and making speeches can easily be 
undertaken because they are self-implementing and costless 
3 ' 
E~ Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy, (London, 
Toronto: D. Van Nostrad Co.Inc. 3rd Edn., 1967), p.40. 
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4 
activities. In another context, the realist-paradigm concludes 
that powerful states can ignore resolutions railroaded through 
the UN, for example by the Group of 77 maj ori ties, because 
consensus has generally become meaningless and that 'sticks and 
5 
stones can break my bones but words can never hurt me.' 
J. Roddick outlined three elements which made agreements 
possible at Rio. The first was the presp.nce of campai~n groups 
and the involvement of NGOs which put pressure on the 
negotiators and made it harder to pursue naked competi ti ve 
- advantage. As an illustration, the pressure imposed on 
industrialised countries committed them to agree to report on 
reductions in C02 emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as 
proposed by the Climate Change Convention. The second was the 
fact that the global world order had already changed, allowing 
the European Union to distance itself from the leadership of the 
Uni ted States on environmental issues. The third was the 
willingness of Southern governments to negotiate an agreement 
which would bind them in practice, if not in law, provided that 
they retained the majority voice in what the agreement said and 
that provisions for review gave real attention to the problems 
of implementation. These factors facilitated an embryonic but 
fragile political alliance among the contending parties.
6 
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Another element that is relevant//to examine when 
determining the success of such negotiations is that of 
personality. There is an argument, according to Winham, that 
personal i ties and personal qual i ties are unimportant in a 
negotiation; that the job is done by professionals and that 
professionalism requires attention to the facts and not the 
7 
personalities of the situation. On one hand, UNCED showed that 
personalities can affect the progress of a negotiation as could 
be seen from the manner in which Tommy Koh conducted the Main 
- Committee meetings. According to Richard Gardner, his superb 
chairmanship applied ~eer pressure on governments that sought 
to press minority positions too far. One of his finest moments 
came at the concluding committee session at 04:30 on 11 June, 
when to thunderous applause, he made a successful appeal to a 
Saudi delegate to defer to the wishes of the overwhelming 
8 
majority on the energy issue. At 06:00, he gavelled the Main 
9 
Committee to a close amidst a prolonged standing ovation. Here, 
it is difficult to determine whether it was Koh's personality 
or professionalism that did the trick. 
On the other hand, what could be said of President Bush who 
was unpopular among the NGOs, the media and the countries of the 
South at Rio? It was not so much his personality but the 
consistent US position after the Stockholm conference that 
affected the progress of the negotiations. Among the first 
7 
Gilbert R. Winham (1977), op.cit., p.113. 
8Richard N. Gardner, Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities 
Four Priorities After Rio, (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1992), p.7. 
9Earth Summit Bulletin, Vol.2, No.10, 12 June, 1992. 
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things that President Clinton did under his/new administration 
was to appease Bush's critics by signing the Biological 
Diversity Convention. Yet, disagreements between the United 
States and the South continued over many aspects of the 
Convention as with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
As one delegate at the third session of the CSO described, given 
the chance, the United States would be too happy to " rewrite" 
the UN resolution 44/228. 
10 
The final days of the Summit showed that the intransigent 
- position of the hard-liners such as the United States, the 
Uni ted Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia over a number of 
issues .(as discussed in Chapter III) were somewhat neutralised 
as a result of compromise settlements reached in the final 
hours. Given the extensive agenda and the number of actors 
involved in deliberating it, it would be difficult to arrive at 
agreements that could be favourable to all. As Klaus Meyer-Abich 
contends, the most basic experience in politics is that no 
action is equally in everybody's interest or disinterest. Some 
will be in favour while others are against it. Whether 
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THE ROLE OF NON-NEGOTIATING ACTORS: 
The Heads of State and Government 
Never before in the history of the United Nations had the 
organisation been able to gather so many Heads of State and 
Government at one time to discuss an issue which its members 
considered crucial - "the survival" of Earth and Humanity". 116 
Heads of State and Government attended the two-da~ Summit 
compared to only two at the Stockholm Conference twenty years 
earlier. The practice of heads of states and governments 
- meeting in consultation and face-to-face negotiation in a 
multilateral conference is not a new phenomenon. Such meetings 
have been going on since the early 19th century (the Congress 
of Vienna (1815), the Paris Peace Conference (1919), Munich 
(1938) and the wartime meetings of Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Stalin). More recently, the various regional groupings such as 
the G 7, the European Union, the Commonwealth, the Non-aligned 
Movement and the G 15 have also held conferences at summit· 
level. 
The difference between these meetings and the Rio Summit 
is the high concomitant non-negotiator attendance. It appeared 
that many Heads of State and Government did not want to miss the 
opportunity of attending a summit that had become dramatic, 
auspicious and above all, newsworthy. After all, what might be 
said if they did not appear concerned about the issue? After 
so much publicity about attending or not attending, President 
." 
Bush, President Mitterand and the Prime Ministers of India and 
Malaysia made it to Rio. But what roles did they assume at the 
SUmmit? It is evident that no discussions or negotiations took 
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place among them.- Time constraints allowed, the world leaders 
only seven-minute speeches, which droned on in succession, hour 
after hour over two long days. 
Here, some leaders made the front-page news headlines: 
President Bush's speech was interpreted by many as defiant 
rather than conciliatory when he said, "It is not easy to stand 
alone on principle, but sometimes leadership requires ~hat you 
do. And now is such a time [ .•. ] America's record on 
environmental protection is second to none [ ..• ] I did not come 
- here to apologise". Fidel Castro, in delivering the shortest 
speech in his entire life, four and a half minutes, said that 
"The ecological debt should be paid, not the foreign debt" and 
12 
"May hunger disappear, not man" . 
. f 
A round-table meeting was brought forward to accommodate 
President Bush, who had decided to return home ahead of 
schedule. This was reported to have angered some world leaders 
who made it known to President Collor that it mattered that they 
had to readj ust their tight programme to accommodate the US 
President.
13 
At the round-table meeting, which lasted for an 
hour, the world leaders patiently listened to the key-note 
addresses of the President of the Conference, the UN Secretary-
General and the Secretary-General of UNCED as well as the 
representatives of the five regional groups. This was followed 
by a signing ceremony in which the world leaders put their 
12 




signatures to the international agreements which their 
governments had negotiated. 
It would be naive to expect that Heads of State and 
Governments could contribute substantially at a summit, even one 
as important as Rio. The Malaysian Prime Minister admitted 
that: 
The issues involved are extremely complex and a Heads 
of Government meeting cannot resolve complex details. 
They, the Heads, do not normally negotiate the terms 
of treaties or agreements. They usually endorse and 
formalise what has already been negotiated by their 
experts and officials and fine-tuned by their 
Ministers. The preparatory meetings are therefore 
more crucial than the ceremonials of a Heads of 
14 
Government meeting. 
The Summit meeting at Rio was never intended to be anything 
other than a ceremonious affair. Presidents and Prime Ministers 
would not be in a position to break an impasse and make dramatic 
decisions at the Summit as they themselves were held in check 
by their own legislatures at home. The most that could be gained 
from their presence was their moral commitment to the issue. At 
a minimum, however, the Summit provided an occasion for them to 
discuss other issues bilaterally. The Malaysian Prim: Minister, 
14Keynote address by Dr.Mahathir Mohamad at the Second 
Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on 





for example, engaged in not less than 10 bilateral discussions 
with his counterparts during the Summit. In a rare occasion, he 
held a breakfast meeting with a group of NGOs from the North and 
South where he clarified the Malaysian position on forests. The 
meeting was significant as it allayed the Malaysian delegations' 
concern of an open confrontation or protest by the NGOs over the 
forest issue - the reason why the Prime Minister was ·not keen 
to go to Rio in the first place. 
15 
The Media 
The UNCED process was significantly influenced by the media 
which made the environment issue front-page news and cover-story 
material. Not less than 9,000 members of the press representing 
16 
111 countries were present at Rio. The media played a critical 
role in interpreting data, educating the public, influencing 
opinion and changing the attitudes of governments. An aspect of 
modern diplomacy that featured very clearly during the UNCED 
process was the interaction of the negotiators and other members 
of the delegation with the media. Press conferences and 
television interviews during the negotiations were used by 
government representatives to reassure.domestic constituencies, 
to float ideas unofficially, or to apply pressure on 
17 




Figures are quoted from Environment, Vol.34, No.6, 
October~ 1992. 
17 
R.E. Benedick, 'Perspectives of a Negotiation 
Practitioner', in Gunnar Sjostedt (ed.), International 
Environmental Negotiation, (London: Sage Publishers, 1992). 
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for Environment's opposition to President/Bush's line on the 
environment, President Bush's initiative for World Forests, 
announced a few days prior to his arrival at Rio, and John 
Major's warning to his domestic audience not to expect too much 
18 
from the Rio Summit. On the part of the Malaysian delegation, 
the Prime Minister's BBC interview was televised in the United 
Kingdom as well as in Malaysia. Ambassador Razali Ismail and 
Ambassador Ting Wen Lian were also giving press briefings to 
clarify the position of the South, if not the Malaysian 
", 
- position, on numerous issues. Non-governmental observers _ 
environmental groups as well as industry - also turned to the 
media to amplify their positions and influence the negotiators. 
In an interview which was published in the Guardian, Richard 
Tapper of the WWF pointed out that the top 500 companies of the 
world control about 70 per cent of world trade, 80 per cent of 
foreign investment and 30 percent of the world's GDP. They also 
generate more than half the green house emissions produced by 
global industry.19 Speaking to several hundred newspaper, radio 
and television journalists, Maurice Strong suggested that they 
should not view the Earth Summit as a two-week session that will 
sol ve the Earth's problems. Rather, he emphasised that UNCED was 
a 'launching pad', not a 'quick fix' - a beginning of a process 
that should lead to fundamental changes. 
20 
18 
See Financial Times dated 26 and 31 March, 1992, ~ June, 
1992, White House Fact Sheet No.910 issued on 2 June, 1992. 
19 
Guardian dated 8 May, 1992. 
20 
Earth Summit Bulletin, 3 June, 1992. 
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Another important feature related to/ the media was the 
growing quantity of publications that appeared during the 
process. The Earth Summit Bulletin, Terra Viva, Earth Summit 
Briefings by the Third World Network provided a day-to-day 
account and analysis of the on-going negotiations. Key 
statements and official posi tions of governments were 
distributed through press releases whtch were made available 
within a short time after adjournments. These publications, 
which were usually brief yet comprehensive, provided useful 
summaries of the on-going negotiations for the delegates who 
barely had the time to know what was going on in the other 
meeting rooms outside of their own. 
According to Chatterjee and Finger, while the media 
provided extensive and useful coverage of the official events 
at Rio Centro, where the government officials were conducting 
their negotiations, it treated the NGOs' participation mainly 
as a joke. Cited was the Financial Times final summary which 
included the NGOs on its list of losers at the Summit and 
commented that they were 'shut out by the politicians and spent 
most of their time at their Global Forum 50 km away where they 
ran out of money and had their electricity cut off'. Other 
summaries reflected similar images. The New Scientist said that 
the NGOs 'appeared marginalised, their lobbyists wandering round 
in ever increasing gloom. The greens had their stunts and photo 
21 
Opportunities but little more'. The following. section on the 
role of'NGOs explains the reasons behind the media's bias. 
21 
Chatterjee and Finger (1994), op.cit., p.100. 
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The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) ~~ 
The participation of NGOs in UN terrain reached an 
unprecedented level at the Earth Summit. 1,420 NGOs were 
officially accredited to the Conference with 2,400 more given 
indi vidual passes to the Rio Centro where the governmental 
22 
negotiations were held. This section examines how the NGOs 
became involved in a big way in the UNCED process, the extent 
to which they made their presence felt at UNCED and the impact 
that it left on them, in particular, the green movement. 
" 
As far as the unprecedented presence of NGOs in the UNCED 
process was concerned,. Matthias Finger provided an interesting 
explanation which he referred to as Maurice Strong's grand 
23 d' t h' h scheme and vision. Accor 1ng 0 1m, w en Maurice Strong was 
appointed Secretary-General, he had an ambition to involve 
millions of people in the UNCED process. In this regard, he 
designed a scheme which fed the NGOs into the UNCED process with 
the aim of bui lding uP, a so-called UNCED constituency. To 
achieve this end, the Secretariat created a special NGO liaison 
office that deliberately made NGOs access into UNCED an easy 
process which was sometimes even paid for by UN agencies or 
other donors. At the same time, the Center for Our Common Future 
22 
Several figures were quoted for the number of NGOs 
officially represented at UNCED. Although by the Fourth 
Prepcom, a total of 1,420 NGOs were,officially accredited, 
P. Willetts refers to 'some 650' wh1ch actually made it to 
Rio. For a comprehensive discussion on NGOs partic~pation 
at UNCED, see P. Willetts, 'Social Movements, NGOs and the 
Impact of the Earth Summit on the United Nations System', 
Unpublished mimeo, 1995. 
23 
ibid. II part II. 
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(a charitable public relations agency which was dealing with 
publicity for the 1987 Brundtland report) set up an 
International Facilitating Committee (IFC) to help NGOs become 
part of UNCED. Even NGOs with no consul tati ve status with ECOSOC 
were granted the rights to be included in the process. As a 
result, NGOs were accredited in such great numbers that almost 
anyone who wanted to be accredited could be. Such extensive 
participation by the NGOs was not initially envisaged by the 
governments but Strong used the argument that NGOs could 
contribute information to UNCED and help disseminate its 
outcomes, while the governments remained in charge of the whole 
process. 
Whi Ie it was undeniable that Maurice Strong assumed a 
leading role in enabling the extensive participation of NGOs at 
Rio, it was in no wayan easy task as the opposition to NGO 
participation was intense among the government delegations. At 
the first Prepcom, his motives for broadening the NGOs' 
participation in the UNCED process were challenged by the 
government delegations as going beyond the terms of the mandate 
of the General Assembly. The wordings of the UNGA Resolution 
44/228 implied that NGOs could only contribute in the 
preparatory process within each country. With respect to the 
main conference, there was a request to 'relevant' ECOSOC NGOs 
to contribute 'as appropriate' while no mention was made of 
other NGOs. 
The main concern raised at the First Prepcom was the 
proposal made by Strong-for all ECOSOCNGOs and 'others with 





papers and speak at the meetings of the/'Prepcoms and their 
working groups. Developing countries expressed concern that 
there should be a balance between the environment and 
development NGOs and among the regions. Strong's proposal was 
considerably watered-down when the Precom Chair, in 
accommodating the views of the delegations, tabled a draft 
decision which was approved without amendment. The decision, 
referred to as 'Decision 1/1' enabled established ECOSOC NGOs 
and other NGOs the right to attend prepcom meetings and the 
possibility of being able to speak 'with the consent' of the 
meeting but with no negotiating role. The Chair was given the 
discretion to establish ground rules on NGO participation in 
accordance with normal UN practice. Decision 1/1 was thus 
significant as it opened the door to NGO participation in the 
UNCED process. 
24 
UNCED provided a valuable learning experience for the NGOs 
as well as opportunities for networking and lobbying. However, in 
terms of creating an impact on the overall process and outcome 
of the Summit, the NGOs appeared to have failed considerably. 
The initial enthusiasm of the NGOs to be involved in the 
negotiation process quickly dampened when ground rules barred 
them from attending the closed-door 'informal-informal' 
sessions. While they were allowed to speak in formal sessions, 
they had no speaking rights in the 'formal-informals', thus 
depriving them of a role in actual negotiations. A~. the Fourth 
Precom where the layout of the conference rooms posed a problem, 
24 , 
UN Document A/CONF.151/PC/L.8 on Draft Decision Submitted 
by the Chairman, adopted on 14 August, 1990. 
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NGOs could only gain access through a ticketing system in which 
only 35 NGOs could enter at anyone time. Once the tickets had 
been distributed, they were rotated and traded among 
representati ves so that more NGOs could participate in the 
meetings each day. NGOs were also left to their own devises to 
obtain official documents, which were limited in number.
2S 
In order to influence the negotiations NGOs had basically 
three possibilities: to submit written statements to the 
negotiations, to establish personal contacts with the delegation 
and to speak up in the sessions where this was possible. It is 
necessary to point out that some NGOs did gain access and had 
some influence on the negotiations. This applies to those who 
were part of the government delegation (eg. Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Denmark, the United States) and 
were acting either as full members or as observers within the 
delegation. NGOs which had good relations with government 
delegates and the Secretariat also somehow gained access to the 
negotiations through individual passes provided to them. These 
NGOs included the Third World Network (TWN) based in Penang, 
Malaysia, the World Resources Institute (WRI), Worldwide Fund 
for Nature (WWF), World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the 
influential and wealthiest environmental organisations in the 
United States, and probably the world, known as the 'Big Ten' . 
2S 
Earth Summit Times, 5 March, 1992. 
26See Chatterjee and Finger (1994), op.cit. The 'Big Ten' 
are the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, the 
National Parks and Conservation AssOCiation, the Izaak 
Walton League, the Wilderness Society, the National 
Wildlife Federation, the Defenders of Wildlife, the 
Environmental Defence Fund, Friends of the Earth and the 
26 
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Through them, a number of written interventions and proposals 
were passed to the government delegations to be incorporated 
into the official documents. 
It was no overstatement when Chatterjee and Finger singled 
out the Third World Network as having very good relations with 
27 
the Malaysian delegation. Martin Khor and Chee Yoke Ling (both 
Malaysians) from the TWN are recognised ~xperts in their fields. 
Together with Vandana Shiva and Raghavan from India, Charles 
Abugre from Ghana and Daniel Querol from Peru, they have gained 
their reputations for countering government positions through 
their briefing papers and their magazine, the Resurgence. 
However, during the Prepcoms and at Rio they were also seen to 
be assisting the Malaysian delegation in formulating the South IS 
position. Here, the danger of being "instrumentalised" by 
governments for their own purposes should not be 
underestimated. 28 While the NGOs took advantage of the good 
relations they had with the government delegations by submitting 
their interventions, there was no guarantee that their ideas 
would be incorporated into the official documents. Some NGOs 
complained that government delegations at best took some 
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formulations, but never the intentions. Bits and pieces were 
tinkered with and modified here and there, but the structure of 
the agreements and the contexts within which they were 
considered, all conformed to governments' expectations, not the 
29 
NGOs. 
The situation did not improve at Rio where the Brazilian 
host kept the NGOs some 50 km away from the official conference. 
The IFC had organised a parallel NGO forum, the Global Forum, 
which was sponsored by numerous big corporations and to a 
certain extent by the UN. Here, the accredited NGOs and 
thousands of their representatives gathered and formulated over 
thirty resolutions which had no official standing. The media, 
which had witnessed the whole event, portrayed a negative image 
of the NGOs role at UNCED. The Global Forum was described as a 
circus and a colossal mess. Chatterjee and Finger placed the 
blame on the NGOs themselves for focusing too much on lobbying 
on the inside, where no one could see them, instead of being a 
voice for the millions they were supposed to be representing, 
30 
by taking on the media. 
The NGOs however did not return home empty handed. The 
governments accommodated them by offering a specific chapter on 
their role in Agenda 21. The discussion on "Strengthening the 
Role of NGOs: Partners for Sustainable Development .. was held on 
29 
Views of Mark Valentine, issue director of US Citizens' 
Network, cited in Chatterjee and Finger (1994), ~cit., 
p.96. 
30Chatterjee and Finger (1994), op.cit.,·p.100. 
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the final days of the Fourth Prepcom. The draft proposal which 
was tabled by Poland acting on behalf of the NGOs was to be 
incorporated into the Agenda 21 chapter entitled "Strengthening 
the Role of Major Groups". Although the final version of the 
text was heavily watered-down .by the representatives of the 
governments, some considered it the most extensive and 
formalised recognition in a UN document of the potential and 
actual contributions of NGOs and other independent sectors (i. e. 
women, children, youth, NGOs, trade union workers, local 
authorities, scientific community, etc:) To illustrate, Agenda 
21 states: 
The United Nations system and Governments should 
initiate a process, in consultation with non-
governmental organisations, to review formal 
procedures and mechanisms for the involvement of 
these organisations at all levels from policy-making 
• • 31 
and decision-making to 1mplementat1on. 
That the above provision was adopted without much problem 
had baffled even the government delegations. M. Grubb suggested 
that this was possible because Tommy Koh had left the discussion 
32 
to the very end when the delegates were tired. While the Role 
of Major Groups was being discussed, negotiations were gOing on 
in the other meeting rooms on what were considered "more 
31 
Agenda 21, Chapter 27. 
32 
Michael Grubb et al. (1993), op.cit., p.142 
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important issues" such as the Earth/' Charter, forests, 
institutions, technology transfer and finance. As far as the 
discussion on the Role of Major Groups was concerned, the 
general remark that was passing through the corridor during 
those frantic hours was that national delegations could live 
with any kind of language .as long as the "women and the other 
independent groups are kept happy." Wha.t was certain.was that 
in the basement meeting room where the discussion on NGOs was 
going on, both the Northern as well as the Southern delegations 
were equally unenthusiastic about the enhanced and collaborative 
role the NGOs intende~ to assume in relation to the governments 
and the UN institutions. Diplomats were simply not keen to open 
up the doors of their 'exclusive club' to those outside their 
league. This explains the non-binding and ambiguous language in 
33 
their recommendations for action. 
Ambassador Razali Ismail made his country's position known 
as early as the Third Prepcom that Malaysia was not prepared to 
rely on a non-governmental mechanism, however attractive it 
might appear. The idea, he stressed, needed crystallisation and 
34 d acceptance. At Rio he was quote as saying, 'Rio has been 
35 




UN document: A/CONF.151/PC/102, 'Institutional Proposal: 
Report by the Secretary-General'. 
35Ambassador Razali quoted in Global Forum press release, 
no.273 12 June 1992: "Government Representatives and NGOs 
discus~ 'Who Will Rule the World", cited in Bruce Rich, 
Mortgaging The Earth,. (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 
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first CSD meeting a year after Rio, he underlined the fact that 
the Commission was a body of governments and while the NGOs 
participation in the CSD was welcomed, they would not replace 
governments as the voice of the people. 
The demand for extended participatory rights for NGOs met 
with little approval on the part of most governments as they 
were said to lack democratic legitimacy·and that it was unclear 
on whose behalf they actually spoke at the international 
meetings. In fact, objections to wider participation were also 
raised by the NGOs themselves. Existing accredited NGOs were 
afraid of losing their.privileged position if the UN was opened 
up further. A prominent leader of a Malaysian NGO questioned 
whether the Third World Network, which had gained such a high 
reputation at Rio, was actually speaking on behalf of the Third 
World or whether they were merely "NGIs" - non governmental 
individuals claiming to represent the "civil society". 36 
Logistically, the Rio experience has proved that the UN 
cannot accommodate as many NGOs as some would desire. The basis 
of NGO participation in the UN is an ECOSOC resolution, and 
given the heterogeneity of the NGOs, it would be difficult to 
select from amongst them those to be accredited to the UN 
meetings. Rio showed that there was no unity among the NGOs and 
that they frequently played off against each other. The IFC, 
which was in charge of mobilising the NGOs into the UNCED 
process, was itself accused of being biased towards ~~siness and 




with the most coherent intellectual framework such as the IUCN, 
WRI, WWF, Greenpeace, the "Big Ten' and the TWN made their 
presence felt at Rio. The other factions of the green movement _ 
the New Age greens, the deep ecologists, the political and 
social ecologists - were alienated and screened out. Even the 
TWN was considered a loser at Rio: while they lobbied for 
equi table distribution of profits and development for the South, 
rich governments and TNCs justified industrial growth as the 
solution. 
37 
The conclusion that Matthias Finger formed was that the 
UNCED process divided,. co-opted and weakened the green movement. 
While UNCED had brought every possible NGO into the system of 
lobbying governments, it quietly championed the business NGOs. 
NGOs were thus trapped into a situation whereby, having lent 
support to governments in return for some small concessions on 
language, they came to legitimise a process that was in essence 
contrary to what many of them had been fighting for years. 38 
THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT 
For those who have been studying the UNCED process, the outcome 
of the Summit i's well known but it is worth repeating in this 
section. Rio adopted the following: 
37 
Chatterjee and Finger (1994), op.cit. 
38 
Matthias Finger, "Politics of the UNCED Process', 
in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.) Global Ecology (1993), op.cit. 
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A declaration known as the "Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development"; 
a Programme of Action known as "Agenda 21"; 
a Statement on Forests called "A Non-legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of Forests'l; 
the Setting up of a Commission on Sustainable Development 
under ECOSOC for the follow-up to UNCED decisions; 
the establishment of an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a proposed Convention on Desertification; and 
_ the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity by 154 countries. 
With the exception of Agenda 21 and the proposed convention on 
desertification, which are beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
other outcomes mentioned above have been discussed in detail in 
the previous chapter. 
One remarkable achievement of the Earth Summit was the 
abili ty of the participants to avoid the inclusion of 'high 
poli tics' issues in an agenda that has all along been wi thin the 
realm of 'low politics' . This was possible because of the nature 
of the post-cold war era in which many political issues that 
have been occupying the UN such as the East-West conflict, the 
problems of Apartheid and the Cambodian question have been 
resolved. 
There was however, one surprise proposal made by the 
representative of Palestine at the Fourth Prepcom to include 
1 
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references to 'people living in occupied~territories' into a 
number of chapters of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. This 
was an obvious reference to Palestinians in the Israel-occupied 
territories. As the PLO had only observer status and thus no 
right to offer amendments according to the rules set by the 
Chair, Yemen acted on behalf of the Arab group to sponsor the 
Palestinian proposal. The G 77 subs€quently supported the 
proposal. This prompted Israel to intervene and to question 
whether Rio would be another Middle-East battleground. It called 
\ 
for the removal for all references to 'people under occupation' 
promising to continue .its protest at Rio if amendments were not 
made. The issue was finally resolved on the last day of the Main 
Committee meeting at Rio. Tommy Koh announced that after a 
series of consultations which he had held with the two parties, 
a compromise was arrived at in which all references to 'people 
under occupation' were removed from the chapters of Agenda 21 
39 while the text of the Rio Declaration remained unchanged. The 
interested parties took the floor to express their continued 
reservation over the Chair's proposal but expressed, in a spirit 
of compromise, that they were willing to lay aside their 
concern. In a self-assuring statement, the PLO representative 
added that since Agenda 21 was intended to go beyond the present 
century, he hoped that by the year 2000, there would no longer 
be any occupied territories to quarrel about and that the matter 
40 
would then be a non-issue. 
39See Earth Summit Times, 3 April, 1992 and Earth Summit 
~ulletin, 3 June 1993 and 10 - 11 June,·· 1992. 
40 • 
Earth Summit Bullet1n, Vol. 2, No.10, 12 June, 1992. 
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Three other controversial issues preoccupied negotiators 
till the last days at Rio. These were the issues of forests, 
atmosphere and finance. Since they were still not resolved by 
the time the Main Committee terminated its mandate, the issues 
were transferred to the Plenary where negotiations were taken 
over at the ministerial level. Tropical forest countries such 
as Malaysia, India and Indonesia claimed victory for having 
successfully acquired a non-legally binding statement of forest 
principles as opposed to a forest convention. They were also 
elated that the forest principles did not limit itself to 
tropical forests but. also sought to embrace all kinds of 
forests, which included the North's boreal and temperate 
forests. 
41 
The negotiation on Atmosphere was also difficult and 
protracted. Upon the insistence of the oil-producing Arab 
countries, the Fourth Prepcom had been forced to transmit a 
completely bracketed chapter to Rio. The oil-producing Arab 
countries, headed by Saudi Arabia, maintained that the chapter 
not only duplicated the work of the Climate Change negotiations, 
but that it placed an over-emphasis on energy efficiency and 
conservation. Another contentious point was Saudi Arabia's 
insistence on adding the word "safe" in the context of energy 
resources. This problem also had its spill-over effect in the 
technology transfer chapter which could not be resolved for the 
same reason. As the matter could not be resolved, Saudi Arabia 
41Mark F.Imber, Environment~ Security and UN Reform, 
(New York: St.Martin's Press, Inc., 1994). 
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formally placed on record its reservations/with the Atmosphere 
chapter. 
Finance remained the most contentious, difficult and 
disappointing outcome of Rio. It was and still is the basis upon 
which the success of UNCED depends. Unfortunately, no amount of 
persuasion, pressure or 'greenmailing' could make the North 
agree to the transfer of financial resources to the South. 
CONCLUSION 
Terra Viva, the independent daily of the Earth Summit, wrote on 
its front page special edition: 'It took man 12 days to recreate 
the earth'. Indeed, the UNCED process which culminated at Rio, 
provided an invaluable learning experience for practitioners, 
politicians and NGOs alike. In terms of the issues covered, the 
organisation of the conference, the number of people it gathered 
and the media attention it received, no other special UN 
conference to-date has been able to surpass UNCED. The Human 
Rights Conference held in Geneva in 1993, the Population 
Conference held in Cairo in 1994 and the Social Summit held in 
Copenhagen in 1995 paled in comparison. Even the 1995 Beijing 
Women's Conference turned out to be largely a chimera as the 
serious work of the Conference was overshadowed by the presence 
of First Ladies who headed their government delegations but had 
no legal standing to sign agreements. 
The Rio Summit secured a set of agreements between 
governments which denotes a significant advance of international 
.' .' 
cooperation on development and environment issues. It was able 
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to secure a political commitment at the highest level and placed 
the issue of sustainable development at the heart of the 
international diplomatic agenda. Equally significant, it led to 
an enormous increase in public awareness of the issues. The 
subject has become household and popular language to the extent 
that it has become much more difficult to construct large dams, 
indiscriminately export toxic wastes, clear-cut forests}, traffic 
in endangered species or emit unlimited quantities of chemicals 
42 
that destroy the ozone layer. These elements are interlinked 
- the action programme, the political commitment, the open and 
transparent process. and the public awareness, together 
constitute a significant step in the transition to sustainable 
development. 
43 
Having made an impact at Rio, Malaysia has tried but failed 
) 
to emulate UNCED in preparing for other special conferences 
following it. This refers to its preparation for the subsequent 
special conferences such as the Human Rights Conference, the 
Population Conference and the Social Summit. As in their 
preparation for UNCED, an ad hoc committee was formed to 
formulate the country's position. A national seminar was held 
to obtain the widest possible views from the public and a 
National Report was prepared at the request of the UN 
Secretariat. Yet these subsequent special conferences did not 
leave an impact as they 'did at UNCED, as far as the Malaysian 
42 
Ken Conca, 'Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate', 
Millennium, Winter, 1994, Vol.23, No.3, p.704. 
43Razali Ismail, Ambassador; 'Overview of the Road to Rio 
and Thereafter': Paper delivered at the National Seminar on 
UNCED, 7 - 8 September, 1992 at Kuala Lumpur. 
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participation was concern. To a large extent; the nature of the 
issues made UNCED crucial for Malaysia in a way that issues at 
the other summits were not. In addition, no two conferences can 
create the same impact if the intention is basically to project 
an image abroad or to use the United Nations as a tool of 
foreign policy. National interests are the primary determinants 
of outcomes and national interests and partners shift according 
to the issues at stake. For example, while it was possible for 
Malaysia to galvanise the South at UNCED, it was less possible 
to do so at the Social Summit and the impact was minimal because 
most of leaders from the North preferred to stay away from the 
44 
Social Summit. 
Discussion across issues shows that it is not the number 
of Heads of States that counts for the success of the Rio 
Summit. Neither is the number of NGOs that took part in the 
process. Rather, it was the commitment on the part of all states 
that brought about the necessary changes. It is widely assumed, 
according to Karen Litfin (and supported by Ken Conca and Ronnie 
Lipschutz) that environmental problems, however they manifest 
themselves, should be managed by the governments. This is 
because only the state has the human and financial resources to 
mount the large-scale scientific and technical proj ects for 
detecting, monitoring and preserving the global environment. 
Only the state, standing at the intersection of domestic and 
international politics, has sufficient authority, political 
legi timacy and territorial control to influence the myriad 
44 New Straits Times dated 14 March, 1995. 
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causal agents of environmental degradation,,/ The problems cannot 
be resolved entirely by the invisible hand of the market. 
45 
The Rio Summit has sufficiently defined the problems. It 
is up to the participating states to solve them. In the process, 
the state could benefit from the intellectual and technical 
contribution of the non-state actors who, since the Stockholm 
Conference, have proved to be of tremendous help to the state 
in providing a comprehensive understanding of the environmental 
issue. 
45Karen Litfin -Ecoregimes: Playing Tug of War with the 
Nation-State" in Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca (eds.), 
The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics, 
(New York: Columbia University. Press, 1993), p.95. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter provides an assessment of UNCED as a special 
UN conference. It also attempts to provide an appraisal of 
Malaysia's role at the Conference and speculates on what the 
future holds for UNCED, as seen through the mechanisms already 
put in place, in particular, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development. 
UNCED provided a rich experience in multilateral 
negotiations. It afforded an enormous learning experience, 
especially for developing countries, on negotiating behaviour 
and the diplomatic process of reaching agreement through 
coalition and consensus building. The ability of negotiators to 
cope with the multitude of complex issues and to resolve them 
within a time-frame of two and a half years contributed to 
making this UN special conference a unique event. 
Will UNCED be a model for future global conferences? Will 
it have an impact on future negotiating trends? Or should such 
mega-conferences not be allowed to happen again, taking into 
account the general comments that UNCED concentrated too much 
on the process without giving sufficient' attention to the 
SUbstance and the final product. 
The outcome of the UNCED negotiations and an assessment of 
the maj or issues discussed at UNCED have been treated in Chapter 
III. This chapter attempts. to provide an overall appraisal of 
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the Conference. The analysis offered here focuses on the impact 
that UNCED has left on the different actors as well as the 
factors that contributed to such impacts. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF UNCED AS A SPECIAL CONFERENCE 
Richard Gardner refers to UNCED as the 'tmother of international 
conferences".l Some refer to it as a "mega-conference". 2 Indeed, 
the media attention on the conference, as well as the growing 
interest among international relations scholars and political 
scientists seen from the voluminous literature on this special 
conference, suggest that the environment has become central to 
political activity within and between states. 3 
Mega-conferences like UNCED leave behind different impacts 
on the different sets of actors. Opinions vary between two 
extremes - the optimists and the sceptics. The optimists look 
upon UNCED as a monumental success, taking into consideration 
that it was the first meeting of world leaders since the end 
of the Cold war. They express satisfaction with the learning 
process taking place among politicians, practitioners and the 
NGOs on related issues, some of which have never been treated 
so extensively before, for example, the issues of climate 
change, biodiversity and biotechnology. The UNCED process gave 
1R.Gardner(1992), p.1, op.cit. 
2 
See Peter Willetts (1989) and Mark Imber (1994), cp.cit. 
3 See Steve Smith, ~Environment on the Periphery of 
International Relations: An Explanation I, Environmental 
Politics, Vol.2,No.4, Winter 1993, (London: Frank Cass, 
1993). 
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rise to an unprecedented mobilisation of NGOs and provided them 
with the opportunities for networking, lobbying and engaging in 
new forms of dialogue. At home, UNCED provided the environment 
ministries a chance to be heard and to be taken seriously within 
their national bureaucratic setups. In a remarkably short time, 
-
the international community was able to respond and to reach 
consensus on a comprehensive and extremely complex set of 
documents, which upon ratification, would commit them to 
principles they had never before accepted. UNCED brought about 
the emergence of a wide variety of new legal concepts such as 
legal duties to preven~ environmental harm, duties to undertake 
environmental assessments and duties to inform and consent. New 
principles have appeared on the international scene such as the 
precautionary principle, polluter-pays principle, and ideas of 
common heritage. The agreements reached, although some non-
binding and perhaps weak, represent important steps in the right 
direction. The optimists argue that they provide a benchmark for 
subsequent negotiations. They agree that Rio may not have solved 
all the problems but that it was an important on-ramp to the 
road of environmental reform. 
The sceptics, on the other hand view UNCED as a dismal 
failure. Sceptics unfortunately outnumber optimists. Measured 
against its stated objectives of averting global environmental 
and developmental catastrophe and with the UN Resolution 44/228 
as the yardstick, they argue that the outcome of the Rio summit 
has been disappointing. In terms of the official outcome of Rio, 
the states adopted the-non-binding Rio Declaration in which, 
according to Jens Martens, the mere mention of the 
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responsibi1i ty of the North for the current ecological and 
social crisis - which hardly anyone denies anymore - was 
sufficient for the declaration to be unjustifiably hailed as a 
4 
success. The two Conventions and the Statement of Forest 
Principles contained only non-binding targets and guidelines 
which governments are free to implement at whatever pace they 
see fit. Agenda 21, which was considered to be :the most 
important outcome of Rio, was marked by omissions, by a lack of 
overall coherence and by a reluctance to priori tise and, to 
specify any clear link between aspirations and effective 
5 
action. It shows fundamental weaknesses in planning with the 
action programme predominantly focussed on the Third World. 
Northern consumption, global economic reform to reverse the 
South-North flow of resources, world trading patterns, 
international debt, poverty, population, and the role of TNCs 
were not adequately addressed at Rio. 
UNCED also failed to arrive at an unequivocal definition 
of the concept of 'sustainable development'. Neither the 
practitioners, nor the politicians, academic community or the 
NGOs were able to come to an agreement on the approaches needed 
to solve the global ecological crisis, leaving the term 
'sustainable development' open to almost any interpretation. 
The single biggest disappointment for 'the developing 
countries was the failure of the Conference to generate 
4 
SEF (ed.), Bonn (1993), op.cit. 
5Andrew Hurrell, 'A Crisis of Ecological Viability? Global 
Environmental Change and the Nation State', in John Dunn 
(ed.) Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?, (Oxford: 
Blackwell publications, 1995), p.153. 
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significant aid flows to the South. peveloped countries 
resisted pressure to commit themselves to raising their ODA 
contribution to the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNP by the year 
2000. Al though they agreed in principle to provide "new and 
addi tional" financial resources to implement the programmes of 
Agenda 21, they were very vague when it came to putting actual 
money on the table. In fact, less than s~x months after Rio, the 
British government contemplated a 15 percent cut in its ODA 
contribution, having transferred only 0.27 percent of GNP in 
1991. 6 Other developed countries, including those that 
traditionally have been more sympathetic to developing 
countries, also announced reductions in their aid budgets. 
According to T.G. Weiss et al., some Northern donors had grown 
weary of the constant demands to increase official assistance. 
Seeing little evidence that past assistance had made any 
appreciable difference in alleviating poverty, 'donor fatigue' 
became a prevalent explanation for diminished contribution to 
7 the ODA. For the South, UNCED is a failure as little progress 
is likely until there is substantial financial assistance. 
Many factors contributing to UNCED' s unsatisfactory outcome 
have been identified. Although it was the North which lured the 
South to engage in the UNCED discussion in the first place, it 
. 
failed the South by back-tracking on the objectives agreed upon 
in the UN Resolution 44/228. J. Roddick cited two maj or stumbling 
blocks to the UNCED negotiations: the United States, perhaps 
6 Mark Imber (1994), op.cit., p.124. 
7T.G.Weiss, D. Forsythe and R.A.Coate (1994), op.cit. 
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because it was determined not to give up its privileges, and the 
South, because it was determined to use 'greenmail' to force 
8 
through economic concessions from the North. 
The Players: 
The United States 
UNCED would have provided an excellent opportunity. for the 
United States to demonstrate its leadership. Its overall 
environmental record compares favourably to that of most 
countries. It is still a major provider of environmental and 
developmental aid and has pioneered some of the most important 
concepts embodied in Agenda 21 such as broad public 
participation in environmental decision-making. It has a strong 
story to tell in such concrete measures as the Clean Air Act, 
transportation legislation and an ambitious energy-conservation 
programme. Together, these may enable the United States to beat 
the target of stabilising greenhouse emissions at 1990 levels 
by the year 2000. Unfortunately, instead of seizing leadership 
and galvanising its industry to compete with Japan and Europe 
in the emerging market for clean technologies, the Bush 
Administration, according to Time, "has taken up the cause of 
the environmentally handicapped, limply replaying arguments 
developed by the coal, electric-utility and railroad lobbies 
that meeting the greenhouse target would cost jobs and harm the 
8 
J.Roddick, 'The Results of the Rio Earth Summit', Science, 
Technology and Development, Vol.10, No~3, Dec. 1992, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1992). 
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9 
US economy. II Unconvinced that the interests of the United 
States would be well served, President Bush had initially 
refused to attend the Summit but decided otherwise for fear of 
the impact of non-attendance on his standing in the presidential 
election. For a country with a distinguished history of 
environmental programmes, the United States upheld an 
isolationist position at Rio by insisting that there be no firm 
targets in the Climate Change Convention and by refusing to sign 
the Biodiversity Convention. It also obstructed progress in a 
host of other areas, particularly those relating to the request 
for II new and additional ll financial resources and for technology 
transfer to the South. Throughout the UNCED negotiations, the 
United States argued for market-led mechanisms such as applying 
the 'polluter pays principle' and 'technology cooperation'. 
R. Gardner provided an explanation for the US attitude. 
According to him, the Bush administration approached the Rio 
meeting with a deeply divided frame of mind. William Reilly, 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Curtis 
Bohlen, Assistant Secretary of State for the Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, both shared 
the basic premise of the conference that a successful 
partnership in sustainable development would require cooperation 
from all countries and fundamental changes in.rich countries' 
lifestyles and consumption patterns. They saw the environment 
and development as reinforcing and non-antagonistic concepts, 
9 
Time, 22 June, 1992. 
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believing that adjusting to higher environmental standards could 
lead to greater productivity and competitiveness. 1o 
The tendency to see Rio as a foreign policy and an economic 
and environmental opportunity was, however, not shared elsewhere 
in the administration. According to Gardner, the domestic and 
economic staff at the White House, joined by Vice President Dan 
Quale's Competitiveness Council, viewed Rio as a threat. The 
Rio agenda meant the loss of jobs and painful economic 
adjustments in a time of economic difficulty, as well. as 
unwanted pressure to increase foreign aid. In addition, it was 
an election year and in their view there were no votes to be had 
at Rio. Elsewhere in the administration - in the Interior, 
Commerce and Treasury departments, Rio was regarded at worst 
11 
with suspicion, at best with indifference. 
An administration in such a mood of negativism and 
organisational disarray provided fertile ground for a disaster 
waiting to happen in the unexpected form of the Biodiversity 
Convention. When the United States announced its refusal to sign 
the Convention, not only was its position interpreted with 
hostility by the media and the NGOs, it also saw its allies 
distancing themselves from its unpopular position. When Reilly 
tried to save the situation through a message to the White House 
proposing modest changes to enable the United States to sign the 
convention, his memorandum was leaked to the press, thus 
10 • 





deepening the country's isolation at Rio. Shortly after the 
conference, Reilly gave his own version for United States 
failure at Rio: 
We assigned a low priority to the negotiation of the 
. 
biodiversity treaty, were slow to engage the climate 
issue, were last to commit our President to attend 
Rio. We put our delegation together late, and we 
committed few resources. No doubt, this contributed 
to negative feelings toward the United States [ •.. J 
For me personally, it was like a bungee jump. You 
dive into space secured by a line on your leg and 
trust it pulls you up before you smash into the 
ground. It doesn't typically occur to you that 
13 
someone might cut your line. 
Despite the defence Reilly has come up with to justify the 
United States role at UNCED, the revealing truth remains that 
the United States squandered a rare opportunity to invest 
meaning in the "New World Order". By embarking on its 
isolationist approach on a broad range of UNCED issues, the 
United States weakened international confidence in them. It 
could rightly then be said that the United States was clearly 
as committed to the assertion of national interests and 




New York Times, 1 August, 1992. 
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doing the same. For a great power, the United States has showed 
regrettably little political will to collaborate with the rest 
of the world, much less to provide the leadership role it has 
generally been expected to assume. 
The South 
The South's approach to UNCED was in many ways aimed at reviving 
the calls of the 1970' s for a New International Economic 
14 . 
Order. The 1980s have been described as a lost decade for 
15 
development in the South. While the industrialised countries 
were recovering from the early 1980s recession and enjoying 
years of uninterrupted growth, a large number of countries in 
the South were facing an acute and continuing development crisis 
brought about by the deterioration of the world economy. 
Depressed world commodity markets were adversely affecting the 
export earnings of the developing countries. The protectionist 
policies of the North, the debt burden, high interest rates and 
the high cost of debt servicing were forcing the countries of 
the South to become net exporters of capital to the North. Even 
the IMF and the World Bank became net recipients of resources 
16 
from developing countries. 
14Nassau Adams, Worlds Apart, The North-South divide and the 
international system, (London: Zed Books, 1994). 
15 • 




UNCED provided a platform for the South to engage the 
industrialised countries in a debate that could provide a new 
"deal" for the South. The South seized the North's obsession 
with environmental concerns as an occasion to underscore the 
importance of the developmental dimension of the conference. The 
. 
North's concern for the protection of the environment provided 
the South wi th increased bargaining pows:::-. This was particularly 
true as no effective action could be taken without the South's 
consent and no agreement reached in the absence of the South's 
participation. With this in mind, the South went a step further 
to emphasise that, since the North had been responsible for the 
current environmental degradation brought about by their 
excessive consumption patterns and lifestyles and was therefore 
in a better position financially, they should bear the main 
responsibility for improving the global environment. 
The South was convinced that by applying 'linkage 
politics', its strategy of advancing a broader agenda on the 
North-South economic relationship could be pursued.
17 
The main 
goal was to articulate an approach to the environment consonant 
with the pursuit of economic growth. Developing countries were 
also concerned that any new international agenda should not 
place a disproportionately heavy burden on them. 
18 
The South's approach of leveraging concessions from the 
North, along with the notion that Southern problems could be 
17 
Porter and Brown (1991), op.cit., p.129. 
18Marc Williams, "Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: 
the role of the environmental agenda', Third World 
Quarterly, Vol.14, No.1, 1993, pp.7-29. 
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transported to the North if the latter/failed to transfer 
financial aid, evidently did not work. As late as the Fourth 
Prepcom, the South had thought that the North would give in to 
their demands and that there would be actual pledging and a 
commitment in terms of specified financial commitments by the 
industrialised countries at Rio. This hope went unrealised. 
Rather, the Rio outcome suggests that. the South's bargaining 
power has not increased and the North is no more ready to listen 
19 
in the 1990s than it was in the 1970s. As the negotiations 
unfolded, it became obvious that the developed countries, having 
consented to Resolut~on 44/228, no longer felt bound by its 
language or content. It appeared to many that the developed 
countries had accepted it only to draw the developing countries 
into the negotiating process. Once engaged in the process, the 
developing countries would have to continue until a compromise 
20 
was reached. 
The lIED Perspectives commented that the G 77's approach 
of using the environment as a bargaining chip to extract 
financial concessions and technical resources from the North 
represents outdated thinking that harks back to the 1970s. Aid 
flows do not have the importance attributed to them of making 
the world more sustainable. Equally important are issues such 
19 
Marc Williams, ibid. 
2°Tariq Osman Hyder, 'Looking Back to See Forward', Irving 
Mintzer & J.A.Leonard (eds.), Negotiatinq Climate Change, 
(1994), op.cit., pp.206-207. 
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as sound economic and social policies, good governance, proper 
economic incentives and effective regulatory frameworks. 21 
Grubb et al. expounded that developing countries were often 
unclear about their demands at UNCED. They made general remarks 
about the need to restructure international economic 
relationships wi thout giving detailed specifications or 
22 
providing real alternatives. Willia~ Nitze observed that 
developing countries were largely represented by professional 
diplomats accustomed to taking stereotyped positions in North-
South debates instead of people who really understood the 
potential for cost-e~fective policy and organisational and 
technological improvements in all . 23 countr1es. Developing 
countries were also said to be less appreciative of the 
constraints faced by the industrialised countries, in 
particular, that raising taxes to give money to poorer countries 
was not a vote winner in most developed countries, especially 
the more insular United States. Added to this, Roddick conferred 
that Rio revealed gaps in the South's own perception of the 
limitations and opportunities of the new environment/development 
debates, on where the debates were leading and on the likely 
differences between old World Bank conditionality and new green 
21 
lIED Perspective, No.9, 1992. 
22 
M. Grubb et al. (1993), op.cit. 
23William A.Nitze, 'A Failure of Presidential Leadership', 
Irving M. Mintzer & L .A. Lec:>nard~ (eds. ), Negotiating Climate 
Change, (UK: Cambridge Un1vars1ty. Press, 1994), p.200. 
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conditionality which could be turned to/good account. The 
South still has, therefore, much to do. As Martin Khor points 
out: 
There is much spring cleaning to be done within the 
South itself [ •.. J Power, wealth and income have to 
be redistributed in Third World countries so that the 
interests of the majority can be adequately expressed 
in new development models that emphasise the 
satisfaction of basic and human needs and that are 
25 
harmonious with the environment. 
While many in the North disapprove of the South's linkage 
strategy, it is worth considering that it is not solely based 
on the desire of the developing countries to extract concessions 
from the North. As Marc Williams contends, the approach by the 
developing countries reflects their particular economic 
circumstances. They have a genuine concern that they do not have 
to bear the costs of environmental protection at the expense of 
their development strategies, particularly when their domestic 
26 
resources are already thin. 
24 J • Roddick, Science, Technology & Development (1992), 
op.cit. 
25Martin Khor, cited in Hall and Hanson, A New Kind of 
Sharing, International Development Research Centre, 
Ottawa, 1992, p.302. 
26Marc Williams (1993), op.cit. 
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The European Union 
If the United States has been accused of mishandling its 
approach at Rio and the South's linkage politics has been 
considered as unproductive and unfair, the European Union on 
the other hand was to a certain extent able to emerge from the 
process with its links to the rest of the world reinforced and 
its influence and standing enhanced ratber than eroded. Brenton 
attributed this to the fact that the European Union, by virtue 
of its size and proximity, was by then well-adjusted and well-
attuned to completing environmental business by international 
27 
negotiation. It is also important to note that for the first 
time, the European Union was allowed to represent exclusively 
its member-countries' positions on issues falling within its 
competence. In cases of mixed competence, the European Union and 
its member-states were allowed to determine which of them would 
represent the position of the Union and its member-states. 28 
Brenton's view of the European Union is not shared by many, 
particularly the South. Strong as it appeared to be, the EU was 
not able or willing to challenge or offer an alternative to the 
leadership of the United States at Rio. Although there were 
Some indications of a willingness to contribute financially by 
Some of the member states, such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom, they were at best vague and contained no specifics, 
either in the form of ODA or through the GEF. 
27 • 
Tony Brenton, The Green1nq of Machiavelli, (London: RIIA, 
Earthscan, 1994), p.235. 
28 
See UN document: A/CONF/151/PC/128 on Status of the EEC at 
UNCED. 
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This spirit of 'cautious internationalism' may be brought 
about by the fact that within the European Union itself there 
were still differences in terms of priorities and approaches. 
The Maastricht Treaty, for example, governs environmental 
consideration by the unanimity rule among member-states. Thus, 
while environmental issues may be important to the NGOs and the 
Green movement within its member-states, these were not 
necessarily the European Union's main preoccupation. 
Environmental issues have become one more item added to the EU's 
agenda. 
The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
Much has already been said in the preceding chapter of the role 
and the impact of the NGOs in the UNCED process. In general, it 
has been suggested that their bids for legitimacy have put them 
on a collision course with the nation-state. Some argued that 
the NGOs were co-opted into becoming quasi-bureaucracies, acting 
in an advisory role on the sidelines. 
It is true that NGOs cannot dictate terms to anyone. They 
cannot tax or legislate and cannot formulate foreign assistance 
policies. Their single-issue focus and their no-compromise 
. 
position on environmental matters limit their legitimacy as 
compared to the nation-state which can accommodate a wide range 
of interests. But NGOs can however, have influence. 
Some financially powerful NGOs can wield enough economic 
clout to change governments' or other NGOs' behaviour. In the 
period between 1980 and the early 1990s, the WWF-US has 
244 
contributed some US$62.5 million to 2,OOO~projects worldwide. 
Major NGOs can command media attention (Greenpeace) and provide 
scientific knowledge through their own research which 
governments tend not to possess because of their responses to 
environmental problems which are often reactive and crisis-
driven. NGOs assets include their transnational character which 
does not constrain them by the limited notion of. national 
interests or state sovereignty. It cannot be denied that in the 
absence of pressure from NGOs, states might never move beyond 
vague declarations of intent. Government delegations found 
discussions with NGOs ~o be time-saving as more often than not, 
professional diplomats are not necessarily equipped to deal with 
urgent environmental problems. 
Yet the general impression that NGOs left at the Rio Summit 
suggested that they merely provided 'social services' but not 
'political critiques'. NGOs were not allowed access to decision-
making and they had almost no impact. While there might have 
been odds and ends in policy debates in which their thoughts 
were useful to the delegation, they failed in the effort they 
29 
set out to accomplish. 
29See Ann Hawkins, Karen Litfin in Lipschutz and Conca 
(Eds.) (1993), op.cit., and Thomas Princen (1994), op.cit. 
Sovereignty and National Interest 
Even when the future of the planet is at stake, 




interests. Sovereignty reigns 
245 
It would be incorrect to suggest that UNCED was a debate 
between the North and South. This is evident from the differing 
positions of individual countries of the North, for example, 
between the United States and the European Union over issues 
such as Climate Change and Biodiversity. Even among the European 
countries, the Nordic's approach to the developing countries' 
needs differed. On the other hand, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand (CANZ Group) maintained a common position on many issues 
while the former Soviet states, which formed the 'economies in 
transition', approached UNCED as a competitor for aid with the 
developing countries. 
The G 77, which consists of 129 countries of the South, may 
have presented a formidable force against the industrialised 
countries throughout the UNCED debate but a number of issues 
continued to divide them. The concern of the small island states 
about the impact of global warming on sea level, the opposition 
of oil-producing countries to the imposition of a carbon tax and 
the insistence of certain individual countries on developing and 
protecting their natural .. resources according to their own 
national plans, made it_difficult for the G 77 to arrive at a 
30 (1992) ,301 . t J.D. Hall & A.J.Hanson p., Op.C1 • 
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common position. As a result, UNCED produced a set of bland 
-'/' 
agreements which served the minimal interests of all 
participants. 
The difficulties of the UNCED negotiations and their meager 
resul ts have indicated that despite the urgent necessity to 
avert global environmental crises,' few countries were seriously 
prepared to transfer or relinquish tll;eir claims to national 
sovereignty or to dispose of their rights to their natural 
resources. On the contrary, UNCED demonstrated that the 
international community is made up of nation-states with widely 
differing sets of interests, mainly founded on economic factors: 
a situation which does not necessarily align all countries along 
a North-South divide. 
To some extent therefore, it would not be wrong to say that 
the so-called growing concern over the environmental problems 
is mere rhetoric. The primary objective of government 
representatives seemed to be not the resolution of global 
environmental problems but the protection of their countries' 
national interests. Governments, while recognising the need for 
cooperation, still try to maximise their own interests in the 
process. This is illustrated by the marked preference for goals 
and guidelines which are ambiguous, non-binding and 
consequently, non-committal. Governments remain extremely keen 
to maintain firm control over reporting, monitoring and 
inspection procedures. And although much is made of the 
increased openness of governments to NGO participation, 
247 
governments continue to be extremely /resistant to any 
31 
significant dilution of control. 
But to harp on this is to reveal a lack of understanding 
of what conference diplomacy is all about. According to Paul 
Taylor, the multi lateral approach to resolving problems does not 
alter the fundamental-- role of governments in world politics. 
He argued that the primary actors in world politics are.nation-
states; any attempt to suggest otherwise is completely 
erroneous. Nation-states have the option to participate in, or 
_ abstain from any decision taken in a multilateral negotiation. 
They reserve the right.to present their own views or veto any 
action which may prove detrimental to their national interests, 
prestige or honour. In fact, governments yield very little 
sovereignty when they participate in multilateral negotiations, 
and yet they consider themselves as the most important actors, 
even when acting in concert with fellow members of an 
32 
international body. 
Critics may find the above view to be very crude. But the 
truth is that although it may not be the most respectable or 
most admired view of the world, it is in fact the one in the 
light of which most governments, when they have any power to 
exercise, have acted. According to Susan Strange, governments 
. 
see the United Nations and the other international organisations 
as tools of foreign policy that are there to be used, abused or 
31 Andrew Hurell (1995), op.cit. 
32Paul Taylor, Nonstate Actors in International Politics, 
(London: westview Press, 1984), pp. 3-4. 
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ignored according to the shifting perceptions and directions of 
national foreign policy. 
33 
AN APPRAISAL OF MALAYSIA'S ROLE 
Malaysia's participation at UNCED merits attention given the 
active role it assumed throughout tpe two-and-a J:lalf-year 
process. It may be worth recalling that Malaysia was the Chair 
of the Group of 77 when the UNGA Resolution 44/228, which 
initiated the UNCED process, was drafted. It led theG 77 on the 
issues of Biodiversity and of Forests and in the final attempt 
to garner the support of developing countries to speak with one 
voice at Rio. It hosted the Kuala Lumpur Ministerial Conference 
of Developing Countries on the Environment and Development, four 
weeks before the Summit. At Rio, Malaysia held one of the 39 
vice presidents' posts. Its active role as Chair of the 
Commi ttee on Institutions made it the natural candidate for 
membership of the newly-established post-Rio Commission on 
Sustainable Development. During a secret balloting taken at an 
ECOSOC meeting in February 1993, Malaysia was elected as the 
first Chair of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 
garnering 52 out of 53 votes. 
The active, sometimes aggressive leadership role assumed 
by Malaysia on behalf of developing countries is Supported by 
the voluminous literature emerging from the Conference. Roddick 
considered that as a middle-sized trading country of the South, 
33Susan Strange, "The Poverty of Multilateral Economic 
Diplomacy' (1985), op.cit. 
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which was not only industrialising but also had substantial 
natural resources important to its export base, Malaysia had a 
real stake in finding a solution to conflicts between trade and 
the environment. During the pre-UNCED negotiations, Malaysia was 
said to be preoccupied with finding ways of using G 77 to shape 
the reaction of the South's giants and to control their 
prosperity by using national sovereignty as a stock defence. 34 
It was therefore not uncommon for Malaysia to be characterised 
during the UNCED negotiations as "a typical defender of national 
35 
sovereignty" , "sovereign-sensitive"'" and "defensi"ve,,36 by 
participants, particularly from the North and "a new fanatic of 
37 
pollution" • Malaysia was also noted for applying "linkage 
strategies" as it threatened to withhold signature of the 
Climate Change Convention if the tropical timber-exporting 
countries were stigmatised in the forestry agreement. 3B Gardner 
labeled Malaysia together with India as "troublesome" because 
they sought to assign all the blame for poverty and 
environmental degradation on the developed world while failing 
to recognise the need to alter their own self-destructive 
34J.Roddick, -Earth Summit North and South', Institute of 
Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, January, 
1995, mimeo. 
35 • 
Tony Brenton (1994), Op.C1t. 
36 
Mark Imber (1994), op.cit. 
37 • 
Alain Lipietz (1995), Op.C1t. 
38 • 
Mark Imber (1994), Op.C1t. 
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economic and environmental practices. Many/of their statements 
and proposals were seen as a philosophy of one-way sovereignty _ 
the poor countries had the right to share in the wealth and 
technology of the rich, but should not be asked to undertake any 
commitments whatsoever with respect to the management of their 
own affairs. 
39 
To the South, the above claims appear unjustifiable, given 
the fact that the North is much to be blamed for the present 
state of environmental degradation and for its refusal to bear 
the responsibility of cleaning up the mess. It has become common 
knowledge that the countries of the North, with only 20 percent 
of the world's population, are responsible for 80 percent of 
global consumption and 85 percent of the world's GNP. The onus 
of change must therefore be on them, not the poor. President 
Bush's cutting remarks at Rio that the lifestyles of the United 
States would not be up for discussion is an obvious example of 
'one-way sovereignty'. 
Equally deceptive is the North '.s insistence on promoting 
free market policies during the UNCED discussions. The World 
Bank reports that protectionist measures by industrialised 
countries actually reduce national income in the South by about 
twice the amount of official aid, and in the past decade alone, 
. 
twenty of twenty-four OECD countries have increased 
protectionism. The fact remains, according to Chomsky, that the 
rich powers are as opposed to free trade as they always have 
39 . 
R.N.Gardner (1992), op.cit., p.7. 
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been, except when they feel they can prevail in competition. 40 
According to Princen, the major powers must take the lead to 
solve serious problems that crossed national boundaries as they 
have the carrots and the sticks and they create the dependencies 
of other countries by dominating the major financial and trade 
institutions with their proportionally weighted votes. Yet, he 
argues, major powers not only are the major sources of 
environmental degradation and resource depletion worldwide, they 
do not, on the whole lead. More often than not, they are 
obstacles to change, not proponents .. , of change because the 
traditional concerns of international relations have been 
military security, trade and monetary relations. Thus, even as 
governments experience ever-increasing environmental threats, 
defenders of the status quo are not likely to take the lead in 
41 
reducing those threats. 
On the constructive side, Benedick and Carvalho noted the 
comparative speed with which Malaysia not only ratified the 
previous negotiations on the Montreal Protocol, but also 
42 
swiftly implemented CFC replacements. Brazilian negotiators 
concluded that Malaysia was willing to play the' villain I in the 
4°The argument is raised by Chomsky, cited in C.Thomas's 
'Beyond UNCED', in Enviroment Politics, Vol.2, (London: 
Frank Cass, 1993). 
41Thomas Princen, 'NGOs: creating a niche in environmental 
diplomacy', in Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger (eds.), 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics, (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 29-47. 
42 J . Roddick, mimeo (1995), op.cit. 
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43 
negotiations, as Brazil had done at Stockholm. Malaysia was 
said to have taken a particularly aggressive line in the 
negotiations on Forests and on Climate Change, one outcome being 
reflected in its refusal to sign the Climate Change Convention 
at Rio on the grounds that it failed to restrain Northern 
emissions. On Institutions, where 'Malaysia chaired the working 
group, Roddick noted that Malaysian. negotiators showed an 
uncommon willingness to work with Northern NGOs and to support 
the participation of NGOs within the post-UNCED institutional 
framework. Malaysia could support NGOs without giving up too 
many apparent hostage~ to Northern intervention. Malaysia's 
reputation highlights the importance of a publicly aggressive 
role in maintaining a position of leadership and preserving the 
44 
cohesion of the Southern camp. 
Roddick described Malaysia's aggressive positions as 
"perverse universalism": a vigorous attack on Northern 
responsibility for the environmental crisis, a demand for reform 
of Northern practice as a precondition for any international 
regulatory action affecting Southern countries, but a 
willingness to look for principles which could provide the basis 
, 45 
for international agreement. This last point is illustrated 
by Malaysia's proposal for a universal and binding commitment 
to maintain 30 percent forest cover, "the greening of the world" 
43 Porter & Brown (1991), op.cit. 
44 J.Roddick, mimeo (1995), op.cit. 
45J.Roddick, mimeo (1995), op.cit. 
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or fund forests elsewhere, to compensate ,"for a failure to 
,~ 
achieve that aim. 
Malaysia had indeed corne a long way in playing an active 
and aggressive role at UNCED, considering that its leader was 
initially reluctant to attend the Summit due to what he felt 
were preconceived notions held' by 'certain international 
environmental movements on its loggipg acti vi ties and its 
treatment of the Penan communities in Sarawak. In spite of the 
Prime Minister's comment that it was pointless to attend a 
conference when the world has already prejudged it, Malaysian 
officials continued diligently to prepare themselves for the 
Conference. The National Steering Committee, headed by the 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went to 
great lengths to formulate and shape the country's national 
position and in devising strategies to gain acceptance by as 
many countries as possible. 
Malaysia's constant interaction with the countries of the 
South, beginning with the members of ASEAN, the Group of 
Fifteen, the members of the Non-aligned Movement and the Group 
of 77, enabled it to move from a position of uncertainty, with 
little knowledge of or involvement in international 
environmental issues, to a position of strength, as it rapidly 
acquired the confidence to expound and defend its views and 
those of the South. Malaysia's close and constant collaboration 
with India and China explains its forthright approach at UNCED. 
It may,be recalled that India had been vocal and had played a 
leading role among de~eloping countries since the Stockholm 
Conference. It was India which initiated the argument that the 
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environment and development are sides of / the same coin and 
./ 
should be viewed as integral parts of each other. China on the 
other hand initiated the debate on developed countries as the 
main contributors to the present day environmental damage who 
should therefore bear the responsibility for improving the 
global environment. Verbatim records of the famous UN draft 
resolution 44/228 do not reveal Malays~a's contribution during 
the debate. Yet, by the conclusion of the Rio Summit, Malaysia 
was playing a leading role in defending many of the issues 
expounded by the South. Several factors contributed to this 
development: issues of sovereignty and national interests. 
Like most developing countries, Malaysia had not come to 
the first Prepcom fully prepared. For one thing, it was still 
uncertain of what to expect of the meeting, and rightly so the 
first Prepcom was an exploratory exercise for most participants. 
However, it was also at the first Prepcom that the issue of 
deforestation was raised. Taking the cue from the G 7 Houston 
Summit, the United States in particular was insistent that a 
forest convention should be formulated in time for UNCED, 
claiming that deforestation constituted the most serious 
environmental problem currently facing mankind. Malaysia's 
initial reaction was to see the G 7's enthusiasm as a move to 
convert national forests to global commons. This would have 
constituted an infringement of the country's sovereign right to 
exploit its forests and was therefore a question of paramount 
national interest. 
Malaysia's fear of the move towards a global, legal 
instrument on forestry was real. During the same period, the 
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European Union was under strong pressure / to act upon the 
European Parliament's resolutions to ban the import of tropical 
timber from Sarawak. Several municipal councils in the 
Netherlands and in Belgium had already imposed a ban on the use 
of Malaysian tropical timber products in the construction of 
their buildings. In Austria and in the United Kingdom, there 
were strong calls to introduce legislation on 'ecolabeling' of 
tropical timber products, implying that these products were 
extracted from unsustainably-managed forests. Being the world's 
largest producer and exporter of tropical timber, Malaysia saw 
these moves as attempts to impede its timber trade on 
environmental grounds. 
This explains its aggressive role in the forest debate. It 
was also these "unfair" allegations of its alleged deforestation 
activities that led Malaysia to propose that UNCED discuss the 
universal management of marine pollution, beginning with the 
Malacca Straits and the international management of Antarctica, 
which had been proved sufficiently to have a negative global 
environmental effect. The first proposal found opposition from 
countries which subscribed to keeping all international straits 
open and free, while the second was opposed by the members of 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP). Both 
oppositions were based on national interests. 
Malaysia's interest in championing the course of the South 
is also evident in its active participation in the debate on 
finance. South-south cooperation became an important aspect of 
Malaysia's foreign po;Licy objectives following the Prime 
Minister's announcement of the creation of the South Commission 
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in 1990 and the Summit-level Group for South-South Consultation 
and Cooperation (Group of 15) during the same year. The finance 
issue at UNCED was not entirely a matter of national interests 
for Malaysia but one in which it negotiated to promote the 
interests of the South. Compared to several developing 
countries, Malaysia was financially less dependent on the North. 
As such, it felt no restraint when criticising the North for 
their historical culpability, over-consumption and excessive 
life styles, insisting that they compensate the South 
financially. It was, in short, advocating the interests of 
countries which could not speak openly for themselves. 
This brings up another result of Malaysia's interests in 
the UNCED negotiations. UNCED provided a platform for Malaysia 
to promote its image abroad. Susskind argued that national 
leaders can increase their domestic popularity by demonstrating 
leadership on the world stage. Even a failed effort to win 
international support for a proposed global treaty-making effort 
(for example, Malaysia's proposal on the "greening of the 
world") can redound to a national leader's political benefit at 
home. In addition, participating actively at a conference 
provides the participant with the opportunity to set a precedent 
46 
or strike a deal that could be useful later on . 
. 
Since UNCED, Malaysia has participated in the UN special 
Conference on Human Rights which was held in Geneva in 1993 the . , 
Population Conference in Cairo in 1994 and the Social Summit in 
1995. Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir was asked to comment on 
46 L•E• Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p.44. 
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whether the latest round of such conferences was the latest 
example of "summit fatigue", a disease that results from 
increasingly frequent top level meetings called to discuss the 
world's ills, and whether it was worthwhile for developing 
countries to continue attending such conferences which do not 
produce any concrete results. The Prime Minister commented that 
such meetings offered world leaders an. opportunity to discuss 
problems and they were also useful as some of the statements 
made by these leaders were worthy of consideration. He further 
commented that we move from one major' conference to another, 
pronouncing with loft~ intention global action programmes, but 
we have never satisfactorily made available the means of their 
implementation. Yet, if we stuck to the belief that a summit was 
not important simply because we had moved so far ahead, become 
developed and were therefore no longer bothered about others, 
then we could lose friends. Governments he said, need friends, 
and they can never know when they might need them - that is why 
we pay attention to these conferences. 
47 
Indeed it is difficult to imagine what would have happened 
if Malaysia had not gone to Rio. No country can defend its 
interests if it is not on the battlefield. Roddick contends 
that without the South's pressure, the weak agreements would 
have been much weaker or in some cases, not existed at all. 48 
47 d Comments by Dr. Mahathir Mohama 
Malaysia, 14 March, 1995. 
in New Straits" Times, 
48 • h 1 & D 1 J. Roddick, SC1ence, Tec no Ogy eve opment (1992), 
op.cit., p.349. 
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It can also be said that Malaysia's a~tive involvement in 
the UNCED debate reflected a developing country's maturing 
foreign policy. Malaysia had benefitted from the vast experience 
in mul tilateral negotiations afforded by the numerous 
conferences and meetings conducted by the United Nations. These 
conferences provided a training ground for its officials while 
the multi-thematic and multi-secto~al aspects of these 
conferences enabled officials outside the Foreign Ministry to 
get a taste of multilateral diplomacy. The Malaysian negotiators 
had come to UNCED fully prepared. Despite facing the constraints 
of a small delegation, the negotiators were adequately briefed 
by the technical experts back home. They were also certain of 
their priorities and were well-informed of the minimum position 
they could take during negotiations. Their constant interaction 
wi th the delegations from both the North and South also enhanced 
the sophistication of their arguments. UNCED has shown that 
Malaysian negotiators can adapt and accommodate when the 
situation demands, and are capable of playing their part within 
the limits of their instructions. For the Malaysian negotiators 
at UNCED, it was definitely not a question of referring to the 
home office all the time. 
Talk is cheap, so the saying goes. But having done the 
talking, the difficult part is translating words into action. 
Malaysia was the first country to hold a national conference to 
evaluate the outcome of the Rio Summit. A two-day meeting, held 
on 7 -·8 September, 1992,was attended by the Prime Minister, 
several ministers, senior civil servants, representatives of the 
business community, the media and NGOs. The Prime Minister 
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noted that Malaysia's stand on the environment has changed so 
much in the last three years that the Government was now sitting 
49 
with NGOs - once its "worst enemies". 
At the conference, two points were consistently raised by 
the participants - overlogging 'and the pollution of water 
resources. Most participants appeared quite unprepared to 
defend logging as it was taking place in Sarawak, Sabah and to 
a certain extent, some peninsular states. Ambassador Razali 
Ismail stressed that it was in logging that Malaysia's 
credibility was at st~ke. He added that having taken a strong 
stand at UNCED, Malaysia would be the focus of attention by all 
concerned parties and, with satellite technology at their 
disposal, the critics might know much more than they about what 
50 
was happening to Malaysia's forests. 
The conference also called for an integrated approach 
between the federal government and the states and for closer 
coordination between government agencies in order to implement 
the Rio decisions. It cautioned against pressure from the North 
to impose its own definition of sustainability. As a developing 
country, Malaysia viewed sustainable development as an 
evolutionary process that would be phased in within short, 
. 
medium and long-term time frames. Sustainable development 
should also be taught at institutions of higher learning as well 
49A.Kadir Jasin, 'Always with the Environment at Heart', New 




as training institutions which should train public servants 
better to be able to face the challenges ahead. 51 
Thus, Malaysia took the first steps towards implementing 
Agenda 21. During an informal discussion with participants at 
the closing of the conference, the Prime Minister reflected that 
being vocal at the international platform on environmental 
issues has made Malaysia the focus of attention and sc~utiny of 
others and it was important that it had the resilience to deal 
wi th them. He cautioned that Malaysia should set its own 
standards on the environment which must be consistent with the 
country's need to cont~nue its development towards the obj ecti ve 
of Vision 2020 as well as its own system, values and culture. 
He stressed that it was important to maintain a balance between 




not be extremist in promoting 
THE FUTURE OF UNCED: THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (CSD) 
UNCED might well have ended at Rio had it not been for the 
creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development. The CSD 
was set up with a dual. purpose of monitoring and reviewing the 
51'Malaysia and UNCED - The Roa~ from Rio', Seminar Report 
prepared by the National Steer1ng Committee, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1993, pp.14 - 15. 
52'Informal discussion with the Prime Minister', held at the 
closing session of the National Seminar, 8 September, 1992. 
Vision 2020 refers to Malaysia's objective of becoming a 
developed country by the year 2020. 
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implementation of Agenda 21 as well as/ coordinating the 
activities of the UN Specialised Agencies on sustainable 
development. With its creation, it is now difficult to imagine 
environmental concerns disappearing completely from the agenda 
of governments are now tied into a continuing and 
institutionalised process where regular meetings and further 
negotiations will keep the UNCED issues alive. How successful 
this follow-up process is will depend largely on the 
effectiveness of this new institution in terms of fulfilling 
its mandate. 
The CSD is a meeting of government representatives, not an 
53 
executive body. It is expected to receive reports on the 
implementation of Agenda 21 by governments at national levels. 
It will also coordinate agreements such as the Climate and 
Biodiversity Conventions, Montreal Protocol and others. Beyond 
these functions, the CSD is also the forum where governments can 
keep under negotiation those aspects of the Earth Summit agenda 
on which they failed to reach full agreement at Rio, namely, 
finance, technology transfer as well as trade and consumption 
patterns. The CSD also has responsibility for updating Agenda 
54 
21 as required. 
The first meeting of the CSD was held exactly a year after 
Rio. Inter-sessional groups on finance and technology transfer 
were established as well as an Inter-Agency Committee on 
53 J .Roddick, "Second Session on the Commission on .' 





Sustainable Development that includes a group of nine UN agency 
representatives chaired by the Under-Secretary-General of a new 
Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development. 
It is difficult to see how the new Commission, which is 
bogged down in the UN bureaucracy, can monitor, much less 
coordinate and review the activities of the UN Specialised 
Agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions. It .is a well 
known fact that the Specialised Agencies have continued to pay 
far more attention to the edicts of their own governing bodies 
than to any New York-based coordinating machinery. The major 
World Bank donors hav~ been even more reluctant to allow the UN 
any kind of supervisory role in its affairs. 55 Roddick cited yet 
another area of difficulty where early efforts of the CSD to 
secure a rapprochement between UN organisations and the newly 
created World Trade Organisation (WTO) received a blow in 
November 1994 when the latter formally refused to accept a UN 
56 
status. 
Whi Ie it may appear to be too early to judge UNCED from the 
outcome of the recent sessions of the CSD, serious questions 
have been consistently raised and cannot be taken lightly. The 
commitments that were made at Rio remain at risk primarily for 
the lack of the means of implementation. Indications are that 
. 
the level of resources under the ODA has fallen, rather than 
increased, causing a genuine concern in the South that the Rio 
compact is being diluted and applied selectively. It is 
55Stanley Johnson, The Earth Summit (1993), op.cit., p.488. 
56 J. Roddick, mimeo (1995), op. ci t. 
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depressing to note the General Assembly, the Second Committee, 
ECOSOC and the CSD meetings repeating the old clashes over the 
poli tical control of environmental institutions, over the amount 
and management of transferred resources and over the meaning of 
sustainability. This could well be a factor contributing to the 
declining interest among NGOs in issues covered by the CSD. 
Even the media does not display much interest, even though Rio 
was a highly memorable media event that generated global 
57 
awareness. What is more, attending meetings which do not 
produce results poses heavy strains on developing countries' 
participants as well ~s the South's NGOs. 
The challenge for the CSD is overwhelming. With no power 
to legislate or to enforce its decisions and no desire to become 
a "watchdog", CSD's success will depend on its effectiveness 
in mobilising the political will necessary to move the Rio 
agenda forward. 58 The potential lies in the willingness of both 
the North and the South to create a genuine partnership and 
trust in addressing the wider issues of inequality and 
maldistribution of resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The general comment about the Earth Summit is that in terms of 
substance, it has not changed anything. In terms of money and 
time spent on the whole process, it was an inefficient exercise. 
The developing countries felt the pinch because, with their 
57 . ' Personal 1nterv1ew. 
58Environment, December, 1994. 
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limi ted resources and expertise, a lot of time was put aside for 
UNCED, which in the end came to very little. This is because the 
nation-state is still obsessed with the concept of sovereignty 
and national interest. The failure to make progress is due to 
the disagreement over priorities and over the relative 
importance of different social ·values which motivated the 
behaviour of governments during the lengthy negotiation. Unlike 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations such as the Kennedy or the 
Tokyo Rounds which were conducted in a milieu of liberal values, 
there was very little evidence to suggest that governments at 
UNCED were willing to yield their sovereignty for the sake of 
59 
community interests. 
This thesis has argued that, in spite of NGOs participation 
and the hype and publicity given to UNCED which attracted 
scientists, academicians, journalists and the business 
community, it remained a conference of practitioners. Although 
more than 3,000 NGOs were accredited to UNCED and over 20,000 
attended the alternative NGO event, there was not much 
interaction between them and the governments. Nor was the UN 
mechanism ready to include them physically in the process. The 
NGOs and other pressure groups may have in one way or another 
helped shaped the agenda, but the agreements that were 
. 
eventually arrived at were negotiated by the practitioners who 
were representing their governments and thus defending their 
59 In his assessment of the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds;· Winham 
accounted the success of these negotiations on the 
environment of liberal values within which the negotiations 
were conducted. Participants at these meetings placed a 
high priority on maintaining a liberal, open trading regime 
and consequently were able to achieve this end. See G.R. 
Winham (1986), op.cit. 
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national interests. Many have suggested/' that it would be 
imprudent to predict the withering away of the nation-state 
because nation-states will remain key actors, even if their 
interests, identities and power are rendered problematic by the 
60 growing importance of non-state actors. 
UNCED poses a challenge to the UN. The world organisation 
appears to have relatively little influence in determining the 
course of world politics. The repetition of discussions about 
the same issues at the General Assembly, the Second Committee, 
ECOSOC and the CSD gives the impression that the UN is too much 
of a 'talk shop' where .li ttle of practical importance gets done. 
While this may be true, diplomats at the UN in particular, would 
agree that in the UN process as a whole, the medium is often 
more important than the message. The UN system permits all 
sides to express their opinions from a position of sovereign 
equality. Major powers are forced to take into consideration the 
contrasting views of many other countries, however weak these 
other countries may be. This creates equitable dialogue, better 
understanding of the differences among their positions, thus 
plaCing them in a better position to adjust their own policies 
61 
or to reconsider their options. In the same light, A.J .R. 
Groom relates that although governments will always indulge in 
selfish and single-minded pursuit of self-interest, relations 
60A view shared by Paul Taylor (1984) op.cit., pp.3-4, Steve 
Smith (Environmental Politics,1993), Alan James.(RIS,1989), 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, (UK: Macmillan;' 1977), 
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: 
Random House, 1979), amongst others. 
61Tariq Osman Hyder (1994), op.cit., pp. 203-204. 
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have a dimension of time. While it is possible to be selfish, 
or to cheat in an isolated relationship and get away with it, 
if the relationship continues, these would incur costs which may 
in the long run far outweigh short-term advantage. And since few 
actors are comfortably self-sufficient, all governments will 
rely to a certain extent on services best provided by the 
62 
international community in some form. • 
Moreover, mul tilateralism is not the only way out to 
solving the ecological problems. Rio has shown that one must 
not delegate the solution of global j' social and . ecological 
problems to internati?nal diplomacy alone. There is already a 
considerable intermix, a veritable web of bilateral, regional 
and multilateral relationships among countries. 
This thesis demonstrated that Malaysia assumed an active 
role at UNCED and was a dominant 'veto' power in many issues 
which affected its national resources and sovereignty. It 
showed that it had come into the international arena prepared, 
given the preparation it did at home and the support it received 
through galvanising the position of the South. At UNCED, 
Malaysia strove to influence events at the multilateral level 
in defence of its economic and national interests as well as in 
promoting an image abroad. This last point is important as it 
. 
reflects a quest for identity, without which there is likely to 
63 
be no notion of self or no self-respect. Given its drawbacks, 
the Malaysian Prime Minister admitted that the UN may be 
U A. J •R• Groom (1989), op.cit., p.289. 
63A•J •R. Groom (1978), op.cit. 
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cumbersome and some members can be unreasonable. But it is the 
only true representative body of countries in the world; it can 
be improved but it cannot be bypassed[ •.. ] And when all is said 
and done, we still have to admit that the United Nations is the 
only truly multilateral organisation where the voices of small 
64 
countries can be heard. There' is after all no pure and 
effective multilateralism. 
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Appendix 
FOREST COVER AS A PERCENTAGE OF lAND AREA 
World 27.6 
Africa 23.6 
North America 25 
Central America 27.4 
South America 48.6 
Southeast Asia 52.6 
South Asia 15.9 
Rest of Asia 10.9 
Oceania 17.9 
USSR 35.5 
Nordic countries 54.8 
Europe 32.1 
Malaysia 
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Source: See Appendix 
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. Appendix: Forest Cover in Cowitries of the World 
Continenti Total Total Percentage 
country land for~ted forest 
area area cover 
('OOOkm1) ('OOOkm1) (%) 
AFRICA 
Algeria 2,382 18 0.8 
Angola 1,247 536 43.0 
Benin 111 39 35.1 
Botswana 567 326 57.5 
Burkina Faso 274 47 17.2 
Burundi 26 0 0.0 
Cameroon 469 233 49.7 
Central Africa Republic . 623 359 57.6 
Chad 1,259 135 10.7 
Congo 342 213 62.3 
Cote d'Ivoire 318 98 30.8 
Egypt 995 0 0.0 
Ethiopia 1,101 272 24.7· 
Gabon 258 206 79.8 
Gambia 10 2 20.0 
Ghana 230 87 37.8 
Guinea 246 107 43.5 
Kenya 569 24 4.2 
Lesotho 30 0 0.0 
Liberia 96 20 20.8 
Libya 1,760 2 0.1 
Madagascar 5~2 132 22.7 
Malawi 94 43 45.7 
Mali 1,220 73 6.0 
Mauritania 1,030 6 0.6 
Morocco 446 36 8.0 
Mozambique 784 154 19.6 
Namibia 823 184 22.4 
Niger 1,267 26 2.1 
Nigeria 911 148 16.2 
Rwanda 25 10 ·40.0,. 
Senegal 192 11 5.7 
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'Continentl Total Total Percentage 
country land forested forest 
area area cover 
('OOOkm1) ('OOOkml) (%) 
Sierra Leone 72 21 29.2 
Somalia 627 91 14.5 
South Africa 1,221 14 1.1 
Sudan 2,376 477 20.1 
Tanzania 886 420 47.4 
. Togo 54 17 31.5 
Tunisia 155 3 1.9 
Uganda 200 60 30.0 
Zaire 2,268 1,776 78.3 
Zambia 741 295 39.8 
Zimbabwe 387 198 51.2 
AMERICA 
Argentina 2,737 451 16.5 
Bolivia 1,084 564 52.0 
Brazil 8,457 5,145 60.8 
Canada 9,221 2,641 28.6 
Chile 749 84 11.2 
Colombia 1,039 517 49.8 
Costa Rica 51 18 35.3 
Dominican Republic 48 6 12.5 
Ecuador 277 147 53.1 
El Salvador 21 1 4.8 
Falkland Islands 12 0 0.0 
Guatemala 108 45 41.7 
Guyana 215 178 83.0 
Haiti 28 0 0.0 
Honduras 112 40 35.7 
Mexico 1,923 484 25.2 
Nicaragua 119 45 ., 37.8 
Panama 76 42. 55.3 
Paraguay 397 197 49.6 
Peru 1,280 706 55.2 
Suriname 162 157 97.0 




Continenti Total Total Percentage 
country land forested forest 
area area cover 
('OOOkml ) ('OOOkml ) (%) 
Uruguay 174 6 3.6 
USA 9,167 1,953 21.3 
Venezuela 882 339 38.4 
ASIA 
Afghanistan 648 12 1.9 
Bangladesh 134 25 18.7 
Bhutan 47 21 44.7 
Burma 658 314 47.7 
China 9,326 1,150 12.3 
Democratic Korea 121 91 75.0 
Democratic Yemen 290 15 5.0 
India 2,978 640 21.5 
Indonesia 1,812 1,170 64.6 
Iran 1,636 38 2.3 
Iraq 434 12 2.8 
Israel 20 1 5.0 
Japan 376 253 67.3 
Jordan 97 1 0.7 
Kampuchea 177 126 71.2 
Korea 98 49 50.0 
Kuwait 18 0 0.0 
Laos 231 136 58.9 
Lebanon 10 0 .4.0 
Malaysia 329 185 56.2 
Mongolia 1,565 95 6.1 
Nepal 137 -21 15.3 
Oman 212 0 0.0 
Pakistan 771 25 3.2 
Philippines 298 95 31.9 
Qatar 11 0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 2,150 2 0.1 
Sri Lanka 65 17 26.2 
.... 
Syria 184 2 1.0 .' 
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Continenti Total Total Percentage 
country land forested forest 
area area cover 
('OOOkm2) ('OOOkm2) (%) 
Thailand 512 157 30.7 
Turkey 771 202 26.2 
UAE 84 0 0.0 
Vietnam 325 101 31.1 . 
Yemen 195 0 0.0 
EUROPE 
Albania 27 ····9 34.4 
Austria 83 38 45.2 
·Belgium 33 6 18.2 
Bulgaria 111 34 30.6 
Czechoslovakia 125 44 35.4 
Denmark 42 5 11.2 
Finland 305 230 75.4 
France 546 139 25.4 
Germany 350 97 27.7 
Greece 131 25 19.2 
Hungary 92 16 17.5 
Iceland 100 0 0.0 
Ireland 69 4 5.1 
Italy 294 64 21.6 
Netherlands 34 3 8.5 
Norway 308 80 26.0 
Poland 305 86 28.2 
portugal 92 26 28.6 
Romania 230 62 26.9 
. Spain 499 ·160 32.1 
Sweden 412 270 65.5 
Switzerland 40 9 . 23.5 
United Kingdom 242 20 8.3 
USSR 22,272 7,916 35.5 
Yugoslavia 255 91 35.7 
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Continenti Total Total Percentage 
country land forested forest 
area area cover 
('OOOkm1) ('OOOkm1) (%) 
OCEANIA 
Australia' 7,618 1,070 14.0 
New Zealand 269 71 26.2 
Papua New Guinea 452 350 78.8 
DATA SOURCES: 
Land areas for all countries are taken from UNEJ:>, 1989: Environmental Data Report 1989/ 
90. Blackwell Ltd, UK. The list is not comprehensive. Small countries are excluded. Forest 
areas in temperate and boreal countries, except for the Nordic countries, are from Allan, T 
andJ P Lanly, 1990: 'Global Overview Status and Trends of World's Forests', FAO, Rome; 
these do not include wooded lands. Greenland is excluded. Forest areas in remaining 
countries are from World Bank, 1991: World Development Report. Oxford University 
Press, and refer to total forest cover. 
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